In the Ivory Coast, French-led UN troops (UNOCI) do this time what they refused to do in Bosnia (with the exception of an odd general, later dismissed) or Rwanda: prevent the breakout of another civil war. Or did they? The 'offensive' against the rebel North that included the bombing of a UN base, killing nine French blue helmets, had all the hallmarks of a conscious provocation - I can't imagine Ivory Coast President Laurent Gbago wouldn't have had foreseen, and hence that he didn't calculate with French retaliation, especially considering what followed - the French leaders should have guessed that what will follow will be the instigation of anti-French riots, even if those were not only based on actual French military [both UN and other, already stationed there, with the excuse of the defense of 15,000 French expats] actions but false rumours too. The diplomatic intervention of the African Union (with Mbeki from South Africa) cooled down things a little, but this time the rebels refused peace talks, saying nothing will go with Gbago - which led to an UN SC decision on arms sanctions and a promise of travel bans on both sides earlier this week. So UN troops seem likely to be poised to keep apart the two sides under ever stronger rather than abating tensions. That is, they might fail. ...I don't see the story as evil colonial power vs. rightful leader trying to regain control of his country, and see Gbago as the main problem, despite significant French industrial interests there. Why? Here is my understanding of the background on the Ivory Coast conflict: Like most West African countries, the Ivory Coast has a North-South Muslim-Christian divide, and ethnic divisions that have cross-border complications. Led by the same party from independence, the country was stable until the middle of the nineties, as exemplified by having a Southern President (Henri Konan Bédié) and a Northern PM (Alassane Dramane Ouattara). But the former started to play on divisions to push out power rivals. In December 1999, there was a military coup by general Robert Gueï, a Southerner, who promised new elections. He broke his promise to not enter the race himself. His most popular opponent was Ouattara, so Gueï also attempted to capitalise on divisions, all of them, barring Ouattara from the contest because he was allegedly born in a neighbouring country. (He in fact held a Burkina Faso passport when he was dissident some years earlier.) Also disqualified was Emile Bombet, candidate of the pre-coup ruling party, and a dozen other candidates, including all from the North - but Laurent Gbago, Southern candidate of the third largest party, and three more also-runs remained on the ballot. This led to widespread boycotts of the October 2000 Presidential elections. And here is the root of the current problems: Gueï lost these sham elections to Gbago. When Gueï saw he is losing, he halted the count by sending the military against vote-counting officials, and declared himself winner. But Gbago's followers staged a successful revolution - and Gbago, then with the foolish support of the French government, declared himself President - only to have the followers of the barred candidates against him. Subsequently, Gbago used the same divisive tactics Gueï did (whom he gave immunity in return for Gueï's appeal to the Army to accept Gbago), also barring Ouattara and others again in Parliamentary elections December 2000 - January 2001. They lasted so long because of repeats, which failed to 'ride out' the almost total Northern boycotts (while boycotts by other parties meant low turnout in the South too). Conflict ensued, breaking into a civil war in September 2002 after a mutiny and failed coup, ended by French/UN intervention (which saved Gbago: he was poised to lose militarily at this time) and a French-brokered peace agreement in January 2003. The peace agreement prescribed a unified transitional government, the deployment of UNOCI in the summer of 2003 and new elections timetabled for 2005. But Gbago didn't rest, for example after dispersing a peaceful street rally of Ouattara's followers in March 2004, police and militias staged night raids on organisers - killing about 120. This led to a four-month boycott of the nominally joint transitional government by the Northern rebels, ended at EU pressure.
The 'offensive' against the rebel North that included the bombing of a UN base, killing nine French blue helmets, had all the hallmarks of a conscious provocation - I can't imagine Ivory Coast President Laurent Gbago wouldn't have had foreseen, and hence that he didn't calculate with French retaliation, especially considering what followed - the French leaders should have guessed that what will follow will be the instigation of anti-French riots, even if those were not only based on actual French military [both UN and other, already stationed there, with the excuse of the defense of 15,000 French expats] actions but false rumours too.
The diplomatic intervention of the African Union (with Mbeki from South Africa) cooled down things a little, but this time the rebels refused peace talks, saying nothing will go with Gbago - which led to an UN SC decision on arms sanctions and a promise of travel bans on both sides earlier this week. So UN troops seem likely to be poised to keep apart the two sides under ever stronger rather than abating tensions. That is, they might fail.
...I don't see the story as evil colonial power vs. rightful leader trying to regain control of his country, and see Gbago as the main problem, despite significant French industrial interests there. Why? Here is my understanding of the background on the Ivory Coast conflict:
Like most West African countries, the Ivory Coast has a North-South Muslim-Christian divide, and ethnic divisions that have cross-border complications. Led by the same party from independence, the country was stable until the middle of the nineties, as exemplified by having a Southern President (Henri Konan Bédié) and a Northern PM (Alassane Dramane Ouattara). But the former started to play on divisions to push out power rivals.
In December 1999, there was a military coup by general Robert Gueï, a Southerner, who promised new elections. He broke his promise to not enter the race himself. His most popular opponent was Ouattara, so Gueï also attempted to capitalise on divisions, all of them, barring Ouattara from the contest because he was allegedly born in a neighbouring country. (He in fact held a Burkina Faso passport when he was dissident some years earlier.) Also disqualified was Emile Bombet, candidate of the pre-coup ruling party, and a dozen other candidates, including all from the North - but Laurent Gbago, Southern candidate of the third largest party, and three more also-runs remained on the ballot. This led to widespread boycotts of the October 2000 Presidential elections. And here is the root of the current problems: Gueï lost these sham elections to Gbago.
When Gueï saw he is losing, he halted the count by sending the military against vote-counting officials, and declared himself winner. But Gbago's followers staged a successful revolution - and Gbago, then with the foolish support of the French government, declared himself President - only to have the followers of the barred candidates against him. Subsequently, Gbago used the same divisive tactics Gueï did (whom he gave immunity in return for Gueï's appeal to the Army to accept Gbago), also barring Ouattara and others again in Parliamentary elections December 2000 - January 2001. They lasted so long because of repeats, which failed to 'ride out' the almost total Northern boycotts (while boycotts by other parties meant low turnout in the South too).
Conflict ensued, breaking into a civil war in September 2002 after a mutiny and failed coup, ended by French/UN intervention (which saved Gbago: he was poised to lose militarily at this time) and a French-brokered peace agreement in January 2003. The peace agreement prescribed a unified transitional government, the deployment of UNOCI in the summer of 2003 and new elections timetabled for 2005. But Gbago didn't rest, for example after dispersing a peaceful street rally of Ouattara's followers in March 2004, police and militias staged night raids on organisers - killing about 120. This led to a four-month boycott of the nominally joint transitional government by the Northern rebels, ended at EU pressure.
Agnes, was this a fair assessment? *Traitor*, n. A benighted individual who perceives an illusory distinction between serving his nation and abetting the criminals who govern it.
As I already wrote, in what we call Afrique noire, ie Sub-Saharan Western Africa, people belong to an ethnic group, much more than a religious community. The ethnic group is about language, customs, rituals, the land where ancestors rest in peace. Religion is essentially an imported concept. And it is not about race, it is about the land of your ancestors. Everyone who spent some time in Afrique noire will reckon that Nature talks to you out there. I am afraid that ethnic divisions with cross-border complications together with reckless fight for political supremacy will shape the destiny of Ivory Coast over the foreseeable future. When through hell, just keep going. W. Churchill
However, I can safely say that people would be better off if ethnic groups were not split up by political borders. I am not trying to brush off your question, just need to do some research before I provide a more accurate answer. When through hell, just keep going. W. Churchill
Thank you for contributing to this diary. When through hell, just keep going. W. Churchill
I hope I can still catch you with this short reply. Regarding religion vs. ethnicity, it was just my bad composition in using 'northerner/southerner' every time (and lazyness in getting accustomed with the names of major ethnic groups), the impression that the religious division is the key was unintended, I'm sorry 'bout that. But your assessment that Ouattara and Bédié and Gueï were playing who-blinks-first is just a kind of on-the-ground-based correction I expected. So one question: were/are there any significant political groups (even if with no chance at leadership of the country), or even civilian groups, with a markedly cross-ethnic base? (Oh, and a connected question: what I read and put into my November 2004 blog post regarding Ouattara having been most popular, would you say that that was - if it was true at all and not pro-Ouattara spin - because of the relative size of the ethnic groups behind him?) *Traitor*, n. A benighted individual who perceives an illusory distinction between serving his nation and abetting the criminals who govern it.
I very much doubt that there are civil or political forces with a cross-ethnic base. This is one of the reasons why the Marcoussis peace treaty was dead before even being implemented : the rebels (read opponents) had managed to negotiate portfolios within the new government that would have emerged from the agreement. The President accepting that, plus the fact that the agreement was perceived as fostered by France, brought discredit to the peace treaty. The President was considered felon by his own supporters, for he had accepted participation of a different ethnic group, and not only because they were rebel representatives. When through hell, just keep going. W. Churchill
