Even though these instances still seem to be relatively few By what standard of 'few'? They include all the break-up products, and affects tens of millions of people.
By what standard of 'few'? They include all the break-up products, and affects tens of millions of people.
I obviously have to do more reading on this, which may force me to retract that "relatively few". But in a quick listing of post-Soviet countries --
-- I believe only the top five countries, plus the ambivalent cases of Chechnya and Transdnistria -- involved significant (i.e. large-scale and prolonged) violence that was due to ethnic disagreements and/or border disputes. I understand that in Lithuania, Gorbachev caused the deaths of 19 Lithuanian civilians when he tried to stop the indendence movement, and in Latvia there was a tense stand-off that ended peacefully. However, while tragic and scary, I see these as historically relatively small incidents of violence in light of the potential of much broader and protracted violence that the independence of those two countries might have entailed.
Also, as Miguel pointed out in a parallel comment, Stalin had caused mass removals and replacements of populations internally in the Soviet Union; it is conceivable that had populations been left in place, there would have been even less conflict and violence in the eventual emergence of these independent countries. (Obviously pure speculation.)
Nevertheless, I take your two broader points: (1) each historical situation is unique and (the putative break-up of European countries into smaller ones) should ultimately be evaluated on its own terms and not primarily by analogy to a previous, in some ways similar situation (like the break-up of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe); (2) there was plenty enough violence and disenfranchisement and/or potential for them in the break-up of the Soviet Union and Easter Bloc that even that historical case is not a good example for the argument that many countries can decompose into smaller countries within a short time frame peacefully. Truth unfolds in time through a communal process.
Nitpick: Chechnya and Transdnistria weren't countries (at least officially). The first is part of Russia, the second officially part of Moldova.
only the top five countries ... involved significant (i.e. large-scale and prolonged) violence
Note that my focus was on Europe, and the countries you mentioned are the European ones. Also note that our discussion wasn't only about violence, but disenfranchisement, too, and that's the main problem in the Baltics.
I don't profess to know much about the conflicts and their underlying causes in Central Asian former Soviet Republics, say if and what role they had in the Tadjik civil war (which was worse than any of the secession wars in the European part). I do know that borders don't correspond to ethnic borders at all, and that there are large Russian minorities. I also know that there is one border-related big issue with certainty: the Ferghana Valley, home to the Central Asian tradition of Islamic fundies, was divided by Stalin between Uzbegistan, Tadjikistan and Khyrgyzistan in the most twisted way.
Finally, I try to redirect you back to what I intended as my original point.
Separatism can be driven by three different forces, of which just one is sufficient: (1) majority opinion of the populace in a territory, (2) power aspirations of certain politicians or potentates, (3) facts created by small groups using violence. Separatism can be blocked by the same three different kinds of forces, with the complication that in all three cases, the mover (popular majority, politician, armed group) can be within the supposed-to-separate community or the rest of the large community.
A typical separatist struggle will not only pinch the different kinds of forces against each other (say, an armed group against a majority opinion against separation), but the various forces will try to do some gerrymandering. I mean disputes about what exactly the borders of the splitting-off part should be (compare Ireland and Croatia), deny voting rights to certain groups (beyond Czech stateless Gypsies and RUssians in the Baltics, there is Montenegro, independent only because Montenegrins living in Serbia were denied the vote), or even, ethnic cleanse (as in most cases in the post-WWI and post-WWII separations which you still don't seem to have contemplated for a big picture), be it with police or military power. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
Yes, I was torn between including them all as "ambivalent cases" or leaving them out and risk being accused of skewing the numbers in favor of my position. ;-)
Note that my focus was on Europe, and the countries you mentioned are the European ones.
Whether they are European or not was not the issue for me. Rather, it was whether mass "autonomization" of regions into sovereign states can happen peacefully in a short period of time. I do not see any a priori reason why non-European examples should be treated differently than European examples. If there were an alternate example in Africa, Asia or the Americas that came to mind, I might have used it as well.
Also note that our discussion wasn't only about violence, but disenfranchisement, too, and that's the main problem in the Baltics.
True.
I also know that there is one border-related big issue with certainty: the Ferghana Valley, home to the Central Asian tradition of Islamic fundies, was divided by Stalin between Uzbegistan, Tadjikistan and Khyrgyzistan in the most twisted way.
Stalin did twist things up pretty well, didn't he. Again, it makes me wonder whether the Soviet Union would have come apart less violently had he left the peoples of that country alone.
This paragraph was really helpful to me for grasping separatism. Is this your own analysis, or a standard one among in history and/or political science?
A typical separatist struggle will not only pinch the different kinds of forces against each other (say, an armed group against a majority opinion against separation), but the various forces will try to do some gerrymandering. I mean disputes about what exactly the borders of the splitting-off part should be (compare Ireland and Croatia), deny voting rights to certain groups (beyond Czech stateless Gypsies and RUssians in the Baltics, there is Montenegro, independent only because Montenegrins living in Serbia were denied the vote), or even, ethnic cleanse (as in most cases in the post-WWI and post-WWII separations which you still don't seem to have contemplated for a big picture), be it with police or military power.
When I read this, it occurred to me that there must be some subfield of politcal science/history that focuses specifically on separatist and independence movements, though I had never been aware of any before. A diary -- or series of diaries -- comparing and contrasting various such movements would be fascinating and really useful for these discussions.
As for the post-WWI and post-WWII separations, well I had thought of these, but I hastily assumed that conditions had changed, people had changed, to the point that where looking at more recent events -- i.e. the break-up of the USSR -- would be much more informative. But now that you and Miguel have significantly dismantled that model of "peaceful" separatism, I'll go back further historically in the spirit of plus ça change.... (Also, a diary comparing and contrasting separatisms that only goes 20 years or so would be quite shallow.) Truth unfolds in time through a communal process.
I do not see any a priori reason why non-European examples should be treated differently than European examples.
I didn't say they should, I just chose to give European examples because (a) the diary was about Europe, (b) as I said, I know there were serious conflicts in Central Asian countries too, but I know much less about their background.
it makes me wonder whether the Soviet Union would have come apart less violently had he left the peoples of that country alone.
I thought about how to answer that when reading your previous comment, but I just can't. For me, the question is too academic. That is, would the Soviet Union even survived Stalin if he didn't do those things? What's more, would it even have been born? To what extent are Stalin's policies the industrialised versions of earlier policies both by Tsarist Russia and by Central Asian Khanates? Is the Russian Federation itself not a multi-ethnic state whose integrity should be considered?
Is this your own analysis, or a standard one among in history and/or political science?
Only my own :-) But based on knowing many examples near-by, I don't view it as a particularly deep analysis.
I hastily assumed that conditions had changed, people had changed
I submit this is true to some extent, but I would point to another angle: the results of the separations 80, 65 years ago still reverberate, they gave birth to long-lasting hates on people level and troublesome relations on state level, and can seed new conflicts over sparatist issues. (For example, in Romania in the nineties, there was serious fear of Transsylvania going the Yugoslav way.) *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
I submit this is true to some extent, but I would point to another angle: the results of the separations 80, 65 years ago still reverberate, they gave birth to long-lasting hates on people level and troublesome relations on state level, and can seed new conflicts over sparatist issues.
Cyprus problems today are for example linked to the birth of modern Turkey and the flight of greeks and turks to their respective new homelands. A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!
