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Do they say why the cascade failure happened? Was it a design fault?
by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Tue Sep 12th, 2006 at 02:48:57 AM EST
It would be nice to have an explicit list of faults, not just their number. Cascades of electrical faults are not unusual.

Nothing is 'mere'. — Richard P. Feynman
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Sep 12th, 2006 at 05:32:23 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I was thinking of how to write this diary. To actually describe each step in the chain and make it understandable I would have to write at least as good an article as the one I started with (it is good do check it out, follow the link and then press 'se grafik' if nothing else for the neat pictures) and I am not sure I could. Not without the original report (which I have been unable to find) to check disambiguities. So I brought you a summary instead.

But of course you can have the list:

  1. Shortcircuit
  2. High-power pulse
  3. Back-up batteries A and B (two of four) automatically turned of
  4. Faulty oilpump in turbine 1
  5. Faulty installation takes out turbine 2
  6. To low frequency in the current activates switches that isolate the system from the grid, making backup power from the grid unavailabel.
  7. A gasturbine does not start.
8 & 9. Dieselengines A and B does not start as their batteries (step 3) has been turned of. Dieselengines C and D worked however as their batteries had not been turned of.

And why batteries C and D was not turned of in step 3 is still unclear. If they had been they would have lacked all power.

by A swedish kind of death on Tue Sep 12th, 2006 at 07:50:07 AM EST
[ Parent ]
A very good summary of events.  I've never worked in a power plant, but I work fairly closely with people who do.  I can imagine the scenario you describe.  It sounds like a marvelous example of Murphy's Law.  The statistical odds of all those things happening at the same time is probably on the order of a meteor strike.  Cold comfort to anyone who remembers Chernobyl, I know.


Somewhere in cyberspace, the ghost of de Chardin is smiling.
by budr on Tue Sep 12th, 2006 at 10:51:22 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The statistical odds of all those things happening at the same time is probably on the order of a meteor strike

Which points at negligence as a cause rather than bad luck.
by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Tue Sep 12th, 2006 at 10:56:58 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Not necessarily.  Meteor strikes do happen after all.

Still, I wouldn't be at all surprised to learn that large amounts of money eventually change hands based on the circumstances surrounding items 4 & 5.  Pure speculation on my part, you understand.

Somewhere in cyberspace, the ghost of de Chardin is smiling.

by budr on Tue Sep 12th, 2006 at 11:05:50 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I think 1, 2, 3, 6 are actually related and should not be considered independent. Each failure in the chain increases the likelihood of the next one.

So maybe there are just 4 independent faults instead of 7 independent faults.

Nothing is 'mere'. — Richard P. Feynman

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Tue Sep 12th, 2006 at 12:15:23 PM EST
[ Parent ]
That is exactly the way I am reading it. 7 is unclear as to why it happened and could also be related.

I do not know why 8 & 9 fell out of the list, but they are clearly related as they are because of 3 (nad the reason I call them 8 & 9 instead of 8 is that the paper does so).

by A swedish kind of death on Tue Sep 12th, 2006 at 01:16:53 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It's generally accepted, by those who calculate such things, that the probability of dying from a meteor strike is roughly the same as dying in an airplane accident. Not at all an insignificant chance.
by asdf on Wed Sep 13th, 2006 at 09:36:04 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Um. What are the odds? Both events are pretty unlikely, to the point of being insignificant unless you expect to live for a few thousands of years.
by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Wed Sep 13th, 2006 at 09:41:39 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Here are detailed statistics about air disasters. The risk is per flight, not per distance travelled, and is broken down by aircraft model. The Boeing 737 has 3 accidents for each 5 million flights.

Nothing is 'mere'. — Richard P. Feynman
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Sep 13th, 2006 at 09:48:32 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Interesting.

Could you clarify why the high-power pulse counts as separate failure? Was some system meant to block high-power pulses in case of short-circuits?

Overall, withe the final point, this now looks as a much more serious system failure than Vattenfall would have us believe. As a nuclear sceptic, I'd highlight as general principles
(a) the irreducibility of the system (which makes cascading failures likely),
(b) that this cascading failure, like many others, wasn't expected and as such doesn't turn up in (prior) disaster probability calculations used in safety arguments,
(c) that such serious and multiple examples of negligence and technical bungling can occur even in countries with the best record (not the level to be expected in most places should nuclear become a global-warming-battling mainstay of electricity generation globally),
(d) that companies do some serious spinning and withholding of information (in this case, the it-wasn't-that-serious-at-all routine) even if they can expect government oversight to uncover the facts for the public some time later.

*Traitor*, n.
A benighted individual who perceives an illusory distinction between serving his nation and abetting the criminals who govern it.

by DoDo on Tue Sep 12th, 2006 at 11:31:07 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Could you clarify why the high-power pulse counts as separate failure? Was some system meant to block high-power pulses in case of short-circuits?

Yes, there was some protection in the switchgear that was supposed to protect the rest of the system. The article does not say more then that. As I read it, it is implied that this should have worked even in the case of shortcircuit but it does not say it explicitly.

by A swedish kind of death on Tue Sep 12th, 2006 at 01:27:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The most striking fallacy of these I think are 6. I can understand that low frequency would isolate the system form the grid wrt outgoing power from the plant but that it also cut off backup power from the grid to the plant sounds like a serious failure in the design.
by high5 on Wed Sep 13th, 2006 at 04:55:12 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Theya are not really comfortable with that conclusion but yes. Or at least design fault in combination with  human error.

This is just the sort of thing that is not supposed to happen as it cuts through the different layers of security.

by A swedish kind of death on Tue Sep 12th, 2006 at 06:58:29 AM EST
[ Parent ]

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