I think not.
Which is easy to type when you don't live in Darfur, but I don't see any good solutions. I'd like to see a much stronger diplomatic effort, but I think it will fail because China has no interest in recognizing the rights of minorities (c.f Tibet) and besides neither China nor Russia have many reasons to trust the West, it seems at the moment.
Never again, until next time, huh?
Interesting how the most powerful countries in the world are expert decision makers when it comes to issues of maintaining their own power, esp the economic power, over the rest of the world, but when it comes to doing something just because it is decent and humane and ethically responsible, they all act like confused, oblivious, indecisive followers waiting for someone else to "go first."
Please, don't let them fool you. If the UN really wanted to help these people, they would. These countries can invade half the Middle East, pay to send people into outerspace, negotiate the ownership of the world's natural resources. It's not that we can't end a genocide. It's that it is not a priority. Life in Europe and America and Russia and China will go on without poor people in Africa. Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities. -Voltaire
First, the most powerful countries in the world are crap at making decisions when in comes to maintaining their own power. Let me point at Imperial Britain and the current US regime, which has massively undermined its power, as obvious examples of this. They're also shit at negotiating the ownership of resources. Generally this involves giving them to people who fund and support people who are trying to destroy the most powerful countries.
Second, the result of their invading the middle east is, among other things, to make clear that we need to ask "what next"? We could, maybe, stop a genocide for a while by invading. What then? Occupy the area for a few decades? Split up the existing state into a few more?
Going into space is easy: that's just a problem of technology and money.
Rwanda might have been doable if we had intervened very, very early on when the government were busy whipping up the people into a frenzy.
No "peacekeeping force" can prevent a government sponsored ethnic cleansing. "Peacekeeping forces" have neither the mandate nor usually the firepower to do such a job.
What about Chapter VII of the UN charta?
I just googled this from Africa Action: How the UN Can Stop Genocide in Darfur. Don't know if it is all true. Check for yourself:
Precedents Prove Case for UN-African Peacekeeping Operation Under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, the Security Council may take such action as necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. The members of the UN have previously shown their willingness and capability to invoke Chapter 7 peace enforcement and peace-building instruments in response to conflict in Africa. Now, the UN can and must furnish the AU with a strong civilian protection mandate and with international backing in the form of a UN peacekeeping mission to support the AU in Darfur. Precedents show that the UN is a viable source for effective and appropriate international intervention to stop genocide and other crimes against humanity. The following examples also show instances of successful cooperation between African regional bodies, which intervened as "first responders", and the UN, which acted to reinforce their efforts with a larger international force. (1) In Sierra Leone, after the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened to enforce the peace in 1998, the UN Security Council acted in 1999 to authorize an international force with a robust mandate, under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, to work alongside and coordinate with the ECOWAS mission. In late 1999, ECOWAS troops in Sierra Leone were "re-hatted" as UN peacekeepers, and transitioned into a UN mission the next year. The transition in early 2000 was initially rocky, but the Security Council rallied behind the mission and boosted its strength, and the mission was able to deter conflict and restore a secure environment to Sierra Leone. (2) In Liberia, ECOWAS intervened to enforce the peace in 2003, and in August of that year it was granted the authority and mandate by the UN Security Council, under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, to establish security and facilitate humanitarian assistance in Liberia and to pave the way for a UN intervention. The UN Security Council acted swiftly and decisively to authorize and deploy (within 2 months) a larger multinational intervention in Liberia. The ECOWAS troops acted as the first contingent of the UN mission to Liberia, and authority was successfully transferred to the UN operation in October 2003. This international operation has been successful in promoting peace and stability in Liberia. (3) In Côte d'Ivoire, the UN Security Council granted authority to ECOWAS and to France in 2003 to take the necessary steps to provide security and protection in Côte d'Ivoire. In 2004, a UN operation was authorized to take over from the ECOWAS force and work alongside the French forces to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement and to provide protection in Côte d'Ivoire. (4) In Burundi, the AU authorized and deployed its first peacekeeping operation in 2003, when the institution was itself only one year old. The AU operation in Burundi faced financial and logistical challenges, but it was able to oversee the cease-fire and provide some stability. It coordinated with the UN to ensure a relatively smooth transition to a UN operation in Burundi after one year. Also under a Chapter 7 mandate, the UN already has a precedent of authorizing and deploying a peacekeeping operation in southern Sudan. In March 2005, the UN passed a resolution establishing a UN mission in Sudan (UNMIS) with up to 10,000 personnel and a mandate to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. At present, UNMIS comprises some 4,000 troops from more than 50 countries, the majority of which are outside the African continent. These examples illustrate several important lessons, which must now be applied to a UN intervention in support of the AU mission in Darfur. First and foremost, these precedents reveal that a UN-authorized Chapter 7 intervention force in support of an African-led force can be effective in providing security and protection. They show that the Security Council can act with swiftness and decisiveness to grant a robust mandate and troop strength to protect civilians, and they highlight that such an intervention can act as a deterrent to violence and as a catalyst to make a peace process successful. http://africaaction.org/newsroom/index.php?op=read&documentid=1603&type=15&issues=1024
Under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, the Security Council may take such action as necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. The members of the UN have previously shown their willingness and capability to invoke Chapter 7 peace enforcement and peace-building instruments in response to conflict in Africa. Now, the UN can and must furnish the AU with a strong civilian protection mandate and with international backing in the form of a UN peacekeeping mission to support the AU in Darfur.
Precedents show that the UN is a viable source for effective and appropriate international intervention to stop genocide and other crimes against humanity. The following examples also show instances of successful cooperation between African regional bodies, which intervened as "first responders", and the UN, which acted to reinforce their efforts with a larger international force.
(1) In Sierra Leone, after the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened to enforce the peace in 1998, the UN Security Council acted in 1999 to authorize an international force with a robust mandate, under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, to work alongside and coordinate with the ECOWAS mission. In late 1999, ECOWAS troops in Sierra Leone were "re-hatted" as UN peacekeepers, and transitioned into a UN mission the next year. The transition in early 2000 was initially rocky, but the Security Council rallied behind the mission and boosted its strength, and the mission was able to deter conflict and restore a secure environment to Sierra Leone.
(2) In Liberia, ECOWAS intervened to enforce the peace in 2003, and in August of that year it was granted the authority and mandate by the UN Security Council, under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, to establish security and facilitate humanitarian assistance in Liberia and to pave the way for a UN intervention. The UN Security Council acted swiftly and decisively to authorize and deploy (within 2 months) a larger multinational intervention in Liberia. The ECOWAS troops acted as the first contingent of the UN mission to Liberia, and authority was successfully transferred to the UN operation in October 2003. This international operation has been successful in promoting peace and stability in Liberia.
(3) In Côte d'Ivoire, the UN Security Council granted authority to ECOWAS and to France in 2003 to take the necessary steps to provide security and protection in Côte d'Ivoire. In 2004, a UN operation was authorized to take over from the ECOWAS force and work alongside the French forces to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement and to provide protection in Côte d'Ivoire.
(4) In Burundi, the AU authorized and deployed its first peacekeeping operation in 2003, when the institution was itself only one year old. The AU operation in Burundi faced financial and logistical challenges, but it was able to oversee the cease-fire and provide some stability. It coordinated with the UN to ensure a relatively smooth transition to a UN operation in Burundi after one year.
Also under a Chapter 7 mandate, the UN already has a precedent of authorizing and deploying a peacekeeping operation in southern Sudan. In March 2005, the UN passed a resolution establishing a UN mission in Sudan (UNMIS) with up to 10,000 personnel and a mandate to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. At present, UNMIS comprises some 4,000 troops from more than 50 countries, the majority of which are outside the African continent.
These examples illustrate several important lessons, which must now be applied to a UN intervention in support of the AU mission in Darfur. First and foremost, these precedents reveal that a UN-authorized Chapter 7 intervention force in support of an African-led force can be effective in providing security and protection. They show that the Security Council can act with swiftness and decisiveness to grant a robust mandate and troop strength to protect civilians, and they highlight that such an intervention can act as a deterrent to violence and as a catalyst to make a peace process successful. http://africaaction.org/newsroom/index.php?op=read&documentid=1603&type=15&issues=1024
At least this sounds desperate and contradictory to me:
I still don't see how military power can achieve anything here without the agreement of a government that is supporting the people causing the probelm.
I mean, if the government is supporting the genocide, how likely is it that the government agrees to peacekeepers?
(And if the government were not supporting the genocide, there would not be a genocide, but "only" mass murder...) Atlantic Review - A press digest on transatlantic affairs edited by three German Fulbright Alumni
So just despressed.
Area - Total 2,505,813 km² (10th) Population - July 2006 est. 36,992,490 (33rd)
I am not pushing for a military commitment. I just responded to some arguments made in the comments here.
I understand the problem you mention. Therefore I would like to see more diplomatic action: Carrots and Sticks.
According to the Investor Responsibility Research Center: Siemens AG and its subsidiaries have operations in the energy, telecommunications and manufacturing sectors of Iran. The company also has operations in Sudan's energy and telecommunications sectors as well as Syria's telecommunications sector. Due to the company's scope and type of involvement in these sectors, financial or reputational risks exist with respect to global security concerns that merit investor attention. These risks are compounded by Siemens AG's operations in more than one country and sector reviewed by the Monitor. The energy sector has potential security risks including the following: * Activities in this sector can generate significant hard currency revenues, particularly from energy exports, that are available for discretionary use by the government; * Certain types of power generation facilities and related components have potential military applications; * The governments covered by the Monitor often rely on foreign firms for advanced technologies, equipment, industry expertise and financing for large-scale energy projects; and * These governments and their state-owned entities or agencies are closely linked to the commercial energy sector. The telecommunications sector has potential security risks including the following: * Certain telecommunications equipment and technologies have potential military (or 'dual use') applications; * Certain types of telecommunications infrastructure, such as command and control technology, computers, communications and intelligence systems, are central to military capabilities; http://www.irrc.org/company/Siemens_SampleRpt.pdf
The folks running the divestment campaign believe that it works:
UC Divestment from Sudan - Position "The effectiveness of divestment from Sudan has clear and recent precedent. Talisman Energy's 2003 decision to extricate itself from operations in Sudan following widespread and sustained economic pressure by Western investors over human rights abuses committed by the government during the North-South civil war prompted two other international oil companies to sell their stakes in Sudan. Faced with the prospect of continuing loss of FDI, Khartoum signed the Naivasha Treaty with southern rebels shortly thereafter, paving the way for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between North and South in January of 2005. Finally, divestment will do minimal harm to innocent Sudanese. The divestment criteria designed by the taskforce, and specifically enumerated in Section VIII, exclude any company engaged in the provision of goods and services intended to relieve human suffering or to promote human welfare. They also exclude sectors of the Sudanese economy, such as agriculture, which provide employment for large sectors of the population." http://www.inosphere.com/sudan/position.asp#proposal
Finally, divestment will do minimal harm to innocent Sudanese. The divestment criteria designed by the taskforce, and specifically enumerated in Section VIII, exclude any company engaged in the provision of goods and services intended to relieve human suffering or to promote human welfare. They also exclude sectors of the Sudanese economy, such as agriculture, which provide employment for large sectors of the population." http://www.inosphere.com/sudan/position.asp#proposal
I am not so sure about it since China is more and more important for Sudan. However, I think we often exaggerate China's economic influence a bit. Besides, if we are unwilling to send troops, then more funding and operational support for the AU (operating under a better mandate) as well as divestment should be the least we should do.
What do you propose, Migeru? Atlantic Review - A press digest on transatlantic affairs edited by three German Fulbright Alumni
But, my depressing conclusion is that that is politically unlikely to be supported in most countries around the world.
if there is no peace to keep you cannot send in "peacekeepers".
"Peacekeepers" can have either a Chapter VI mandate for peacekeeping (=keeping the peace) or a Chapter VII for peaceenforcement (trying to create peace, where none exists).
The bluehelmets operating under a Chapter VII peace enforcement mandate are also called "Peacekeepers".
"Peaceenforcers" would be a better term, but the charta (?) and everybody only refer to them as "Peacekeepers". Atlantic Review - A press digest on transatlantic affairs edited by three German Fulbright Alumni
