Dawkins likes to say that moral implications of scientific theories are irrelevent, that he is merely "describing how things are under evolution, not endorsing them as morally good". But the convictions that everything can be explained and done with selfishness alone do have social (and eventually biological and physical) consequences.
The two theories of economic and biological selfishness might have made the breakthroughs "independently". But I guess that Dawkins' categorical explanations were appealing and instructive to Chicago ideologs. After all, the implications that Nature works this selfish way (with "survival of fittest" included) and so impressively give a lot of excuse and confidence to implement the theory wholesomely.
I think that Dawkins' "approximation" of Nature workings needs to be updated. Greed has evolutionary downsides as well. To deal with them, much more subtle "selfishness" is needed. Pure selfishness as a basic behavioral mechanism requires a good deal of intentionality. A more basic premise is that of functional behavior: animals behave following inhereted or learned behaviour modes, which are usually adequately functional. Habits rule over rational optimizations.
Animals may have selfishness percetion - and it would be evolutionary useful indeed. But:
It is a kind of Occam's razor argument - everything follows from selfishness instinct, no need to assume other instincts, altruistic in particular. But when it comes down to this, even simpler basic assumption is behavioral - animals just behave one way or other, discated by inborne or learned instructions, and not surprisingly, most of their behaviours are useful to them most of the time, and they rarely are harmful to themselves.
Intentionally or not, Dawkins' implications are parallel to straight socio-Darwinistic arguments. In particular, his "selfish gene" metaphor super-emphisises the role of an individual - nothing matters but survival of the smallest subject. I think this a too narrow perspective. Whether you a gene or a slump worker, you can only be so much selfish most of the time - just do your part in the machinery of an organism or a mine company. Dawkins kind of denies meaningful selection on higher than genetic levels - but too often gene selection is just a pretty random game, with every "good-for-something" combination reproducible when circumstances are "normal" to it. Much more meaningful selection does happen on organism level, and sometimes - on group level, when cooperation is a straight necessity (though not necessarily sufficiency) for survival, however you spin that.
In particular, what is "ultimate selfishness"? It is either a tautology, or something no organism can "compute" in advance.
I think that niche constuction (or "over-extended phenotypes") has better explanations to offer eventually. In particular, "fighting" or utilizing "most greedy genes" might be an impressive cooperative (and real) "art" beyond Dawkins' approach.
Naturalistic legitimacy is not something to frown upon. We would be happy if our economies would function just as richly as natural environments. A more cooperative or wholistic understanding of Nature would have positive impact on human societies.
Dawkins is a prime example of why imputing intent to chemical reactions is one of the paths to science hell.
The competative interpretation is funnily interesting - you might probably say that a certain gene of George W controls all the planet. But the context/playground of the genes "battle" becomes so rich and incidental that it makes much more sense to talk a group of genes (and not only from the Bush family) cooperating in competition against other group of genes (say, "liberal" genes) - hence you have very sensible higher levels of selection.
Why the dots?
you might probably say that a certain gene of George W controls all the planet.
I may be mistaken, but this "controls" seems to imply a mistaken idea of what genes do -- the simplistic but widespread idea of genetic determination. But genes don't miraculously 'control' anything, they just have an effect under certain circumstances (circumstances which include both other genes and 'environmental factors'). No gene determines foot size, for example -- with the right diet, you grow much larger (not to mention having zero-sized feet if you cut off your leg in an accident).
it makes much more sense to talk a group of genes ... cooperating in competition against other group of genes
That makes sense only if the occurence of competing variants of the various genes in the group are correlated. There may be some correlation between some gene variants due to compatibilites, but not for the entire genome [varation] of most sexually reproducing species, or even any groups of genes you pick in their genome.
I note though that with Dawkins's original loose definition of 'gene', higher-level selection is a non-issue: what we'd view as separate genes with strongly correlated variants (based on the now accepted geneticist definition of gene) would be one gene in his treatment in those 20-30-years-old books. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
So the economy needs to be thought of as a garden, not as a wild ecosystem. And managing a garden as an ecosystem is hard to do, monoculture is easier as there are fewer different things to think about.
I guess what you're leading to is permaculture. But permaculture is not a natural environment, it's a managed environment. Bush is a symptom, not the disease.
Really? I thought the economy compells to think only about yourself. Who cares about Chinese workers, African kids?
I don't see our economies just us rich. Especially now, I see many wide one-way highways of growth, but I wonder, how the things will bend to ever lively cycles.
But if you do care then you have to manage the economy, because left to itself it's going to look a lot like a jungle. Bush is a symptom, not the disease.
I think that dominating greed is abnormal in Nature. There are no licenses and tax incentives there.
... the economy needs to be thought of as a garden, not as a wild ecosystem.
THAT is excellent Framing and could be developed into a counter-narrative/attack.
No, Dawkins doesn't talk about selfish instincts. He talks about genes, and the issue here is the possibility of selfish genes determining altruistic instincts. (Or cooperation-inducing instincts, or even self-harmful instincts.) Dawkins agues a great deal about potential conflict between the interests of individuals and the 'interests' of their genes. You really should read the book.
parallel to straight socio-Darwinistic arguments. In particular, his "selfish gene" metaphor super-emphisises the role of an individual - nothing matters but survival of the smallest subject.
How is that parallel to Social Darwinism? It is obviously reductionist, in which direction your critisism runs. But the problem with Social Darwinism is not making reductionist arguments (and that's not what they do), but confusing description (what happens and why) and desirability (what should happen), treating nature as some mythical force rather than changing and replaced by our artifical environment & culture, having no clue about the actual human genetic variance but making simplistic (racist) assumptions about it, and having a very narrow (again ideological advocacy parading as science) view of what can constitute 'fitness'.
Dawkins kind of denies meaningful selection on higher than genetic levels
What I'd accuse Dawkins of is denying the importance of evolutionary processes other than adaptive selection. In his later books and articles, when he confronts more scientific criticisms, that's pretty apparent -- he acknowledges things like genetic drift and macroevolutionary processes, but treats them as uninteresting detail when compared to the order-creating(/retaining/accumulating) selection. Dawkins's opponents ascribe this to his reductionism.
Much more meaningful selection does happen on organism level, and sometimes - on group level, when cooperation is a straight necessity (though not necessarily sufficiency) for survival, however you spin that.
...and you accuse others of sounding like Social Darwinists?...
First, you read the Extended Phenotype, but still don't appear to make a difference between genes and phenotype. Selection considered by Dawkins (or Darwin) always acts on the phenotype, be it an organism, a wolf pack or a termite mound. A phenotype is always the result of multiple genes acting in concert (sometimes genes of multiple species, as you say elsewhere). Question is, was there a genetic difference that made a difference? If there was no genetic difference, no biological evolution was involved. If there was difference but it made no difference, we have a case of genetic drift, not selection. (One of the things Dawkins recognises but thinks uninteresting.)
Now, if there was genetic difference and that mattered, how extensive is it? Surely not the entire range of cooperating genes in an organism: there isn't even difference in most. And by all likelyhood, not even the entire genetic variation present in the competing sides (be them organisms or groups of organisms), especially if for genes with variation within, not just between groups.
Viewing group-level conflicts as competition of gene alliances comes dangerously close to racism.
In particular, what is "ultimate selfishness"?
I'm not sure what you refer to. Could you give a quote? *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
The pop social darwinism does like simplistic bottom line explanations. It is not exactly reductionism, but a common idea of "explaining something" nevertherless. I wonder whether they could be led to more proper thinking from there. Or will their explanations "Free Market saves poor" be just as rational or mystical as "God did this"?
What I refer more is the economic side of Social Darwinism - the world is just as it can be for the winners and looseers. Dawkins' notion of fittness does not look very rich to me - and that may feed the "common wisdom" meme of being good will skeptical and minding only your own interests.
I am surprised with you noticing social darwinism here:
I do not mean here survival necessity for group-level conflicts. Hard circumstances might be such that individuals have to cooperate because they would not survive one by one; I also can imagine that raiding or consuming similar kins would not be actually useful to overcome the whole hardship period. One of my thoughts is that extreme survival pressure may result in remarkable cases of symbiosis, and vice versa, most stunning symbioses must have appeared during extinction threatening times - an accidental symbiosis would be vitally useful immediately, while conventionally "selfish" strategies would mostly fail to get through.
In other words, individuals or species are forced to compete in cooperation sometimes. You can see this in the economy (with acquisitions and mergers, corporate alliances). The libertarian ideology does not acknowledge benefits of cooperation, but they are actually enjoyed within wealthy classes pretty much.
("Ultimate unselfishness" was mentioned in Torres' post I was responding to.)
Your arguments sound like one type of moral argument marshalled against Darwin a century ago (and by some creationists even today). *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
