1. in the last 2-3 years, Railion conducted a big cull of freight access points (the part in Germany: the "MORA C" plan, Denmark suffered something similar), focusing on keeping only large customers who'd order full-train transports. Some of these have been taken over by privates, some haven't, and at least in Germany, some couldn't be even if privates would have been willing, because DB made access impossible.

2. In no small part because of this policy, on one hand, Railion reduced losses, on the other hand, overall rail freight volumes got a damper.

3. The following is a doomed strategy: abandon local access points and count on customers electing to send their cargo to the railway with trucks. Why two more reloadings when the trucks can go all the way? This didn't kept Railion's (integrated-railway) precursors from trying it, resulting in some nice new empty combined transport terminals. (Note: this issue, like most issues for railfreight, is one where decisions on infrastructure and operation are closely interlinked.)

4. On a broader note, competition introduced a foreseeable, incurable but overseen problem: that of dominant market players (here: Railion) trying to thwart rivals even at the cost of overall rail market share. Another strong example is Railion's practice to send its old locomotives to scrap metal traders, rather than earn much more from selling them to the privates. Thus the privates either have to buy new locos or buy foreign second-hand locos and go through the lengthy and costy process of getting permission to run them on German tracks.

5. You mention the road toll for lorries, that was a significant help, but apparently not enough.

This is another example of how much infrastructure counts and is linked to operation.

_{*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.}