You picked up on the aspect that nagged at me about the whole issue. Basically, whilst Syrian troops were there, Hezbollah's actions seemed to be muted.
This observation leads to a whole host of Byzantine possibilities for the motives behind the CIA support for the "Cedar Revolution." There's so many and they are so tinfoil hat I hesitate to go through all the ones that come to my mind. Some salient points however:
a) It's hard to believe that the US propulsion of the "Cedar Revolution" occured without Israeli consent. Israel is the trusted partner of the Bush admin in the region.
b) At the same time, it's hard to believe that the Israelis (the Bush neo-cons may have been foolish enough to believe democracy would be a panacea in this case) thought that democracy would solve their Hezbollah problem.
c) Likewise, the Israelis would understand that the Syrians had kept Hezbollah on a shorter leash by their presence and once they were gone, the dynamic could well change.
d) One possibility is that the Israelis were really afraid of Syria. This seems an odd one.
e) Another is that as some have put it, there was a plan to "reshape the map of influence in the area." Syria was to be pushed out of Lebanon and Lebanon brought into the Israeli sphere of influence.
f) The only way (e) could occur in the short term was for the Cedar Revolution to be eventually followed by major Israeli action, possibly even invasion, because Hezbollah weren't ever likely to just go away or give up. That makes current events fairly well calculated and planned out. It's not a response to events, they are just the pretext for strategic action.
g) There is some rhetoric coming out of the Israeli government about "taking this to Damscus." If they have planned that, it is scary stuff. Lebanon will be left by most to twist in the wind and Arab nations will likely at most feed some more money and weapons to Hezbollah. But an attack on Syria could turn things into a major regional mess. So maybe that makes it less likely.
h) What bothers me about all this is that back when Syria was placed on the axis of evil, it feels like an opportunity was missed. There was plenty of economic leverage (and an apparent willingness from the Syrian leadership) to convert Syria into a partner, more like Jordan or maybe even Egypt. Instead we've gone the other route and it looks pretty messy to me.
Re Syria, though, I agree. Enormous opportunities have been missed, purely out of Neocon blindness.
a) I think the US adminstration embraced the largely-European-supported but domestically-driven democratization of Lebanon in order to piggyback on the one thing that had gone right in the Middle East up to that point. It was George W. Bush taking credit for things that he had heretofore no interest in, certainly not to oppose Israel's will. As for what Israel thought of it? A mixed bag, but I think there were plenty of very influential people who pretty much hated the idea that Hezbollah would be maintsreamed in any more than, as they saw it, Hezbollah already was in Lebanese society. Overtly, they took a wait-and-see attitude. More quietly, they decided that Hezbollah and Lebanon were now identical, insofar as Israeli national security interests were concerned. They just never bothered to communicate this view widely; that's why the destruction of Lebanon is no surprise to supporters of the current Israeli action, why same supporters wonder why people say it's a surprise when, to them, it clearly is not...now that it's happened.
b) I do not think the current crop of Israeli leaders have ever seen democratization of their Arab nations, especially their closest ones, as being anything but a dire threat to Israeli national security, and have acted accordingly. Why? Because the Israelis have a pretty good idea what mass sentiment on the Arab street is toward Israel -- overwhelming hostility towards its policies, its people and its existence. The few among many is that functional, legitimate, fair and free elections in the Middle East would actually install more hostile regimes who, due to the need to answer to mass constituencies, would be obligated to act on same, or at least look the other way while others dealt with Israel in their tried-and-true (and terrorist) faction. And reality has confirmed the worst expectations: The new Republic of Iraq is explicitly anti-Israel. Hamas as the rulling party (sic) of the Palestinian Territories is an outrage to the Jewish State. Hezbollah, though, that's an odd one, since they are a minor party in the Lebanese Majlis, but the player on the Lebanese battlefield, the one fighting force in all the Muslim World that made the Israel Defense Forces flinch, and I suspect that is what motivates this most of all: A chance to do-over Israel's version of Vietnam.
c) I suspect that Syrian influence mitigated that of the Iranians, who are much farther removed from the consequences of Hezbollah's actions, though ironically less capable of hurting Israel back if it comes to trouble.
d) The Israelis truly are nervous about a final showdown with Syria, as Syria has all those things that Saddam Hussein was accused of having: Lots of chemical weapons, and massively redundant delivery systems for same: Thousands of long-range artillery pieces could send mustard gas 40-50 km into Israel. Hundreds of shorter-range SCUDs could reach Haifa. Longer-range missiles (several dozen of these) could hit pretty much whatever they wanted in Israel. It's a sufficient threat that if the capability was ever massed and deployed near the Golan, Israel would probably not think twice about using tactical nuclear warheads, but that would risk contamination of the headwaters of the Jordan river, and that would be bad for Israel. Getting Syria wholly involved in this new Lebanon War greatly reduces the likelihood of success, and increases the likelihood of real damage to the state and people of Israel, for if Syria gets involved, other states may, as well.
e) In which case, the Lebanese pushing the Syrians out was a national death sentence; ie, that they were always going to have a hegemon, and now it is Israel's turn to make a play for it. In my opinion, Israel could not in 18 years take car of Hezbollah, so I do not see how any amount of time will help them hold influence in Lebanon without an expensive price tag in blood and treasure for Israel itself. This is Operation Iraqi UnFreedom, plagiarised. I really wonder what the Israeli goverment was thinking, here.
f) I've heard this explicitly, from people who approve very much of the current Lebanon War. This is about killing off Hezbollah, once and for all, and whoever gets in the way, to erase the memory of the 2000 retreat. Oh, and to stop the rockets and attacks, of course. But most to get a do-over for Israel's version of Vietnam.
g) There is a script being followed that is not concerned with regional considerations and realities, but internally-driven within the halls of the Israeli government. Simple demographics are coming to a head; inside of a decade, left alone the Arab neighbors of Israel would be collectively more powerful, perhaps even sporting nukes of their own (the Saudis and perhaps the Egyptians), countries we are not likely to tolerate Israel taking out, just to keep its local monopoly. Once that happens, there will be no use for war; the Arabs will not have to fight, the Israelis will not be able to. There will be peace in the Holy Land, by default, and Israel will be...contained. Sovereign and free but boxed in -- if it does not play nice. Sovereign and free and a major player in a growing trade federation with real problems of development, of water supply and public works, that could really use Israeli expertise in such matters.
But back to the now: Doesn't look like that's going to happen. The Israelis were at the crux: to choose the gradual path toward reconciliation, or to make a more daring bet on massive military victory over its neighbors, not Lebanon (that's just not convincing) but Syria and whoever else comes to the party, to demonstrate for the next 100 years that Israel is not to be effed with. And this is precisely what is happening.
So no. I don't thing they are going to stop at all in Beirut. This is most certainly going to Damascus, and the farther afield, the better in the eyes of the current government in Israel. New Direction, indeed. (God, that term wigs me out, seeing what it looks like in action.)
h) The singular message is that nothing you do, good or bad, in the interests of Israel or of the United States, will save or exonerate you if the decision has been made that you are...in the way. The various Native American tribes learned the hard way that there simply was no bargaining with the white man, until they were seen not only by form but by custom as equals. And that did not happen for a very long time. The Muslims, of course, are substantially more numerous and operating from a far stronger position. And yet, I cannot help but think that the 'Indian Wars' dynamic is play yet again, that the overarching ideology of the War on Terror is a program of systematic, ah, domestication and containment of a two-billion strong society of 'wild men'...or worse.
And that is terrifying, because language that was used to address the 'American Indian', and justify his shoving off his own continent is back. Oh, it's not happening like that. But the mindset is the same.
And unless I am mistaken, what just happened in Lebanon sure looks a lot like the Union Cavalry coming in and burning some Lakota Sioux villages, because a renegade war chief and his braves attacked a wagon.
Collective punishment, taken to a regional scale. I think this is where the neocons really would like to go, and I think that is why the neocons are pushing so hard to tie Lebanon to Hezbollah...because those dead Lebanese children in the pictures I saw last night were a valuable military exercise, according to some. Have Keyboard. Will Travel. :)
This is very worrying. As I said, I fully expect the world to ignore most of Lebanon's suffering, but an invasion of even part of Syria will surely polarise the region beyond belief. At the same time, it's going to be very hard (despite their desire to do so) for Bush and Blair to retain any credibility whilst supporting an attack on Syria. There's a lot of potentially nasty effects on a lot of levels here.
That's less surprising if you consider
