Recurring local terminology sensibility note: if you look at a map, 'Eastern Europe' would be justified only for Russia, Ukraine, a small part of Kazakhstan and the European part of Caucasus. Some people living here around the geometric centre of Europe (which, depending on who did the calculation, lies somewhere between Lithuania and the Northern Carpathian Basin) do indeed call it "Central Europe" in our own languages. You however more to the West found it easy during the Cold War to call everything in the East Bloc "East Europe". Which annoys us, even though on international fora, we accepted compromise terms like Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) or Eastern-Central Europe (ECE).
(Similar issues bound to come up on EuroTrib again and again: "Holland" is not a synonym of Netherlands but only a region in that country; don't over-use the term "Anglo-Saxon"; and a few dozen more I forgot...) *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
Do you mean the Cold War, or something earlier? If the former, you could use the term "former East Bloc". If the latter, I'd love to beg to differ :-)
I certainly don't think that it rises to the level of pejorative terminology.
Don't worry, I didn't meant to imply that it's pejorative, it's simply erroneous, and contrary to local usage and self-understanding, thus annoying. There are a lot of such sensitivities across Europe, I and Migeru listed some of them, and rest assured erroneous usage of each of those already led to complaints by locals from affected countries on EuroTrib. Another I can think of which you may already be familiar with is to call Britain "England". *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
To me there are significant historical distinctions in the divide between Western and Eastern Europe Do you mean the Cold War, or something earlier? If the former, you could use the term "former East Bloc". If the latter, I'd love to beg to differ :-)
I think the whole "Eastern Europe is different" meme is just latent anti-Slav racism. Nothing is 'mere'. — Richard P. Feynman
That is precisely what I meant. The original issue was not related to either religion or language.
Again, where do you draw the line between East and West, and why? Nothing is 'mere'. — Richard P. Feynman
But the trip back was indeed hardly not made sober. 2 hours before the bus left I was still on a street perpendicular to Piotrovska avenue in Wooooooodj, drinking white vodka straight off the bottle with 3 Poles and a Slovenian girl (who spoke perfect French and wanted to "get to know me better", but I was resilient and chose my bus over getting to know her better). I barely had enough time to get a taxi back to my friend's house, take a shower, and race to the bus station.
Part of the point DoDo is trying to make is that after the fall of the Soviet bloc, the countries of the former Austro-Hungarian empire have been very quick to reclaim their Central European identity. Nothing is 'mere'. — Richard P. Feynman
I can't see where the Ottoman or Austro-Hungarian enpires have much to do with NATO.
If you are so desperate to pick an argument, may I suggest FreeRepublic.
And please don't assume people are trying to pick arguments ...
Also, there is a hill in the countryside where for 200 (or is it 300?) years, people have been laying crosses and various artifacts, with messages, for loved ones.
Hill of Crosses
Statehood day
The Russophobia you rightly noted as a factor goes back at least a century more for a number of former East Bloc countries.
The Austro-Hungarian Empire also has a role in the second motivation I named in my long reply, e.g. leaving behind ethnic tensions after it fell apart. Meanwhile, memory of the Ottoman Empire played a not insignificant role at least in Hungary in relation to the third motivation I named, a reason people think that it is unsafe to stand alone while a big power might be swaggering around. I also note that both Empires played a significant role in the arguentation of the nationalist anti-NATO camp, who feared for sovereignity, of being subjugated by yet another Empire, betraying the heritage of the countless rebels/revolutionaries against these Empires (something in which I now, after Iraq, see more truth than back then...) *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
You probably don't realise how dismissive the above sounded. This DOES matter to people from here. You would find out if you travelled here. But if you find this sub-discussion annoying, I don't want to squabble, let's end it here (and I ask Migeru to stand away too), and please read my other, longer comments about the issue of what motivated people and elites in X Europe to join NATO. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
*Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
The usual publicly stated rationale by Eastern European governments is that NATO memberships offers security for their historic fear of Russian domination.
This wasn't mentioned much publicly, though certainly it was sugested implicitely or through media surrogates. But the dual motivations of getting free of Russian influence and joining the strongest kid on the block did play a role for the elites. I note it did play this role to differing degrees. A number of countries that joined NATO had at the time of the accession campaign (or at the time of signing) governments formed by post-(reformed)-communists, who often retained some residual ties or sympathies for Russia. Meanwhile, for the Baltic countries, there was also the ethnic factor (the large Russian minorities) that gave a different dimension to this fearf of Russia.
As Migeru mentioned, another factor was wanting European integration, and seeing NATO membership as a good advertisement and first step for later EU membership. This wish for integration had both practical (economic) and emotional levels: the latter was our wish to regain the historical position denied by the Cold War, to be level with European neighbours again.
A third factor was true security considerations. On one hand, conflicts like Yugoslavia or Transdniestr were before our eyes, and there was this belief that a military alliance would somehow suppress such things (we disregarded the Turkish-Greek experience). On the other hand, nuclear bombs were more in people's minds back then than now (Reagan's microphone probe joke wasn't too funny around here BTW), and only alliance with a superpower was seen as giving deterrence.
There is probably some such perception by a portion of the populace.
The Russia fear factor probably counted even more for the populations than for the elite. But the other factors counted just as strongly if not stronger. (For disclosure: I have actually voted Yes in Hungary's NATO accession referendum, but have regretted it since, seeing my then reasons as misjudgements, and am now against NATO.)
Beyond that the economic elites either have or would like to have connections to the US/European multi-national corporate axis.
That's correct, of course, but this only makes sense through the lens of wishing for EU integration. (Our countries weren't pressedto join the NATO, e.g. economic blackmail. Bush I's and Clinton's people weren't as buffoonish as Bush II's, they were much more clever imperialists.) *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
Perhaps that was the case in Hungary, but in Poland it was at the core of the public, official case for NATO membership. Not that the elites had to work to convince the population since there was overwhelming support for NATO membership in Poland.
But the dual motivations of getting free of Russian influence and joining the strongest kid on the block did play a role for the elites.
It's not simply the 'strongest kid on the block' - it's that this particular strong kid didn't have a long history of bullying them, unlike Russia and Germany. Plus he happens to be far away, making him less threatening.
As Migeru mentioned, another factor was wanting European integration, and seeing NATO membership as a good advertisement and first step for later EU membership.
In Poland NATO membership was far popular than EU membership. The only organized opposition to the former was among the extreme right who in Poland historically favor an alliance with Russia. EU membership caused a lot of worries, ranging from fears of Germany to loss of sovereignty since the EU is a far more intrusive presence than NATO and practical economic concerns.
(Our countries weren't pressedto join the NATO, e.g. economic blackmail. Bush I's and Clinton's people weren't as buffoonish as Bush II's, they were much more clever imperialists.)
More exactly Bush I and Clinton were pressed to expand NATO through a strong coordinated lobbying effort on the part of the countries in question and their ethnic lobby's in the US. The Bush I admin leaned against NATO expansion. The Clinton admin was divided on the issue. Christopher and Talbott leaned against while Albright, Holbrooke, and IIRC Lake were for it. But they were told that there would be a strong effort to swing the Polish American vote to the Repubs if the administration didn't expand NATO.
I will just ask about one thing right at the beginning, and add to others:
...in Poland it was at the core of the public, official case for NATO membership.
I understand that the Russia factor was much stronger in Poland (another pointer to Richard that it wasn't just the last 60 years but [differing] regional histories that led to the wish to join NATO), but how much truly official was it? Did accession-time President Kwaśniewski and earlier the Pawlak government (that joined NATO's Partnership for Peace) use the Russia argument in public?
I ask because I recall joint declarations by the then candidate countries that officially denied the Russia factor when protesting Russia's protests against NATO accession. (E.g. stuff like "this move is not directed against Russia, this is about our security and our sovereignity, Russia should neither try to meddle in our affairs nor believe this is about them").
there was overwhelming support for NATO membership in Poland
There as in most countries. The referendum I mentioned passed with 85.33% approval.
More exactly Bush I and Clinton were pressed to expand NATO through a strong coordinated lobbying effort on the part of the countries in question and their ethnic lobby's in the US.
It was more complex than that. There was probably incoherence in the policymaking of the Bush I admin and later, maybe at top level like in the Clinton admin, or just at lowel levels, for locally stationed diplomats and say Radio Free Europe did encourage a Westward turn in every aspect when they groomed the dissident movements. (A parallel could be 1956, when Radio Free Europe kept suggesting a Western intervention 'in case' before, and 'soon' during the fighting, but there were never such plans.) So the new political elites were 'well prepared' for pushing the next US admin on the issue. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
Hungary had many (failed) revolutions, and while 1956 is more well known abroad, here the 1848 one against the then Austrian overlords (which I diaried about) is by far the most popular and remembered.
There are two important writings connected to it. One is a poem titled "National Song", written for the initial (bloodless) revolt by a chief organiser. It is probably more recited than the national hymn, and its translated reflain ends with: "Shall we be captive or free? That's the question, choose!" This line (or just the first half of it) is heavily used in political discourse. The other writing were the "12 Points", the demands of the revolutionaries summarised bullet-point-wise. Those 12 points (which again include demands for sovereignity) were held up to every government ever since by critics (and all kinds of initiatives try to emulate it by writing their own 12 points, rather silly if you ask me).
However, the pro-accession side had stronger counter-arguments: on one hand, they argued NATO is not an imperial influence but an association that would defend against more imperial influence (people not realising what Brzezinski et al on one side and Perle et al on the otrher side were really about); on the other hand, point out that the Revolution was crushed in the end when Russia intervened on the Habsburg's behalf -- e.g. the country is too weak on its own.
The second example is further back in time, back to the 15th century: to the time of Renaissance king Mathias Corvinus. He was the last strong King of Hungary before the Ottoman conquest (and posthumously the most popular king). He could fight off the Ottoman armies, but realised his kingdom doesn't have the resources for a long-term strategic victory. So he thought he should first get a larger safe background -- and take over German lands by conquest and diplomacy. (He was well into it by the time of his early death, when he already moved his capital ot Vienna.) This is something everyone learns at school, and adds to this idea that the country shouldn't stay alone just in case some big neighbour arises. (I can't believe what prospects seemed realistic ot people back then in retrospect...) *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
Bonus Bush-bashing: no one told about it to Dubya, who on the day of the 1848 Revolution spoke about the 1956 one. I don't make this up -- read the official transscript! This lead to quite a lot of laughing resp. cursing over here. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
