You are asking the wrong question. It's not what smaller states are capable of, but how (a) the people and (b) the current political elites and (c) if present, violent groups relate to a change. We are not talking about practical matters but about emotions, community feelings and power struggles; about conflicts in all of these fields. (The basic truth about separatisms which is amazingly under-recognised is that different people have different ideas about who constitute which community; people talk about "their people" yet many of whom they mean could count themselves in another people.) *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
With the striking yet relatively few exceptions of Yugoslavia [which makes me wonder why that case was so different] and Chechnya (I have the feeling I have overlooked or forgotten others), this does not seem to have been the case with the break-up of the Soviet Union and former East Bloc countries which recomposed themselves along more numerous and more "natural" borders.
Given such a large amount of quite recent evidence, I would say the burden of proof is on those who would argue that state power and authority could not be devolved to more local regional governments smoothly, expeditiously, and peacefully. Truth unfolds in time through a communal process.
You are overlooking and forgetting Transdnistria, North and South Osetia, Abkhazia, Nagorny-Karabakh, Crimea (there was a lot of angst over that one when Ukraine became independent), and this just off the top of my head. Those whom the Gods wish to destroy They first make mad. -- Euripides
I guess I was assuming that the same could happen in Europe: in many cases, it seems to me that existing regional borders would be sufficient just as they were in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet Union, with exceptions. Purely an assumption.
You are overlooking and forgetting Transdnistria, North and South Osetia, Abkhazia, Nagorny-Karabakh, Crimea (there was a lot of angst over that one when Ukraine became independent)
Thanks for pointing these out. I was indeed not aware of these, with the possible exception that I had read that South Ossetia was seeking independence from Georgia (but did not understand that there had been actual violence.) Truth unfolds in time through a communal process.
In Spain: Regional borders Provincial borders Comarca borders Municipalities Districts
Where do you draw the line? Those whom the Gods wish to destroy They first make mad. -- Euripides
Good point. Which made the relative non-violence of the break-up (at least, what appeared to be non-violent to me) all the more remarkable, and consequently encouraged my belief that these independence movements can succeed peacefully. Truth unfolds in time through a communal process.
The Chechens, though, again rose up against Soviet rule during the 1940s, resulting in the deportation of the Chechen population to the Kazakh SSR (later Kazakhstan) and Siberia during World War II. ... The Chechens were allowed to return to their homeland after 1956 during the de-Stalinization which occurred under Nikita Khrushchev.
So when we, Russian people, saw how the Chechens and Ingushs (they are actually the one nation) had tortured the people, mostly children and almost none of them were Russian or Slavonic but the other way around belonged to the very close ethnic group because they wanna independency from us, Russians... well, for many of us, they overdid Hitler. Literally. Once and forever.
I suppose, however, that their cruelty has been learned(and not genetic) and polished for almost 300 years under Russian protectorate. And the first who suffered from it was their own elites because they were ...er... how to say, not immune to corruption and could sell their tribal freedom for russian rubles so they got rid of them - as i realise this is the mostly lefties site i think you may find it interesting as an example of the truly egalitarian rather secular society with a zero level of corruption (before Yeltsin times that is) and complicated tribal rules and rituals.
Is that what most of you are dreaming about? The UK with their now reviving and flourishing druidry and witchcraft and medieval courtship and paganism and obsession with natural healing has already made that "one small step for a man, one giant leap for mankind" (funnily enough it may probably be the same response of the tiny ones towards the same stimuli of the giantic ones, i.e. the Chechens' response towards Russia is similar to the British towards the USA)
So, back (the first and the last time) to Chechens. They fought every outer governing betraying it - that was with Tsarist Russia (many Chechens welcomed revolution), than it was with Soviets (many Chechens greeted fascistic army in WW2), than it was pro-western Yeltsin and isolationist Putin. They will betray everybody. I personally, would a) get rid of them as soon as possible (give them their independency) and b) not allow any Chechen to enter Russia for at least a hundred years.
Stalin, being a Georgian dictator chose to deal with Chechens by sending all of them to Siberia (if Stalin could, i think, he would have been sending there almost everybody of us apart a few millions, i.e. the biggest number a person born in a very small country could manage comfortably without getting paranoic in the endless Russia). Being the people who grew in the smaller countries you no doubt guess who's to blame for Stalin's actions. Well, Chechens have always blamed Russians and why not?
PS My responses are well off-topic but so do Migeru's (to answering the Q How many nations etc he starts listing the numerous evils did by Stalin (read: evil Russians, read: those who're bigger, read: those who'll do the same to me because i am so tiny and lovely and they are so huge and nasty)
PPS Those who're interested in Chechens history may try to find a link to the Sakharov centre - the best suitable for a western mind articles are there (only in Russian though)
On Chechnya, I mostly agree with you. Those whom the Gods wish to destroy They first make mad. -- Euripides
The UK with their now reviving and flourishing druidry and witchcraft and medieval courtship and paganism and obsession with natural healing has already made that "one small step for a man, one giant leap for mankind"
Huh?
fter Beslan i prefer not to talk about Chechens at all... So when we, Russian people, saw how the Chechens and Ingushs (they are actually the one nation) had tortured the people... not allow any Chechen to enter Russia for at least a hundred years.
Can you separate out individuals from groups of people at all?
(And if Chechens and Inhushs are the same, do you believe in Panslavism too? Which Slavs are proper Slavs?)
They fought every outer governing betraying it
How can an outer government that wasn't respected in the first place be betrayed? (How did that outer government came there?) *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
The wholesale removal of potentially trouble-making ethnic groups was a technique used consistently by Joseph Stalin during his career: Poles (1934), Koreans (1937), Ukrainians, Jews, Romanians (1939-1941 and 1944-1953) Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians (1940-1941 and 1945-1949), Volga Germans (1941), Balkars, Chechens, Ingushs (1944), Kalmyks (1944), Meskhetian Turks (1944), Crimean Tatars (18 May 1944). Large numbers of kulaks regardless their nationality were resettled to Siberia and Central Asia. ... In February 1956, Nikita Khrushchev in his speech On the Personality Cult and its Consequences condemned the deportations as a violation of Leninist principles, asserting that the Ukrainians avoided such a fate "only because there were too many of them and there was no place to which to deport them." His government reversed most of Stalin's deportations, although it was not until as late as 1991 that the Crimean Tatars, Meskhs and Volga Germans were allowed to return en masse to their homelands. The deportations had a profound effect on the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union and they are still a major political issue - the memory of the deportations played a major part in the separatist movements in Tatarstan, Chechnya and the Baltic republics.
...
In February 1956, Nikita Khrushchev in his speech On the Personality Cult and its Consequences condemned the deportations as a violation of Leninist principles, asserting that the Ukrainians avoided such a fate "only because there were too many of them and there was no place to which to deport them." His government reversed most of Stalin's deportations, although it was not until as late as 1991 that the Crimean Tatars, Meskhs and Volga Germans were allowed to return en masse to their homelands. The deportations had a profound effect on the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union and they are still a major political issue - the memory of the deportations played a major part in the separatist movements in Tatarstan, Chechnya and the Baltic republics.
I would have to read up on the rest of the internally displaced peoples you list to see in which cases countries that consisting mainly of them emerged with some violence, and how stable the resulting countries are.
It seems to me that all the displacements in the Soviet Union would make the break-up of that country into multiple independent states more likely to be quite violent and prolonged. Although I acknowledge the cases you and DoDo brought up involving violence, I would still take a look at the entire range of countries that came out of the ex-Soviet Union and how many did so fairly peacefully and quickly. If Stalin had not displaced so many peoples, it seems to me that perhaps there would have been even less violence than there in fact had in been. Truth unfolds in time through a communal process.
That's exactly the very popular western point of view which will never be accepted in the modern Russia because it shows the extreme level of hypocrisy and dishonesty i.e. what we call triple standards of Yer Ole Bitch Europe. The USA you lot so like bitching about has double standards. Quelle horreur! And you - have triple!
What about Russia? Didn't Stalin (being a Georgian-born and grown and somehow educated) had his ugly paws all over Russia first and foremost? Did that one of my parents who was born in Gulag or my numerous relatives who died there really asked for the bloody revolution, for being ruled by the international bunch of murderers? How about the Polish twat Felix Dzerzhinsky, the notorious founder of CheKa (KGB) who is personally responsible for the death of the best of the old Russian elite? How about other two Georgians at the top of communistic power - sexual maniac and murderer Lavrenty Beria and Sergo Ordzhonikidse? They all started as revolutianaries in Tsarist Russia which was oh so cruel that sometimes sent them to Siberia (just the cosy conditions they had lived in were in no way comparable with those nightmarish ones which the millions of RUSSIAN people experienced there later) so guess which nation had the better chances to die in the very beginning of the massacre, 1917-1920 or as you put it for starters??? Georgians during the Stalin's era were the most priviledged nation, in fact they so got used to be the superior bullies that still may think we have to thankful them for him and his cronies.
Yes, later the rest of the countries which were under the Russian Empire protectorate experienced the same - Gulags, torture, agony and death - first it was their elites, less numerous than the Russian one and even more later - in 30s when the simple folk irrespectively of their nationality all over USSR realised at last that somehow they live much worse that it'd been in the previous era with Russian Tsar and nobility then the big chistka (cleansing) started. And again, why it is so difficult to understand that it wasn't the ethnic cleansing but quite international (with a big tormenting bias towards the ex-ruling russian nation) - those who didn't manage to demonstrate enough belief in the beautiful communistic future were sent to the hell of Gulag or just killed?
I DON'T know a single russian family here in St Petersburg who didn't lose at least one relative in a Siberian Gulag (or what was a prelude to it in early-mid 20s, not so centralised) or wasn't killed by the local CheKa. Do you really expect us to apologise for what the Soviets did to Georgians, Ukrainians, Latvians (quite a lot of them joined the Red Army and CheKa and with such ardour confiscated the nobility's property her in St Pete and killed and tortuted its ex-owners)?
It was brunoken who used the breakup of the Soviet Union as "evidence" that self-determination in the EU should be expected to be a peaceful business. DoDo and I are throwing out bit and pieces of Soviet history in an attempt to disabuse him of that notion. He mentioned the way Russians are second-class citizens in the Baltic republics. What I meant by "Stalin's ugly paws in Ukraine" is not only the Holodomor but also the fact that Stalin gave Ukraine a chunk of Russia in his top-down border rearrangements and from that comes a lot of the current trouble within Ukraine (we've had some detailed discussions of the minority language status of Russian for instance) and between Russia and Ukraine. It's neither the fault of the Russians nor of the Ukrainians ultimately, but as you say of "the Georgian dictator".
Back in 1991 I was appalled at the glee with which "the West" watched and even encouraged the breakup of the Soviet Union. It could have been done in a less rushed way, maybe? I don't know. Those whom the Gods wish to destroy They first make mad. -- Euripides
So if you haven't heard of them, I must supplement my and Migeru's information in that most of the mentioned conflicts were armed conflicts at some stage or the other, and none were truly settled. Maybe the conflict over Nagorny-Karabakh was/is the worst in terms of losses of life and connected misery. A different kind of ugliness is Abkhazia. I suspect blackhawk will protest, but what I read was that that region had not much of a separate identity, with 85% of the population having been ethnic Georgian, but back in the Yeltsin era, the local clan of a former apparatchnik took over and chased away the Georgians, relying on cover from Russia. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
I have to admit I am surprised, I always had the impression that you are rather well-informed about every region of the Earth and in particular Europe.
I am flattered, but at the same time embarrassed, by that impression, because my own ignorance is all too obvious to myself -- and grows the more so the longer I spend on EuroTrib.
On the contrary, that's one of the things I am really appreciative of on ET: it's a forum where you can learn a lot through dialectic, where assumptions, presumptions and expectations can be altered, corrected, enriched, etc., if you are open to that. In particular, I am grateful to people like you and Miguel and so many others who are patient enough to inform and educate on matters which may seem elementary. It's like getting admitted into a club full of PhD's and post-docs with only a (barely obtaine) undergrad degree.
So if you haven't heard of them, I must supplement my and Migeru's information in that most of the mentioned conflicts were armed conflicts at some stage or the other, and none were truly settled.
I'm not sure if other people who lived in the U.S. during the break-up of the Soviet Union would agree, but my impression from the public presentation in the U.S. of these independence movements was that they occurred with little significant violence. I don't know if that is my own mistaken impression or if the U.S. mainstream media had an agenda in portraying things that way. So it does come as a bit of surprise to learn about the extent of the violence of these secessions (though I guess in retrospect the bigger surprise -- mistaken, it turns out -- had been that so many countries could become independent in such a short period of time so peacefully.) Truth unfolds in time through a communal process.
I wouldn't call it an agenda (others may disagree), just believing and reporting according to a (simplistic, optimistic) narrative. My favourite example for this is my comparison of what I read in different papers when the Oslo peace process was still in a roll over a decade ago: Newsweek and Time reported all positive things and outbreaks of friendship, Der Spiegel also wrote about the distrust, the struggles of leaders; and correctly analysed why Barak is incapable of brokering peace before he was even elected party leader.
the extent of the violence of these secessions
Note about the Soviet disintegration: that happened in form of an agreement of the leaders of the Republics (e.g. chiefly driven by politicians with power aspirations), and violence was either already present or broke out only later in time. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
You apparently haven't read about the conflict over Russian minorities in all the other post-Soviet states, the Armenian-Azeri conflict over Karabah, the Georgian mess, the Ukrainian identity and language question (which is NOT 'Russians vs. Ukrainians' but a lot more complex), Moldova's break-off Dnester Republic, and the lack of Moldovan-Romanian reunion. I think the Czech-Slovak split was the only one really without conflict, though the process had big losers: Gypsies in the Czech half (almost all of whom descentd from Slovakia) who became stateless.
But you could think back also longer. There was more mess after WWII, and much more after WWI.
I would say the burden of proof is on those who would argue that state power and authority could not be devolved to more local regional governments smoothly, expeditiously, and peacefully.
Read my original comment again. It's not about "burden of proofs", it's not an academic question, enlightened people debating in a forum and then deciding. It's on-going struggles, driven by what people want (you can poll that), what politicians want (you can see it from their actions and rhetoric), and facts violent groups create (you can see that on TV and poll their effects). *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
Thanks for pointing these out. With the exception of the "Georgian mess", I was not aware of violence and/or disenfranchisement in these cases. My superficial understanding (based mostly on the mass media) was that the break-up of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc overall went smoothly and non-violently. Even though these instances still seem to be relatively few, I see there are certainly enough of them to warrant a lot of caution with respect to encouraging similar independence movements in Europe.
One question: How "stable" would you say the situation is Eastern Europe, and especially among the former Soviet Republics, and is that stability increasing, decreasing, or remaining about the same?
It's not about "burden of proofs", it's not an academic question, enlightened people debating in a forum and then deciding. It's on-going struggles, driven by what people want (you can poll that), what politicians want (you can see it from their actions and rhetoric), and facts violent groups create (you can see that on TV and poll their effects).
Of course. I guess I overinterpreted (misinterpeted) your previous comment to mean that such separatist/independent movements necessarily involved "conflict", which I took to mean violent conflict. And my understanding -- now corrected -- of the post-Communist creation of independent countries suggested to me that violence was not a sine qua non of such movements to more local political autonomy. So by "burden of proof", I was asking for evidence that violence does typically accompany such events... and boy did I get it! Truth unfolds in time through a communal process.
As I referred to above, there was violence and/or disenfranchisement in most cases.
By what standard of 'few'? They include all the break-up products, and affects tens of millions of people.
How "stable" would you say the situation is Eastern Europe, and especially among the former Soviet Republics, and is that stability increasing, decreasing, or remaining about the same?
I would be hard-pressed to identify trends. In Southeastern Europe, the Yugoslav disintegration is bound to continue, question is at what speed. In Central-Eastern Europe (where I am), it's the older post-WWI conflicts that simmer on, and might flare up here or there (say in Transsylvania). In Eastern Europe, that is basically the European part of the former Soviet Union, methinks Ukraine's future has the most uncertainties, even if Georgia's conflicts are 'hotter'. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
Even though these instances still seem to be relatively few By what standard of 'few'? They include all the break-up products, and affects tens of millions of people.
I obviously have to do more reading on this, which may force me to retract that "relatively few". But in a quick listing of post-Soviet countries --
-- I believe only the top five countries, plus the ambivalent cases of Chechnya and Transdnistria -- involved significant (i.e. large-scale and prolonged) violence that was due to ethnic disagreements and/or border disputes. I understand that in Lithuania, Gorbachev caused the deaths of 19 Lithuanian civilians when he tried to stop the indendence movement, and in Latvia there was a tense stand-off that ended peacefully. However, while tragic and scary, I see these as historically relatively small incidents of violence in light of the potential of much broader and protracted violence that the independence of those two countries might have entailed.
Also, as Miguel pointed out in a parallel comment, Stalin had caused mass removals and replacements of populations internally in the Soviet Union; it is conceivable that had populations been left in place, there would have been even less conflict and violence in the eventual emergence of these independent countries. (Obviously pure speculation.)
Nevertheless, I take your two broader points: (1) each historical situation is unique and (the putative break-up of European countries into smaller ones) should ultimately be evaluated on its own terms and not primarily by analogy to a previous, in some ways similar situation (like the break-up of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe); (2) there was plenty enough violence and disenfranchisement and/or potential for them in the break-up of the Soviet Union and Easter Bloc that even that historical case is not a good example for the argument that many countries can decompose into smaller countries within a short time frame peacefully. Truth unfolds in time through a communal process.
Nitpick: Chechnya and Transdnistria weren't countries (at least officially). The first is part of Russia, the second officially part of Moldova.
only the top five countries ... involved significant (i.e. large-scale and prolonged) violence
Note that my focus was on Europe, and the countries you mentioned are the European ones. Also note that our discussion wasn't only about violence, but disenfranchisement, too, and that's the main problem in the Baltics.
I don't profess to know much about the conflicts and their underlying causes in Central Asian former Soviet Republics, say if and what role they had in the Tadjik civil war (which was worse than any of the secession wars in the European part). I do know that borders don't correspond to ethnic borders at all, and that there are large Russian minorities. I also know that there is one border-related big issue with certainty: the Ferghana Valley, home to the Central Asian tradition of Islamic fundies, was divided by Stalin between Uzbegistan, Tadjikistan and Khyrgyzistan in the most twisted way.
Finally, I try to redirect you back to what I intended as my original point.
Separatism can be driven by three different forces, of which just one is sufficient: (1) majority opinion of the populace in a territory, (2) power aspirations of certain politicians or potentates, (3) facts created by small groups using violence. Separatism can be blocked by the same three different kinds of forces, with the complication that in all three cases, the mover (popular majority, politician, armed group) can be within the supposed-to-separate community or the rest of the large community.
A typical separatist struggle will not only pinch the different kinds of forces against each other (say, an armed group against a majority opinion against separation), but the various forces will try to do some gerrymandering. I mean disputes about what exactly the borders of the splitting-off part should be (compare Ireland and Croatia), deny voting rights to certain groups (beyond Czech stateless Gypsies and RUssians in the Baltics, there is Montenegro, independent only because Montenegrins living in Serbia were denied the vote), or even, ethnic cleanse (as in most cases in the post-WWI and post-WWII separations which you still don't seem to have contemplated for a big picture), be it with police or military power. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
Yes, I was torn between including them all as "ambivalent cases" or leaving them out and risk being accused of skewing the numbers in favor of my position. ;-)
Note that my focus was on Europe, and the countries you mentioned are the European ones.
Whether they are European or not was not the issue for me. Rather, it was whether mass "autonomization" of regions into sovereign states can happen peacefully in a short period of time. I do not see any a priori reason why non-European examples should be treated differently than European examples. If there were an alternate example in Africa, Asia or the Americas that came to mind, I might have used it as well.
Also note that our discussion wasn't only about violence, but disenfranchisement, too, and that's the main problem in the Baltics.
True.
I also know that there is one border-related big issue with certainty: the Ferghana Valley, home to the Central Asian tradition of Islamic fundies, was divided by Stalin between Uzbegistan, Tadjikistan and Khyrgyzistan in the most twisted way.
Stalin did twist things up pretty well, didn't he. Again, it makes me wonder whether the Soviet Union would have come apart less violently had he left the peoples of that country alone.
This paragraph was really helpful to me for grasping separatism. Is this your own analysis, or a standard one among in history and/or political science?
A typical separatist struggle will not only pinch the different kinds of forces against each other (say, an armed group against a majority opinion against separation), but the various forces will try to do some gerrymandering. I mean disputes about what exactly the borders of the splitting-off part should be (compare Ireland and Croatia), deny voting rights to certain groups (beyond Czech stateless Gypsies and RUssians in the Baltics, there is Montenegro, independent only because Montenegrins living in Serbia were denied the vote), or even, ethnic cleanse (as in most cases in the post-WWI and post-WWII separations which you still don't seem to have contemplated for a big picture), be it with police or military power.
When I read this, it occurred to me that there must be some subfield of politcal science/history that focuses specifically on separatist and independence movements, though I had never been aware of any before. A diary -- or series of diaries -- comparing and contrasting various such movements would be fascinating and really useful for these discussions.
As for the post-WWI and post-WWII separations, well I had thought of these, but I hastily assumed that conditions had changed, people had changed, to the point that where looking at more recent events -- i.e. the break-up of the USSR -- would be much more informative. But now that you and Miguel have significantly dismantled that model of "peaceful" separatism, I'll go back further historically in the spirit of plus ça change.... (Also, a diary comparing and contrasting separatisms that only goes 20 years or so would be quite shallow.) Truth unfolds in time through a communal process.
I do not see any a priori reason why non-European examples should be treated differently than European examples.
I didn't say they should, I just chose to give European examples because (a) the diary was about Europe, (b) as I said, I know there were serious conflicts in Central Asian countries too, but I know much less about their background.
it makes me wonder whether the Soviet Union would have come apart less violently had he left the peoples of that country alone.
I thought about how to answer that when reading your previous comment, but I just can't. For me, the question is too academic. That is, would the Soviet Union even survived Stalin if he didn't do those things? What's more, would it even have been born? To what extent are Stalin's policies the industrialised versions of earlier policies both by Tsarist Russia and by Central Asian Khanates? Is the Russian Federation itself not a multi-ethnic state whose integrity should be considered?
Is this your own analysis, or a standard one among in history and/or political science?
Only my own :-) But based on knowing many examples near-by, I don't view it as a particularly deep analysis.
I hastily assumed that conditions had changed, people had changed
I submit this is true to some extent, but I would point to another angle: the results of the separations 80, 65 years ago still reverberate, they gave birth to long-lasting hates on people level and troublesome relations on state level, and can seed new conflicts over sparatist issues. (For example, in Romania in the nineties, there was serious fear of Transsylvania going the Yugoslav way.) *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
I submit this is true to some extent, but I would point to another angle: the results of the separations 80, 65 years ago still reverberate, they gave birth to long-lasting hates on people level and troublesome relations on state level, and can seed new conflicts over sparatist issues.
Cyprus problems today are for example linked to the birth of modern Turkey and the flight of greeks and turks to their respective new homelands. A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!
