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One striking feature of this is that the west (uncapitalised) is defined in pretty narrow security and military terms. It sounds like a purely defensive construct against outside threats. Nothing about values, nothing about democracy, nothing about being an exemple for the rest of the world, or a leader in setting up new standards of behavior - this is batten-the-hatches be-ready-for-battle-against the evil-oppressors rhetoric - the west in under siege.
The 'values' are 'neoliberal'. I.e. these narrow 'security' and 'military' terms are 'security' for the purpose of global Capital. Remember, greed has been elevated to an ethical principle, and the 'security' we need is the one that allows unfettered greed on behalf of Capital, 'security' to ensure that no measure other than 'GDP growth' can be considered a figure of merit. I assume that a lot of the punch of the article in terms of the assumed primacy of US interests, with the UK as a given follower, is that these two 'nations' can be relied upon to understand this inevitable trajectory of Capital and the indisputable goodness of its demands for infinite right to greed, 'growth' and 'profits'. The people in service of 'markets', not 'markets' in service of the people. France is still seen as sometimes trying to assert other, conflicting, metrics of progress. It is therefore more of a prize in this quest for 'security' than the UK could ever be.
Why on earth would they have to explicitly state these 'neoliberal' values? They are after all indisputable and inevitable!
Corollary - Atlanticism is implacably hostile to genuine democracy.
Not that we didn't know that already, but it's worth spelling it out.
As for "the legitimate interests of the people of the United States", yes I do think those could exist. But if those interests extend to other nations, in particular to how those other nations trade and allow access to their natural resources, 'markets' and labour pool, then, I cannot agree that those interests would be 'legitimate'. I.e. if the people of the United States where to explicitly demand and favour foreign policy to exact control over the middle east for the purpose of filling the tanks of those godforsaken SUVs, then, no, that is not a 'legitimate' interest of the people of the United States. If the people of the United States where to explicitly demand and favour foreign policy to limit the rights of workers and human rights in foreign lands so that their box-stores might continue to be filled with cheap goods from sweatshop labour, then that too would not be a 'legitimate' interest. etc. etc. etc.
And every day Americans (and Europeans, we are not blameless, oh no. 'Westerners', we can really write here!!) do demand such foreign policy. Perhaps not explicitly, but certainly implicitly, though their continued worship of another shiny piece of convenience crap. As long as ones economic interests are so closely aligned with an exploitative relationship to foreign labour, than any amount of hand-wringing about those poor people of whatever country, and their lack of human rights, and a decent standard of living, and reasonable labour conditions, is just that. So much hand-wringing, and nothing else! Some pity to make ourselves feel good about ourselves. "Yes! We are good people! Wanting good for everyone. No one should be hurt! And cheap goods and services too, please!!"
Remember, greed has been elevated to an ethical principle, and the 'security' we need is the one that allows unfettered greed on behalf of Capital, 'security' to ensure that no measure other than 'GDP growth' can be considered a figure of merit.
That sums it up nicely. Who defined the goals of NATO as "keeping the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down"?
Whenever Atlanticists demand that Europe speak with one voice they mean the US'. The only way Europe is allowed to have a unified foreign policy is by adopting US positions. The nonsensical boycott of hamas and the sanctions against Iran are cases in point. The plural of anecdote is bullshit.
The nonsensical boycott of hamas and the sanctions against Iran are cases in point.
The EU's soft power relies to some extent on the threat of the USA's hard power. And the EU can't see itself existing in isolation without allies.
So a nominal alliance with the US - ignoring the occasional spats - is still seen as being more strategically secure than an alliance with Pacifica.
And values are more compatible too - both in the stated peacefreedumbndemocracy way, and in the practical realpolitik sense of making a lot of noise about human rights while working to minimise them to an expedient level.
As things stand now, there is no chance at all of a divorce. The best that's going to happen is separate bedrooms while the US gets over its substance abuse issues, and some token media distance.
The EU is more likely to move itself to the middle of the Pacific than it is to snub the US and ally itself formally with China or Russia.
It won't be painless either. We have met the enemy, and it is us — Pogo
As to an Iranian naval commander/genius/hero, I don't know much about their capability. My guess, though, is that, if there is anywhere that technological advantages such as spy satellites and related targetting apply, it is in this context. Those flotillas seem to me to be quite secure. I think that the only reason that Cheney wanted a third carrier group was firepower over-kill, not mutual defense.
What do y'all think about other potential actors, such as Russia, China, or ?? Clearly, they "win", as the U.S. self-destructs, but can they continue to stand aside, if this conflict spreads? If nukes are used, I don't think that they can. I wonder what their contingency plans look like.
I know that the CW is that Israel will participate, but can they sustain their local military dominance, if they expend a major amount of armament? The Iranians and others are giving the impression that they have some sophisticated anti-aircraft tools. If they resist an air attack somewhat successfully, I don't think that Israel can sustain the attack - excepting the use of nukes, of course.
But I think that the largest question is what will happen within the U.S. The rumors are strong that the U.S. military is resisting any attack on Iran, not to mention the continued scale of occupation forces in Iraq. In addition I think that a very large portion of the U.S. population is very restive. Maybe it's my optimistic nature, but it feels very tense here. The letters-to-the-editor in the Northwest run at a high ratio of anti-administration-policies positions. paul spencer
The big priority is to smash the command and communication system to stop the opponent from coordianting their attack, this has been the pattern of US and NATO air opperations since the Berlin wall came down, first destroy any ability for the enemy to coordinate, then remove air defence, then smash ground targets. Interviewer: What do you believe is behind this recent increase in terrorist bombings? Helpmann: Bad sportsmanship
There is a possibility that this could be a devastating attack. From a source who seems a bit odd, but who summarizes clearly what is alluded to in various other sources . . .
The Sunburn can deliver a 200-kiloton nuclear payload, or: a 750-pound conventional warhead, within a range of 100 miles, more than twice the range of the Exocet. The Sunburn combines a Mach 2.1 speed (two times the speed of sound) with a flight pattern that hugs the deck and includes "violent end maneuvers" to elude enemy defenses. The missile was specifically designed to defeat the US Aegis radar defense system. Should a US Navy Phalanx point defense somehow manage to detect an incoming Sunburn missile, the system has only seconds to calculate a fire solution not enough time to take out the intruding missile. The US Phalanx defense employs a six-barreled gun that fires 3,000 depleted-uranium rounds a minute, but the gun must have precise coordinates to destroy an intruder "just in time." The Sunburn's combined supersonic speed and payload size produce tremendous kinetic energy on impact, with devastating consequences for ship and crew. A single one of these missiles can sink a large warship, yet costs considerably less than a fighter jet. Although the Navy has been phasing out the older Phalanx defense system, its replacement, known as the Rolling Action Missile (RAM) has never been tested against the weapon it seems destined to one day face in combat. Implications For US Forces in the Gulf The US Navy's only plausible defense against a robust weapon like the Sunburn missile is to detect the enemy's approach well ahead of time, whether destroyers, subs, or fighter-bombers, and defeat them before they can get in range and launch their deadly cargo. For this purpose US AWACs radar planes assigned to each naval battle group are kept aloft on a rotating schedule. The planes "see" everything within two hundred miles of the fleet, and are complemented with intelligence from orbiting satellites. But US naval commanders operating in the Persian Gulf face serious challenges that are unique to the littoral, i.e., coastal, environment. A glance at a map shows why: The Gulf is nothing but a large lake, with one narrow outlet, and most of its northern shore, i.e., Iran, consists of mountainous terrain that affords a commanding tactical advantage over ships operating in Gulf waters. The rugged northern shore makes for easy concealment of coastal defenses, such as mobile missile launchers, and also makes their detection problematic. Although it was not widely reported, the US actually lost the battle of the Scuds in the first Gulf War termed "the great Scud hunt" and for similar reasons. Saddam Hussein's mobile Scud launchers proved so difficult to detect and destroy over and over again the Iraqis fooled allied reconnaissance with decoys that during the course of Desert Storm the US was unable to confirm even a single kill. This proved such an embarrassment to the Pentagon, afterwards, that the unpleasant stats were buried in official reports. But the blunt fact is that the US failed to stop the Scud attacks. The launches continued until the last few days of the conflict. Luckily, the Scud's inaccuracy made it an almost useless weapon. At one point General Norman Schwarzkopf quipped dismissively to the press that his soldiers had a greater chance of being struck by lightning in Georgia than by a Scud in Kuwait.
The Sunburn's combined supersonic speed and payload size produce tremendous kinetic energy on impact, with devastating consequences for ship and crew. A single one of these missiles can sink a large warship, yet costs considerably less than a fighter jet. Although the Navy has been phasing out the older Phalanx defense system, its replacement, known as the Rolling Action Missile (RAM) has never been tested against the weapon it seems destined to one day face in combat. Implications For US Forces in the Gulf
The US Navy's only plausible defense against a robust weapon like the Sunburn missile is to detect the enemy's approach well ahead of time, whether destroyers, subs, or fighter-bombers, and defeat them before they can get in range and launch their deadly cargo. For this purpose US AWACs radar planes assigned to each naval battle group are kept aloft on a rotating schedule. The planes "see" everything within two hundred miles of the fleet, and are complemented with intelligence from orbiting satellites.
But US naval commanders operating in the Persian Gulf face serious challenges that are unique to the littoral, i.e., coastal, environment. A glance at a map shows why: The Gulf is nothing but a large lake, with one narrow outlet, and most of its northern shore, i.e., Iran, consists of mountainous terrain that affords a commanding tactical advantage over ships operating in Gulf waters. The rugged northern shore makes for easy concealment of coastal defenses, such as mobile missile launchers, and also makes their detection problematic. Although it was not widely reported, the US actually lost the battle of the Scuds in the first Gulf War termed "the great Scud hunt" and for similar reasons.
Saddam Hussein's mobile Scud launchers proved so difficult to detect and destroy over and over again the Iraqis fooled allied reconnaissance with decoys that during the course of Desert Storm the US was unable to confirm even a single kill. This proved such an embarrassment to the Pentagon, afterwards, that the unpleasant stats were buried in official reports. But the blunt fact is that the US failed to stop the Scud attacks. The launches continued until the last few days of the conflict. Luckily, the Scud's inaccuracy made it an almost useless weapon. At one point General Norman Schwarzkopf quipped dismissively to the press that his soldiers had a greater chance of being struck by lightning in Georgia than by a Scud in Kuwait.
This latter part gives support to your argument that it will be difficult to find and destroy the missile launch sites. Even should fixed C&C facilities be destroyed, there's no reason why mobile missile launchers would not be able to find and sink US Navy assets in the coastal environment, unless the US Navy withdrew to the Indian Ocean.
The truth of this should not be underestimated. In all honesty, I think that in terms of economic gains, Europe is a greater beneficiary of American hard power and the ability to enforce open markets than the United States itself. Which is at a source of American discontent with Europe. Because we're left paying the price (in both and economic and human sense) for creating world order, and Europe is benefiting.
In particular, I recommend former Swiss MP Jean Ziegler's book "Switzerland, the awful truth" for detail of the ways in which European states have been benficiaries of American power.
There is another world to be had, a fairer world. That must come through conscious construction though, and not from rejection of the current international regime without thought to what will replace it. Be careful what you wish for, because you just might get it.
We matter more than pounds and pence/ Your economic theory makes no sense "We work the Black Seam"-Sting
On the surface it relies on a unique narrative and a unique form of accounting, but in fact it's a very old-fashioned kind of empire acting in very old-fashioned ways.
The practical difference is based on clever technology, and there are also some hesitant and very limited steps towards humanitarianism - although they're very local and contingent, and the current US administration is working hard to eliminate them.
Aside from that, ideologically it might as well be Rome.
Rome imploded under the weight of its own corruption. It couldn't afford to keep or train an effective military, and it was eaten alive by neighbouring tribes.
I think we can nearly take a US implosion as a given now. So the question isn't so much whether the EU can split successfully, as whether or not it's juicy enough a prize to be worth picking up afterwards.
I don't think it is. Russia and China have enough people and enough resources not to need more. Don't forget Europe is almost entirely reliant on external energy supplies. That on its own makes it strategically vulnerable.
If times become hard Russia and China may feel like starting a war for political reasons. But I'm not sure it's worth anyone's while to annexe Europe when natural resources here are so limited, and the population would need so much 're-education' to become useful.
So as things are now, divorce is the wrong question. The divorce will happen anyway when the dominant party expires.
After that, Europe's long term survival prospects as a bloc are not good. If the US collapses, Europe is likely to be left to rot because its only real wealth is cultural and historical - and that counts for very little when resources are limited.
Which means that the smart thing to do now is to start planning for a post-US world where trade and economics are very much less important than they are today, and basic farming and energy self-sufficiency are very much more so.
I'm not expecting anyone to actually do this, even though it makes sense whatever happens next - and it may be the only way to salvage anything at all here after a crash.
Before the dawn
Well, maybe not always! I told Bush; don't play chess with the freakin' Russians.
Capital is just another tribal domination game. On the surface it relies on a unique narrative and a unique form of accounting, but in fact it's a very old-fashioned kind of empire acting in very old-fashioned ways.
I've been reading for classes, and one of the more interesting ideas that I've encountered recently is the idea that the current international system in some sense represents the global diffusion of the utlitarian value system across the globe.
Now if you are a good utilitarian, you have an indivualist ontology. Which is to say that the value that you place on items is entirely your own, value is no affected by social interaction. Let's call this the income narrative. In this instance, the amount of income that others posses is of no concern to you. So long as the amount of income that you receive increases, the distribution of income is not important.
This defies common sense. Anyone who's been a teenager knows that consumption is largely socially driven. That is to say that value is not internally determined, but instead the origin of preferences lies in socialization into one's peer group. And value isn't indivualized, it's socialized. Wealth becomes a zero-sum game, because the relative distribution of wealth rather than the absolute quantity present in a society is what matters. And individuals will willingly destroy societal wealth (including the portion they own) in order to create a more even distribution of wealth in society. Wealth derives its importance not from the individual utility, but from the social status it grants.
Consider now what this means for the global distribution of wealth, and the prospects for conflict as that changes..........
That is to say, "if you are a typical, debased utilitarian (simplistic, and blind even to your own values)..." -------------
I prefer to attack bad ideas on their own terms when possible: This bypasses a layer of intellectual armor and concentrates fire on a soft spot. For example:
Genuine "utility" corresponds to what people actually value, which includes a more than just money and what it can buy. Confused utilitarians, out to maximize wealth instead of utility, are simply wrong by their own standards. What people actually value includes their relationships, the well-being of others, and a lot more.
So, no need to attack utilitarianism or self-interest here; we can save that effort for another war. (Hmmm... If people understood the reality of the hedonic treadmill, then what?)
</ favorite-topic> Words and ideas I offer here may be used freely and without attribution.
It's a key element in this Economic Madness that all utility must be measured in monetary terms to the maximum extent possible, and all relationships must be commodified.
Of course this is nuts, and it's at the core of our pathology.
But while that minor detail is sorting itself out in a collision with the real world, we're left with the fact that it's a rare neoliberal who can accept that monetary utility isn't the ultimate measure of everything that matters, and that the magic of the markets creates more utility for everyone.
(Or at least, for everyone who matters.)
The EU's soft power relies to some extent on the threat of the USA's hard power. And the EU can't see itself existing in isolation without allies. The truth of this should not be underestimated. In all honesty, I think that in terms of economic gains, Europe is a greater beneficiary of American hard power and the ability to enforce open markets than the United States itself.
The truth of this should not be underestimated. In all honesty, I think that in terms of economic gains, Europe is a greater beneficiary of American hard power and the ability to enforce open markets than the United States itself.
Perhaps in the universe that we are expected to believe in, it is true. It makes complete sense.
Did the EU experiment start better because of NATO sitting off its shores, or would it have gone even smoother without the US influence over England, for example.
Does China or Thailand or Japan or the Middle East trade more with the EU due to the largesse of NATO?
Could it be said that the EU would have had to confront and come to terms with a united foreign policy with a united military, and hone a force vector harmonious with its soft power should NATO not have been here?
And as far as getting what we wish for, what is the consequence of the US pulling out of the land it occupies here...outside of the benefit that it might help them get their financial house in order sooner.
I think that it could be said that a working EU without the NATO factor would serve a good example in contrast to the US example.
I'm not trying to be snarky; I can think of some disruptions, but none with more impact than the benefits. It's a wonder that people wonder why the aristocracy lose their heads in revolutions.
I do see the elites staffed by dedicated Atlanticists who are unwilling to consider making a clean break. And individual states still mired in nationalisms - often sponsored by US influence - which make a clean break even less likely.
Very few leaders in the EU seem to be considering a federal vision that isn't, at the very least, a partnership with Washington. Very few appreciate the extent to which the constant propaganda for reform and 'liberalisation' undermines national autonomy and federalisation while appearing to support both.
This is very useful for EU pols, because it provides deniability. When terror flights land in EU countries, EU politicians can cluck unsympathetically in public - which is always useful for a few poll points - while offering support in private.
And that's where we are. Rather too much of the EU leadership is like a French- and German-speaking wing of the Democratic party - outraged and disapproving in public, spineless or even actively supportive and complicit in private.
I don't see any evidence of genuine disdain for Washington among the pols. Bush is considered an aberration rather than a symptom, and the Atlanticists are convinced that AngloSaxonia is still basically sound and entirely friendly.
Populations may be suspicious, but they hardly count. And it's easy for the US-sponsored financial and nationalist media outlets to bring them to heel by promising a few gaudy nationalisms which will teach Brussels a lesson and put the Eurocrats in their place.
What's tragic is that hardly anyone in Brussels seems to see the reality of the situation. The EU is so completely a vassal state that true independence of thought and action has become unthinkable. The best we're going to get is a few slaps for Microsoft and maybe a banana war. But there isn't going to be a serious questioning of the Atlanticist view - which means the neoliberal Washington consensus - any time soon.
When even the Greens support the Iraq war, you know that dissent has pretty much been sidelined into electoral insignificance. (No matter how big it is numerically.)
Or is this something we all knew and there's nothing to discuss?
Of course, it's the love that dare not speak its name, by which I mean the attraction of technical authoritarianism to the global neoliberal elite.
The world is their sandbox, and the box it came in clearly stated "democracy not required."
The unfortunate impact of this is that there is a very real need for common safety standards and social market protocols, but those concerns are crowded out by the belief that 'efficiency' alone is the only concern. That in disembedding the market from its social and natural context, and commodifying man, nature, and credit we might destroy the foundations upon this is all built. Lost to them.
There has to be a community of "the West" in the sense that the failure to provide common standards and market regulation spawns its own little demons.
Like having to worry about swallowing toothpaste when you brush your teeth, because there's such a lack of protections that the product may well be contaminated with something that will kill you.
The deterioration of the European economy would force European countries to resort to trade by govrenment monopoly - not for economic but for political ends. The United States would almost inevitably have to follow suit. The resulting system of state controls, at first relating to foreign trade, would soon have to be extended into the domestic economy to an extent that would endanger the survival of the American system of free enterprise. (quoted in Melvyn Leffler, The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953, p. 53)
Postwar American officials felt that without western Europe being securely in an American orbit, the US would have to move toward a more social democratic economy - at minimum - or face a decline in standards of living. NATO was the means by which this Atlanticist approach was cemented - and I really like Migeru's comparison to the Delian League in that sense. And the world will live as one
However you reduced the question's scope too fast. West is defined by opposition to East. East may have meant Soviet Union, but certainly now means Asia, including Japan (Bil has already questioned Japan's clustering). This is true not only as we look to the future, but also as we look to the past. Andre Gunder Frank presents China as being the biggest economical centre of world trade until almost 1800. See an extract of its ReOrient book in studien-von-zeitfragen.
So where should one put South America and, even more interestingly, Africa? Is West a rich nations club? This is the first question.
From Real Clear Politics [the site's title is without irony, I'm afraid -- L]
[Author] Tony Corn is currently writing a book on the Long War. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Paris and is a graduate of the U.S. Naval War College. The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the position of the U.S. Department or the U.S. government.
I urge you to try to get through the full article by Corn, beyond the few excerpts, below. The author may sound like a nut-case but policy papers by graduates of the US Naval War College are taken very seriously by the US Defense Department.
The Revolution in Transatlantic Affairs
The return of both China and Islam in world history after a three-century-long eclipse has been the defining feature of the international stage since 1979. In the first decade afterwards, the West was simply too focused on the "second Cold War" against the Soviet Bloc to ponder the meaning of the revolutions engineered by Den Xiao Ping in China and Khomenei in Iran. In the second decade, a victorious West, indulging in rhetorical self-intoxication, mistook the most recent stage of a century-old globalization process for the end of history and even geography. Throughout the 1990s, this infatuation with globalization and a "time-space compression" in the virtual world led most Westerners to ignore the twofold epochal change taking place in the real world: the transfer of the center of gravity of the world economy from the Atlantic to the Pacific, with "three billion new capitalists" poised to put an end to three centuries of Euro-Atlantic economic primacy; and the rise of a "second nuclear age" in Asia and with it, the concomitant end of three centuries of Western military superiority.1 [my emphasis]
In the first decade afterwards, the West was simply too focused on the "second Cold War" against the Soviet Bloc to ponder the meaning of the revolutions engineered by Den Xiao Ping in China and Khomenei in Iran. In the second decade, a victorious West, indulging in rhetorical self-intoxication, mistook the most recent stage of a century-old globalization process for the end of history and even geography.
Throughout the 1990s, this infatuation with globalization and a "time-space compression" in the virtual world led most Westerners to ignore the twofold epochal change taking place in the real world: the transfer of the center of gravity of the world economy from the Atlantic to the Pacific, with "three billion new capitalists" poised to put an end to three centuries of Euro-Atlantic economic primacy; and the rise of a "second nuclear age" in Asia and with it, the concomitant end of three centuries of Western military superiority.1
[my emphasis]
This article is a must-read for anyone who would like to know what is being fed to the current US administration by the military and what's shaping its policies with regard to Europe and NATO.
Corn goes on to rant about the SCO, "the NATO of the East" and its dangers.
The Long War promises to be a thinking man's war. As a full-fledged Alliance, NATO possesses the kind of staying power that mere ad hoc coalitions cannot deliver; but NATO still has to come to terms with the fact that thinking power will matter more than fighting power. If NATO is to avoid the twofold danger of the SCO becoming a NATO of the East while NATO becomes a mere SEATO of the West, the Alliance will have first of all to downgrade its "toolbox" dimension and beef up its "think-tank" dimension.
It's a lengthy article and may merit deconstruction.
I'm still disappointed that we couldn't get Marek or Joerg to articulate an Atlanticist position in a diary here. Meanwhile, Joerg is busy providing cover to the White House policy in Iraq. We have met the enemy, and it is us — Pogo
Sometimes the most ardent doctrinaires are the converts. Freiheit ist immer Freiheit der Andersdenkenden
And I've been too busy working on a Jonny Wilkenson voudou doll today to comment.
It appears to be working. Freiheit ist immer Freiheit der Andersdenkenden
