One of the tragedies of the Blair years is that he never had the courage to defy Murdoch and stand up to argue for his theoretical pro-European views. Remember at the start of his premiership Blair was the pro-European alternative to John Major and the Conservatives.
Blair several times rallied the pro-European cross party campaign, but never gave it sufficient support, so that the pro-Europeans were undercut and got discouraged. I seem to recall someone like Lord Heseltine (prominent pro-European Conservative politician of the last generation) promising that he would never trust Blair again.
If we ever had a referendum, presumably the pro-European politicians would be heard from. I do not underestimate the impact of the "keep tight hold of nurse, for fear of finding something worse" argument on the undecided voter. It was what decided the 1975 referendum in the UK.
And what I'm bothered about is not a simple anti-Britishness. A point both I and Migeru tried to stress is that you cast the conflict and interplay of Eurosceptics, neoliberals, etatists in only a (simplified) Franco-British framework, but the setup is different whether we speak of Scandinavian countries, new members, the Netherlands, Germany or Italy -- and for a European debate with (against) both Euroscepticism and neoliberalism, I'd wish your arguments reflected the latter too. To stress again, Euroscepticism =/= neoliberalism is the most important point for me. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
As to assimilating euroskepticism and neoliberalism, let's not play with words. The neolibs are hostile to the EU as a political force, but do not mind using the EU clout to push for neolib "reform". So they use the powers while at the same time denigrating them and bashing them, a truely nasty combination, as it doubly deconsiders the EU - as a pusher of neolib policies, and as an apparently corrupt, bureaucratic, non-transparent out of control institution.
The EU Constitution would have reinforced the political legitimacy of the EU institutions, and, via the EP, transparency. With more legitimacy it could have easily fought off the neolib tendencies of those in power, as the less powerful EP today already shows. In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
Except for 'purported', and with the addition of 'on the domestic arena', that far all of us are in agreement.
"Eurosceptic in practice" is one example of your limited and simplified Anglo-French focus.
let's not play with words
Indeed let's not. Using the EU clout to push neolib "reform" is friendliness to the EU as political force. The neolibs are friendly to further EU integration and institutional development, but want it in a way that that clout for "reforms" is enhanced, and resistance paralysed. Outside France vs. Britain, they use the very same pro-business, market-faithful, no-alternative-to-globalisation arguments as arguments for remeining or entering the EU, the Euro, or adopting standards, or the Constitution, or just be enthusiastic about Europe, or to denounce nationalist opponents' views.
Maybe I should recruit you Marek, A Swedish Kind of Death, Nomad, dvx, and a couple of others to write diaries about the neolibs vs. the Eurosceptics and the debate on Europe in each of their countries of good knowledge. Maybe those would also help me explain to you what significant and qualitative difference (for the even worse) Bliar's not being Eurosceptic means at the EU level. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
That puts them at odds with the euroskeptics on means, not on goals. In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
I ask because from everything I read, Brown does have some marked but not very public Eurosceptic views (and I'd range his one significant standing-up to Bliar, just over the Euro, in there), but elsewhere you argued that there is little or no difference between Brown's and Bliar's views. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
I presume that Brown accepts, in the abstract, that British membership of the EU is in the British national interest. He has however sometimes seemed uninvolved in the reality of being an EU member.
It would be bad for the prospects of a pro EU outcome to a referendum if Brown followed the Blair policy of not making the pro EU case forcefully.
In the only UK wide referendum in our history, in 1975, the yes side included the bulk of the leadership of our three major parties and a very enthusiastic cross party campaign. The no camp was a lot less organised than the eurosceptics are today. It was an odd mixture of left wingers like Tony Benn (who saw the then EC as a capitalist club), Labour centrists like Peter Shore (representing the early 1960s view of the late Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell, that joining the Common Market would be the end of a thousand years of history) and right wing Conservatives (at the time given little importamce compared to the dissident Labour cabinet ministers).
The overwhelming weight of political and media support was on the yes side. Leading politicians like Ted Heath, Harold Wilson and Roy Jenkins were campaigning positively as well as warning of the bad consequences of leaving the community.
I think the British people confronted by the solemn warnings of the leading centrist political figures of the day, were persuaded to vote yes rather than risk the uncertainties of rejecting that advice.
Since 1975 the mainstream leadership of the Conservative party has moved 180 degrees on Europe. It is unlikely that any current Tory frontbenchers would be part of a pro EU campaign. On the other hand there is less division amongst the leading Labour ministers than there was in Harold Wilson's cabinet.
Nowadays, with politicians held in even more contempt than they were in 1975, and after decades of almost unanswered eurosceptic propaganda; if Brown does not campaign wholeheartedly for the EU case the prospects for it are fairly dismal.
