First, though Wilson initially denied his wife was involved in getting the assignment, of course she was. Also note the very unbiased description of the assignment she gave to him <snark>. (Emphasis is all mine).
Some CPD officials could not recall how the office decided to contact the former ambassador, however, interviews and documents provided to the Committee indicate that his wife, a CPD employee, suggested his name for the trip. The CPD reports officer told Committee staff that the former ambassador's wife "offered up his name" and a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of the CPD on February 12, 2002, from the former ambassador's wife says, "my husband has good relations with both the PM [prime minister] and the former Minister of Mines (not to mention lots of French contacts), both of whom could possibly shed light on this sort of activity." This was just one day before CPD sent a cable DELETED requesting concurrence with CPD's idea to send the former ambassador to Niger and requesting any additional information from the foreign government service on their uranium reports. The former ambassador's wife told Committee staff that when CPD decided it would like to send the former ambassador to Niger, she approached her husband on behalf of the CIA and told him "there's this crazy report" on a purported deal for Niger to sell uranium to Iraq.
<snip>) On February 18, 2002, the embassy in Niger disseminated a cable which reported that the alleged Iraq-Niger uranium deal "provides sufficient detail to warrant another hard look at Niger's uranium sales. The names of GON [government of Niger] officials cited in the report track closely with those we know to be in those, or closely-related positions. However, the purported 4,000-ton annual production listed is fully 1,000 tons more than the mining companies claim to have produced in 2001." The report indicated that the ambassador had met with the Nigerien Foreign Minister to ask for an unequivocal assurance that Niger had stuck to its commitment not to sell uranium to rogue states. The cable also noted that in September 2001 the Nigerien Prime Minister had told embassy personnel that there were buyers like Iraq who would pay more for Niger's uranium than France, but the Prime Minister added, "of course Niger cannot sell to them." The cable concluded that despite previous assurances from Nigerien officials that no uranium would be sold to rogue nations, "we should not dismiss out of hand the possibility that some scheme could be, or has been, underway to supply Iraq with yellowcake from here." *The cable also suggested raising the issue with the French, who control the uranium mines in Niger, despite France's solid assurances that no uranium could be diverted to rogue states. <snip> Mayaki said that if there had been any such contract during his tenure, he would have been aware of it. Mayaki said, however, that in June 1999,( ) businessman, approached him and insisted that Mayaki meet with an Iraqi delegation to discuss "expanding commercial relations" between Niger and Iraq. The intelligence report said that *Mayaki interpreted "expanding commercial relations" to mean that the delegation wanted to discuss uranium yellowcake sales. The intelligence report also said that "although the meeting took place, Mayaki let the matter drop due to the UN sanctions on Iraq.",,,,,,,,
<snip>
Mayaki said that if there had been any such contract during his tenure, he would have been aware of it. Mayaki said, however, that in June 1999,( ) businessman, approached him and insisted that Mayaki meet with an Iraqi delegation to discuss "expanding commercial relations" between Niger and Iraq. The intelligence report said that *Mayaki interpreted "expanding commercial relations" to mean that the delegation wanted to discuss uranium yellowcake sales. The intelligence report also said that "although the meeting took place, Mayaki let the matter drop due to the UN sanctions on Iraq.",,,,,,,,
The former ambassador also told Committee staff that he was the source of a Washington Post article ("CIA Did Not Share Doubt on Iraq Data; Bush Used Report of Uranium Bid," June 12, 2003) which said, "among the Envoy's conclusions was that the documents may have been forged because `the dates were wrong and the names were wrong." Committee staff asked how the former ambassador could have come to the conclusion that the "dates were wrong and the names were wrong" when he had never seen the CIA reports and had no knowledge of what names and dates were in the reports. The former ambassador said that he may have "misspoken" to the reporter when he said he concluded the documents were "forged." He also said he may have become confused about his own recollection after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in March 2003 that the names and dates on the documents were not correct and may have thought he had seen the names himself.
The possible grades are unsatisfactory, satisfactory, good, excellent, and outstanding, which, according to the Deputy Chief of CPD, are very subjective. SENTENCE DELETED The reports officer said that a "good" grade was merited because the information responded to at least some of the outstanding questions in the Intelligence Community, but did not provide substantial new information. He said he judged that the most important fact in the report was that the Nigerien officials admitted that the Iraqi delegation had traveled there in 1999, and that the Nigerien Prime Minister believed the Iraqis were interested in purchasing uranium, because this provided some confirmation of foreign government service reporting. <snip> They did not find Nigerien denials that they had discussed uranium sales with Iraq as very surprising because they had no expectation that Niger would admit to such an agreement if it did exist. The analysts did, however, find it interesting that the former Nigerien Prime Minister said an Iraqi delegation had visited Niger for what he believed was to discuss uranium sales.
They did not find Nigerien denials that they had discussed uranium sales with Iraq as very surprising because they had no expectation that Niger would admit to such an agreement if it did exist. The analysts did, however, find it interesting that the former Nigerien Prime Minister said an Iraqi delegation had visited Niger for what he believed was to discuss uranium sales.
(2) But the trip was decided upon in that meeting - and nothing in the text justifies your claim that Plame gave the assignment, nor is her memo more than a statement of his bona fides. In fact, the firt half of the last sentence in your quote, the half you failed to bold, tells just that. You are repeating right-wing spin without having checked opposing claims - including Wilson's own, or these newspaper articles:
[Newsday 22 July 2003] A senior intelligence officer confirmed that Plame was a Directorate of Operations undercover officer who worked `alongside' the operations officers who asked her husband to travel to Niger. "But he said she did not recommend her husband to undertake the Niger assignment. `They (the officers who did ask Wilson to check the uranium story) were aware of who she was married to, which is not surprising,' he said. `There are people elsewhere in government who are trying to make her look like she was the one who was cooking this up, for some reason,' he said. `I can't figure out what it could be.'
"But he said she did not recommend her husband to undertake the Niger assignment. `They (the officers who did ask Wilson to check the uranium story) were aware of who she was married to, which is not surprising,' he said. `There are people elsewhere in government who are trying to make her look like she was the one who was cooking this up, for some reason,' he said. `I can't figure out what it could be.'
[CNN] 'She did not propose me', he [Wilson] said--others at the CIA did so. A senior CIA official said that is his understanding too.'
(3) A general point: all you bring is about how the possibility that Iraq may be willing to buy yellowcake could be maintained. This is what I call paranoid logic: you have a theory, and make up additional theories on how it could still be true with new evidence; instead of testing multiple theories with new evidence. The question is, who practised paranoid logic: the "intelligence community", or the political leadership, which only listened to those experts supporting their side. I'm inclined to believe the latter, and this is done in a bipartisan way - after all, WMD lies didn't start with the Bush government, one has but to think only of Desert Fox. At any rate, these points made by the CIA later that year imply that the intel community was less to blame:
(1) The evidence is weak. One of the two mines cited by the source as the location of the uranium oxide is flooded. The other mine cited by the source is under the control of the French authorities... (3) we have shared points one and two with Congress, telling them that the Africa story is overblown and telling them this is one of the two issues where we differed with the British.
(4) The original intel reports Wilson was sent to investigate concerned an Iraqi delegation visit in February 1999. That these discussed purchase of uranium were clearly debunked - also by what Makiya said. (And also by what other officials said - for example, one Mai Manga admitted to Wilson that Iran has sought yellowcake, but said that Iraq hasn't.)
(5) The claim that the Iraq delegation in the summer of 1999 wanted to purchase uranium isn't just merely former PM Makiya's speculation - the Senate Whitewash Report (and/or its source) grossly mis-interprets the passage, no delegation actually visited. It was merely a future visit a businessman suggested. Your claim that the bottom line of Wilson's report was the opposite of what he claimed is wildly overblown to say the least.
(6) Furthermore, there is that weasel line: did not provide substantial new information. Which only means: it confirmed earlier information.
(7) And indeed it did. You, copying right-wing spin and the MSM, also grossly misrepresent Wilson's original claim - which was not about Iraq seeking yellowcake, but actually purchasing it:
[New York Times op-ed] I spent the next eight days drinking sweet mint tea and meeting with dozens of people: current government officials, former government officials, people associated with the country's uranium business. It did not take long to conclude that it was highly doubtful that any such transaction had ever taken place. Given the structure of the consortiums that operated the mines, it would be exceedingly difficult for Niger to transfer uranium to Iraq. Niger's uranium business consists of two mines, Somair and Cominak, which are run by French, Spanish, Japanese, German and Nigerian interests. If the government wanted to remove uranium from a mine, it would have to notify the consortium, which in turn is strictly monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Moreover, because the two mines are closely regulated, quasi-governmental entities, selling uranium would require the approval of the minister of mines, the prime minister and probably the president. In short, there's simply too much oversight over too small an industry for a sale to have transpired.
Given the structure of the consortiums that operated the mines, it would be exceedingly difficult for Niger to transfer uranium to Iraq. Niger's uranium business consists of two mines, Somair and Cominak, which are run by French, Spanish, Japanese, German and Nigerian interests. If the government wanted to remove uranium from a mine, it would have to notify the consortium, which in turn is strictly monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Moreover, because the two mines are closely regulated, quasi-governmental entities, selling uranium would require the approval of the minister of mines, the prime minister and probably the president. In short, there's simply too much oversight over too small an industry for a sale to have transpired.
[Meet the Press] I assumed that they were talking about one of the other countries and not Niger since we had, I believed, at the time effectively debunked the Niger arms uranium sale.
(8) Notice that "we" in the last quote. The part you Wilson-haters always forget that Wilson wasn't the only one who made a trip and concluded that the yellowcake is safe. Admiral Fulford, dispatched to warn the Nigerians about al-Qaida seeking Uranium, reached the same conclusion. Suggested reading is this TNR article, which also points out that Fulford didn't heard about the Iraq link, even tough by his position he should have if it was important.
Your only point that remains is Wilson's messing up on the forgeries, which frankly I don't see as serious an error as you. We don't actually know Wilson's actual words - this was in an article that was only yet anonymously paraphrasing Wilson. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
I have also made the same calendar notes on the "no growth" scenario vs. one I presented which was strong growth. I'm happy just to bet my money and my choice of jobs on the way I think, and,,,we'll just see.
