Under two important scenarios - the remaining EU members, including the UK, join EMU by 2020 or else the recent depreciation trend of the dollar persists into the future - the euro may surpass the dollar as leading international reserve currency by 2022.
2022 is not exactly "soon". But then, you can't rely on economists' predictions, so we're back to guessing anyway. "If you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles." Sun Tzu
In the transition scenario, its not smooth at all. "If you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles." Sun Tzu
Yea, okay that's my prejudice too, but from left to right political viewpoints they all seem to think it's stupid and backward keep to the Fen Causeway
FT Maverecon blog: Isn't it time for Britain to join the EU?
Denmark is likely to hold a referendum on its relationship with the European Union. The referendum proposed by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, its newly re-elected prime minister, is not a referendum on the EU Reform Treaty (aka Constitution-lite), although it is possible that Denmark will also hold a separate referendum on the EU Reform Treaty. Instead, the Referendum proposed by Rasmussen concerns the four opt-outs Denmark negotiated as part of the Maastricht Treaty. The four opt-outs concern Denmark's participation in (1) the common currency (full EMU membership); (2) EU defence policy; (3) EU cooperation on justice and home affairs and (4) EU citizenship. The reasons for Denmark's change of heart are obvious. As regards Eurozone membership, the Danish currency is umbilically linked to the euro via a fixed exchange rate. Danish interest rates follow those set in Frankfurt for the Eurozone with a lag of a few hours. Might as well save the transaction costs of converting Danish kroner into euros, get a voice in setting monetary policy for the Eurozone (and for Denmark) and have access to a serious lender of last resort, rather than one which can only issue kroner. Non-participation in EU defence policy means that Denmark has to stand on the sidelines with military actions it approves of, and even feels strongly about, such as the EU presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and probably soon also in Kosovo. Since 2002, the EU has engaged in sixteen operations outside the EU, using civilian and military instruments in several countries in three continents (Europe, Africa and Asia).
The reasons for Denmark's change of heart are obvious. As regards Eurozone membership, the Danish currency is umbilically linked to the euro via a fixed exchange rate. Danish interest rates follow those set in Frankfurt for the Eurozone with a lag of a few hours. Might as well save the transaction costs of converting Danish kroner into euros, get a voice in setting monetary policy for the Eurozone (and for Denmark) and have access to a serious lender of last resort, rather than one which can only issue kroner.
Non-participation in EU defence policy means that Denmark has to stand on the sidelines with military actions it approves of, and even feels strongly about, such as the EU presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and probably soon also in Kosovo. Since 2002, the EU has engaged in sixteen operations outside the EU, using civilian and military instruments in several countries in three continents (Europe, Africa and Asia).
IN SOVIET times, one escape for freedom-loving types was "internal emigration". This involved a retreat to a country dacha or secluded library, there to write or grow vegetables and be isolated from the world beyond. It was a rational strategy for those who could not influence the regime, but it had a flaw: they were still behind the Iron Curtain. Now, in a perverse echo, something similar is happening with Britain and its relationship with the European Union. The British are not about to walk out. But they are in danger of mentally turning their backs on the EU. Plenty of other EU countries harbour Eurosceptics of their own. French leftists want more protectionism; most Austrians hate the thought of admitting Turkey; lots of east Europeans feel the club's environmental rules are overblown. But the British case is different: sections of the government, media and public seem to want to forget that the EU exists. This is an irrational strategy, with two big flaws. Eurosceptic daydreaming aside, the EU is not a dictatorship; and Britain remains a paid-up member.
Plenty of other EU countries harbour Eurosceptics of their own. French leftists want more protectionism; most Austrians hate the thought of admitting Turkey; lots of east Europeans feel the club's environmental rules are overblown. But the British case is different: sections of the government, media and public seem to want to forget that the EU exists. This is an irrational strategy, with two big flaws. Eurosceptic daydreaming aside, the EU is not a dictatorship; and Britain remains a paid-up member.
EU decision making is still often high-level diplomacy. Germany and France have a lock on most of the power because they realise this and act accordingly. For the same reason, the Dutch are punching far above their weight and the Italians have never had much power.
I mean, we do complex 150 page studies to evaluate our negotiating strategies, using fancy game-theoretical models and all. It's not just some game. Every country that is serious about European policy spends a lot of attention on it and has a lot of extremely competent civil servants working on it. Plus of course it tries to get as many civil servants as high in the European civil service as possible.
The UK, however, prefers to sleep things over and consequently it does not get to shape policy but only has blocking power and is frequently isolated. And Brown 'gets' this much less than Blair did. Blair might actually have gotten the UK somewhere in Europe had he not blown it by going to war with Iraq.
It's just expressing the worry that French and German visions of Europe will win out, not the laisser-faire one. In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
The death of the European fast stream is "insane, insane", groans one top Eurocrat. A diplomat from another country calls its disappearance "great for the rest of us".
As I've said many times, France and Germany actually agree on very little spontaneously, it's a permanent fight, but both have made the strategic decision that a compromise MUST be found with the other, and such compromises are quite often acceptable to most other EU countries because France and Germany usually represent the usual poles. That dynamic actually brakes down on topics where France and Germany are closer. That's where a similar dynamic with the UK would work wonders.
How to make the UK take the strategic decision that it MUST force itself to find compromises with France and/or Germany (and France/Germany making the same commitment) for the greater good of Europe?
The concept of "greater good of Europe" has to exist beyond the channel, I guess would be a first requirement... but I still have hope.
A strengthening euro might concentrate minds, who knows. Or a grand financial crash. Something to take off Brown's mind his haughty conviction of the absolute superiority of the current British model and his vision of Europe as a chore, like sickly parents visiting can be. In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
