Here's an opinion piece from the FT a couple of days ago about the Indian deal:
The key to Iran's nuclear aspirations The Bush administration's decision to ease restrictions on the transfer of civilian nuclear technology to India is long overdue. It will help India keep pace with the burgeoning energy demands that threaten its economic and political stability. It will reinforce Indian economic and strategic ties to the west. Above all, by acknowledging belatedly that India is a nuclear weapons state, the White House has updated and strengthened a global non-proliferation regime in which India will now have an increased stake. Until now, the US failure to treat India as a nuclear weapons power has led to ridiculous results. Washington has permitted the sale of civilian nuclear reactors to China, which signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but violated Article One by giving nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan and Iran. At the same time, it has barred such sales to India, which did not sign the NPT but has never been accused of transferring nuclear secrets to others. The US has attempted to justify this absurdity with legalistic hair-splitting. Because China conducted a successful nuclear test in 1964, it was classified as a "nuclear weapons state" under the NPT when the treaty took effect in 1970. That made Beijing eligible to obtain US civilian nuclear technology when the US Congress passed a law in 1978 restricting such access to NPT signatories. To take advantage of this legislation, China signed the NPT in 1992. India refused to sign from the outset, branding the treaty as inherently discriminatory, but later became a nuclear weapons state in 1998. The crux of the case for the Bush administration's bold departure is that the NPT itself does not bar signatories from providing civilian nuclear technology to non-signatories such as India. What complicates the present situation is that the 1978 Non-Proliferation Act went far beyond the NPT, barring non-signatories from receiving US civilian nuclear technology. Washington also led the way in creating the Nuclear Suppliers Group to back up the US position. To serve today's economic and geo-political priorities, the application of the 1978 law and the policies of the Nuclear Suppliers Group should be adjusted with respect to India. There would be no direct impact on the non-proliferation regime, because India has a tight export control system and an impeccable record of safeguarding its nuclear secrets. The economic importance of nuclear power in resolving India's energy crisis is steadily growing. With slightly more than 1bn people at present, India's population is projected to grow to 1.2bn by 2011, with electricity demand expected to increase at an annual rate of nearly 7 per cent. New Delhi hopes to attract $50bn (£28bn) of foreign investment in civilian reactors and is ready to place all civilian reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. But the 1978 US law blocks imports of all nuclear technology unless India agrees to "full-scope" safeguards, placing military as well as civilian reactors under IAEA inspection, which it is not prepared to do. Until the law is changed, the most urgent priority in Indo-US nuclear co-operation is avoiding another Chernobyl. The Tarapur reactor in Mumbai, with a "safe" life of 25 years, is 43 years old, and an accident was narrowly averted at a Madras reactor in the recent tsunami disaster. Critics of the Bush decision warn that Pakistan, North Korea and Iran will now demand the same treatment as India. Unlike India, however, neither Pakistan nor North Korea has observed non-proliferation norms and neither could expect such demands to be taken seriously. Islamabad became a nuclear Wal-Mart under the aegis of A.Q. Khan, and Pyongyang has sold missile delivery systems for nuclear weapons to all comers. Iran, however, is a more complex case and poses a growing threat to the non-proliferation regime, as its defiant posture in current negotiations with the European Union makes clear. Unlike India, though, Tehran is an NPT signatory and is entitled under Article Four to pursue peaceful nuclear development, albeit under "full-scope" safeguards. Unlike India, it is free even now to import nuclear technology. But with its petroleum riches, Tehran does not need nuclear energy for economic reasons as much as India does, and its nuclear intentions have not been seriously tested. Threatening to break the IAEA seals yesterday on its Isfahan nuclear conversion facility was only a tactical gambit in the EU negotiations, as converting uranium ore to uranium hexafluoride is a step short of actual uranium enrichment, which is to remain suspended, as the EU has demanded. Iran might yet agree to the kind of deal being pursued by Britain, France and Germany if the US would join in providing meaningful economic incentives and, above all, security guarantees addressing Tehran's anxieties over the ring of US bases near its borders, not to mention US nuclear weapons capabilities. The central problem facing the global non-proliferation regime has nothing to do with civilian nuclear power in India. It lies in the failure of the original nuclear powers that signed the NPT to live up to Article Six, in which they pledged to phase out their own nuclear weapons. Until global nuclear arms reductions are once again seriously pursued, would-be nuclear powers will feel entitled to join the nuclear club, just as India did seven years ago. The writer, director of the Asia programme at the Center for International Policy, is a former Washington Post bureau chief in New Delhi and author of India: The Most Dangerous Decades
The Bush administration's decision to ease restrictions on the transfer of civilian nuclear technology to India is long overdue. It will help India keep pace with the burgeoning energy demands that threaten its economic and political stability. It will reinforce Indian economic and strategic ties to the west. Above all, by acknowledging belatedly that India is a nuclear weapons state, the White House has updated and strengthened a global non-proliferation regime in which India will now have an increased stake.
Until now, the US failure to treat India as a nuclear weapons power has led to ridiculous results. Washington has permitted the sale of civilian nuclear reactors to China, which signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but violated Article One by giving nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan and Iran. At the same time, it has barred such sales to India, which did not sign the NPT but has never been accused of transferring nuclear secrets to others.
The US has attempted to justify this absurdity with legalistic hair-splitting. Because China conducted a successful nuclear test in 1964, it was classified as a "nuclear weapons state" under the NPT when the treaty took effect in 1970. That made Beijing eligible to obtain US civilian nuclear technology when the US Congress passed a law in 1978 restricting such access to NPT signatories. To take advantage of this legislation, China signed the NPT in 1992. India refused to sign from the outset, branding the treaty as inherently discriminatory, but later became a nuclear weapons state in 1998.
The crux of the case for the Bush administration's bold departure is that the NPT itself does not bar signatories from providing civilian nuclear technology to non-signatories such as India. What complicates the present situation is that the 1978 Non-Proliferation Act went far beyond the NPT, barring non-signatories from receiving US civilian nuclear technology. Washington also led the way in creating the Nuclear Suppliers Group to back up the US position.
To serve today's economic and geo-political priorities, the application of the 1978 law and the policies of the Nuclear Suppliers Group should be adjusted with respect to India. There would be no direct impact on the non-proliferation regime, because India has a tight export control system and an impeccable record of safeguarding its nuclear secrets.
The economic importance of nuclear power in resolving India's energy crisis is steadily growing. With slightly more than 1bn people at present, India's population is projected to grow to 1.2bn by 2011, with electricity demand expected to increase at an annual rate of nearly 7 per cent.
New Delhi hopes to attract $50bn (£28bn) of foreign investment in civilian reactors and is ready to place all civilian reactors under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. But the 1978 US law blocks imports of all nuclear technology unless India agrees to "full-scope" safeguards, placing military as well as civilian reactors under IAEA inspection, which it is not prepared to do. Until the law is changed, the most urgent priority in Indo-US nuclear co-operation is avoiding another Chernobyl. The Tarapur reactor in Mumbai, with a "safe" life of 25 years, is 43 years old, and an accident was narrowly averted at a Madras reactor in the recent tsunami disaster.
Critics of the Bush decision warn that Pakistan, North Korea and Iran will now demand the same treatment as India. Unlike India, however, neither Pakistan nor North Korea has observed non-proliferation norms and neither could expect such demands to be taken seriously. Islamabad became a nuclear Wal-Mart under the aegis of A.Q. Khan, and Pyongyang has sold missile delivery systems for nuclear weapons to all comers.
Iran, however, is a more complex case and poses a growing threat to the non-proliferation regime, as its defiant posture in current negotiations with the European Union makes clear. Unlike India, though, Tehran is an NPT signatory and is entitled under Article Four to pursue peaceful nuclear development, albeit under "full-scope" safeguards. Unlike India, it is free even now to import nuclear technology. But with its petroleum riches, Tehran does not need nuclear energy for economic reasons as much as India does, and its nuclear intentions have not been seriously tested. Threatening to break the IAEA seals yesterday on its Isfahan nuclear conversion facility was only a tactical gambit in the EU negotiations, as converting uranium ore to uranium hexafluoride is a step short of actual uranium enrichment, which is to remain suspended, as the EU has demanded. Iran might yet agree to the kind of deal being pursued by Britain, France and Germany if the US would join in providing meaningful economic incentives and, above all, security guarantees addressing Tehran's anxieties over the ring of US bases near its borders, not to mention US nuclear weapons capabilities.
The central problem facing the global non-proliferation regime has nothing to do with civilian nuclear power in India. It lies in the failure of the original nuclear powers that signed the NPT to live up to Article Six, in which they pledged to phase out their own nuclear weapons. Until global nuclear arms reductions are once again seriously pursued, would-be nuclear powers will feel entitled to join the nuclear club, just as India did seven years ago.
The writer, director of the Asia programme at the Center for International Policy, is a former Washington Post bureau chief in New Delhi and author of India: The Most Dangerous Decades
At least the article concludes on the right note... In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
