Perhaps that was the case in Hungary, but in Poland it was at the core of the public, official case for NATO membership. Not that the elites had to work to convince the population since there was overwhelming support for NATO membership in Poland.

But the dual motivations of getting free of Russian influence and joining the strongest kid on the block did play a role for the elites.

It's not simply the 'strongest kid on the block' - it's that this particular strong kid didn't have a long history of bullying them, unlike Russia and Germany. Plus he happens to be far away, making him less threatening.

As Migeru mentioned, another factor was wanting European integration, and seeing NATO membership as a good advertisement and first step for later EU membership.

In Poland NATO membership was far popular than EU membership. The only organized opposition to the former was among the extreme right who in Poland historically favor an alliance with Russia. EU membership caused a lot of worries, ranging from fears of Germany to loss of sovereignty since the EU is a far more intrusive presence than NATO and practical economic concerns.

(Our countries weren't pressedto join the NATO, e.g. economic blackmail. Bush I's and Clinton's people weren't as buffoonish as Bush II's, they were much more clever imperialists.)

More exactly Bush I and Clinton were pressed to expand NATO through a strong coordinated lobbying effort on the part of the countries in question and their ethnic lobby's in the US. The Bush I admin leaned against NATO expansion. The Clinton admin was divided on the issue. Christopher and Talbott leaned against while Albright, Holbrooke, and IIRC Lake were for it. But they were told that there would be a strong effort to swing the Polish American vote to the Repubs if the administration didn't expand NATO.

Hungary had many (failed) revolutions, and while 1956 is more well known abroad, here the 1848 one against the then Austrian overlords (which I diaried about) is by far the most popular and remembered.

There are two important writings connected to it. One is a poem titled "National Song", written for the initial (bloodless) revolt by a chief organiser. It is probably more recited than the national hymn, and its translated reflain ends with: "Shall we be captive or free? That's the question, choose!" This line (or just the first half of it) is heavily used in political discourse. The other writing were the "12 Points", the demands of the revolutionaries summarised bullet-point-wise. Those 12 points (which again include demands for sovereignity) were held up to every government ever since by critics (and all kinds of initiatives try to emulate it by writing their own 12 points, rather silly if you ask me).

However, the pro-accession side had stronger counter-arguments: on one hand, they argued NATO is not an imperial influence but an association that would defend against more imperial influence (people not realising what Brzezinski et al on one side and Perle et al on the otrher side were really about); on the other hand, point out that the Revolution was crushed in the end when Russia intervened on the Habsburg's behalf -- e.g. the country is too weak on its own.

The second example is further back in time, back to the 15th century: to the time of Renaissance king Mathias Corvinus. He was the last strong King of Hungary before the Ottoman conquest (and posthumously the most popular king). He could fight off the Ottoman armies, but realised his kingdom doesn't have the resources for a long-term strategic victory. So he thought he should first get a larger safe background -- and take over German lands by conquest and diplomacy. (He was well into it by the time of his early death, when he already moved his capital ot Vienna.) This is something everyone learns at school, and adds to this idea that the country shouldn't stay alone just in case some big neighbour arises. (I can't believe what prospects seemed realistic ot people back then in retrospect...)

_{*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.}