It goes back, as all modern British history does, to the Second World War. The British, particularly their political leaders, were under the impression that having won that war the world owed them a living; so the pre-war world could be speedily re-created. They were very slow to realise that the Empire was fatally wounded and that British world power was no longer sustainable. The last thing they wanted to concede was that Britain was just a typical European power.

Between 1945 and the Suez crisis in 1957 British policymakers continued to assume they had the power to matter at the highest level of world diplomacy. Unfortunately reality had a way of undermining the outmoded operating assumptions British statesmen were using.

The attempt to preserve the reserve currency status of the pound caused recurring financial problems for decades afterwards. The strain of military adventures during the same period reinforced the economic problems.

Attlee's Labour government, immediately after the war, though the United States should support the UK's economy on generous terms. When the Americans did not agree and imposed tough terms for a loan the gap between real and imagined status became manifest.

In about 1946 Britain had to ask for American help to support the Royalists in the Greek Civil War. The country could no longer afford an independent foreign policy.

The Attlee government signed up to the Korean War and planned to make an enormous national effort to play a part far more extensive than Britain could really afford. The rearmament programme of the Labour government would have caused economic disaster if it had been fully implemented.

Winston Churchill was favourable to European unity, but did not envisage Britain being part of it. He spent his time as Prime Minister in the early 1950's trying to recreate the Big 3 role, between the United States and the Soviet Union, which he had during the war.

Churchill's political heir, Sir Anthony Eden tried to play great power games without American support. This proved to be a mistake.

When the Americans used economic power to pull the plug on Suez, London realised a new departure was necessary in foreign policy.

Harold Macmillan pursued a schizophrenic policy, which is really the root of British ambivalence about Europe.

Macmillan envisaged Britain's world role as being like the Greeks in the Roman Empire, helping the Americans exercise their power. The subtext was that the Americans did not know what they were doing and needed British guidance. You can imagine how little Washington agreed.

On the other hand Macmillan realised that Britain needed to link itself with the EEC. His government made the first membership application, which De Gaulle vetoed.

Harold Wilson, in his 1964-70 administration, explored rge consequences of British decline. The pound had to be devalued and the military role East of Suez abandoned. He also avoided being entangled in Vietnam.

Wilson made the second UK application to join the EEC, which again De Gaulle vetoed.

Heath, Macmillan's original negotiator with Europe, became Prime Minister in 1970. With De Gaulle no longer in office, Heath made the third membership application and joined the EEC.

Edward Heath was the most pro-European leader the UK has ever had and probably the least pro-American Prime Minister of the post-war period. However even his government saw the EEC as a way of expanding British power in the world and a body in need of British leadership. As I recall the subtext was not very hidden at the time and I imagine the other members did not agree with it.

Everything since has been a working out of the consequences of Britain's divided focus.

The punching above our weight school of British diplomacy has cost us dear. Britain badly needs a government prepared to take a fundamental look at the assumptions of our foreign policy. What is our real national interest?