Never going to happen, willingly.
Eventually, the affect of rising oil prices will force a switch from mono-cropping to diversification but the transition will be long and painful.
Unfortunately, the above is untrue.
First, if some Africans can sell more food to Europe and the USA, that will make only them richer - other Africans will still hunger. The present famine in Niger (yes, that Niger - the yellowcake-producing Niger; Americans would do good to care more about this famine than the Plame case) was not caused by insufficient crop returns, but newly 'liberalised' prices (at Western demand) that made even locally produced food too expensive to buy for many.
Second, while trade in food between Europe and Africa and the poorer part of Latin America is not liberalised, it is still on-going by way of special quotas. (The USA used to attack the EU banana quotas at the WTO.) Who would benefit from trade liberalisation? Not the poorest: the poorest would be out-competed by industrialised agriculture in countries like Brazil and Argentine (or more precisely, by large landowners in those countries who run industrialised agriculture).
Unfortunately, saving the Third World by fair trade is another neoliberal mirage. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
It ignores the increasing transportation costs, input costs of food production, and time to market.
The assumption the economy is linear is incorrect.
The prediction X follows Y in the current economic climate (Technically, Fitness Landscape) necessarily limits future economic activity to X always following Y is incorrect.
I agree the neoliberal - I assume DoDo is refering to Neo-Classical economic theory - position that "Free Trade" is a panacea is incorrect.
And please see my response to Colman, below.
Unfortunately, the evidence is not particularly persuasive. Even the World Bank estimates that removing rich countries' barriers to developing country exports would generate only very small income gains for the latter. When fully removed by 2015, developing countries as a group might experience a gross domestic product increase of 0.6 per cent. Almost all the gains would be concentrated in fewer than a dozen developing countries, and many would actually lose from rich country trade liberalisation in key sectors. The ending of the multi-fibre agreement early this year, for example, has hurt textile exporters across the developing world as super-efficient producers in China gobble up the market. Moreover, the removal of producer or export subsidies in the west hurts countries that consume large quantities of the subsidised exports. Removing developing countries' own trade barriers may indeed help their exports. But the estimates of large income gains come from trade models that audaciously omit some significant costs and exaggerate the net gains. One such cost is the loss of tariff revenue, which often amounts to 10-20 per cent of government revenue. The revenue has to be made up by alternative taxes (such as sales or income tax), which have their own "distortionary" impact. Another cost omitted by the trade models is the handicap that lack of protection imposes on an infant industry sector. If the theory of comparative advantage worked, people and capital "released" from existing businesses would be re-employed in other, more "efficient" activities. But the theory assumes full employment, and therefore no significant transition costs. It simply assumes the problem away.
Moreover, the removal of producer or export subsidies in the west hurts countries that consume large quantities of the subsidised exports. Removing developing countries' own trade barriers may indeed help their exports. But the estimates of large income gains come from trade models that audaciously omit some significant costs and exaggerate the net gains. One such cost is the loss of tariff revenue, which often amounts to 10-20 per cent of government revenue. The revenue has to be made up by alternative taxes (such as sales or income tax), which have their own "distortionary" impact. Another cost omitted by the trade models is the handicap that lack of protection imposes on an infant industry sector. If the theory of comparative advantage worked, people and capital "released" from existing businesses would be re-employed in other, more "efficient" activities. But the theory assumes full employment, and therefore no significant transition costs. It simply assumes the problem away.
First, to make it REAL obvious: I accept the statement "Free Trade is not a panacea."
Speaking directly to Colman's post:
Not having access to the model I am unable to critique directly. In general, one may say, if the economic model is static, Simple - as opposed to Complex, uses non-iterative variable value assignment, or disallows schema adjustment of the modeled economic actors (agents) the analysis is - to be kind - not very reliable.
Published reports are indicating the World Bank has started to turn away from, what may be deemed, the 'Simplisitic Top-Down' approach. This may indicate the model does not suffer from the above flaws. Again, without the model, it is impossible to determine.
The sentence, "The ending of the multi-fibre agreement early this year, for example, has hurt textile exporters across the developing world as super-efficient producers in China gobble up the market." is a superb example of:
X now follows Y Therefore, X will always follow Y
a fallacy in Applied Temporal Logic. This fallacy could have been committed in the World Bank report or by the journalist. Shrug
Also, "hurt" WHO? "hurt" HOW? and by what measure - GDP? Caloric intake per person? Dollar/Euro per Thug? Access to cash (internal/external) market? International Corporations scooping-up raw resources on the cheap? (if so then ... ha, ha, ha pfffft.)
