And his analysis of the way Atheism can be attacked is very insightful. You'll see this pattern over and over again.
God's Enemies Are More Honest Than His Friends
As someone who has spent the last few years publicly criticizing religion, I have become quite familiar with how people of faith rise to the defense of God. As it turns out, there aren't a hundred ways of doing this. There appear to be just three: either a person argues that a specific religion is true, or he argues that religion is useful, or he simply attacks atheism as intolerant, elitist, irrational, or otherwise worthy of contempt. Any conversation between atheists and believers is liable to fall into one or more of these ruts, or lurch back and forth between them: 1. Religion is true: There are two problems with arguing that any one of the world's religions is true. First, as Bertrand Russell pointed out a century ago, the major religions make incompatible claims about God and about what human beings must believe in order to escape the fires of hell. Given the sheer diversity of these claims, every believer should expect damnation on mere, probabilistic grounds. The second problem with arguing for the truth of religion is that the evidence for the most common religious doctrines is terrible or nonexistent--and this subsumes all claims about the existence of a personal God, the divine origin of certain books, the virgin birth of certain people, the veracity of ancient miracles, etc. For thousands of years, religion has been a haven for dogmatism and false certainty, and it remains so. There is not a person on this earth who has sufficient reason to be certain that Jesus rose from the dead or that Muhammad spoke to the angel Gabriel in his cave. And yet, billions of people profess such certainty. This is embarrassing. It is also dangerous--and we should stop making apologies for it. 2. Religion is useful: The argument that religion is useful is also problematic--and many of its problems are enunciated daily by bomb-blasts. Can anyone seriously argue that it is a good thing that millions of Muslims currently believe in the metaphysics of martyrdom? Is it really so useful that many Jews imagine that the Creator of the universe gave them a patch of desert on the Mediterranean? How psychologically beneficial has Christianity's anxiety about sex been these last seventy generations? The worst problem with arguing for religion's usefulness, however, is that it is utterly irrelevant to the question at hand: the fact that a belief might be useful is no argument that it is true. While there are many ways to illustrate this, here is how I recently made the point in an online debate: The fact that certain religious beliefs might be useful in no way suggests their legitimacy. I can guarantee, for instance, that the following religion, invented by me in the last ten seconds, would be extraordinarily useful. It is called "Scientismo." Here is its creed: Be kind to others; do not lie, steal, or murder; and oblige your children to master mathematics and science to the best of their abilities or 17 demons will torture you with hot tongs for eternity after death. If I could spread this faith to billions, I have little doubt that we would live in a better world than we do at present. Would this suggest that the 17 demons of Scientismo exist? Useful delusions are not the same thing as true beliefs. 3. Atheism is bad: Rather than argue for the truth of their religious beliefs, or produce evidence that religion is useful, apologists for God often attack atheism as though it were another religion. We are told that atheism is dogmatic, intolerant, irrational, etc. This homily has the virtue of being easy to remember and reproduce--and it now reverberates ceaselessly within the echo-chamber of American religious discourse. It relies, however, on a many false ideas about atheism. On Christmas eve of this year, I published an essay in the Los Angeles Times entitled "10 Myths - and 10 Truths - about Atheism" in which I attempted to set the record straight. I won't repeat these points here. Those interested can find this article on my website.
1. Religion is true: There are two problems with arguing that any one of the world's religions is true. First, as Bertrand Russell pointed out a century ago, the major religions make incompatible claims about God and about what human beings must believe in order to escape the fires of hell. Given the sheer diversity of these claims, every believer should expect damnation on mere, probabilistic grounds. The second problem with arguing for the truth of religion is that the evidence for the most common religious doctrines is terrible or nonexistent--and this subsumes all claims about the existence of a personal God, the divine origin of certain books, the virgin birth of certain people, the veracity of ancient miracles, etc. For thousands of years, religion has been a haven for dogmatism and false certainty, and it remains so. There is not a person on this earth who has sufficient reason to be certain that Jesus rose from the dead or that Muhammad spoke to the angel Gabriel in his cave. And yet, billions of people profess such certainty. This is embarrassing. It is also dangerous--and we should stop making apologies for it.
2. Religion is useful: The argument that religion is useful is also problematic--and many of its problems are enunciated daily by bomb-blasts. Can anyone seriously argue that it is a good thing that millions of Muslims currently believe in the metaphysics of martyrdom? Is it really so useful that many Jews imagine that the Creator of the universe gave them a patch of desert on the Mediterranean? How psychologically beneficial has Christianity's anxiety about sex been these last seventy generations? The worst problem with arguing for religion's usefulness, however, is that it is utterly irrelevant to the question at hand: the fact that a belief might be useful is no argument that it is true. While there are many ways to illustrate this, here is how I recently made the point in an online debate: The fact that certain religious beliefs might be useful in no way suggests their legitimacy. I can guarantee, for instance, that the following religion, invented by me in the last ten seconds, would be extraordinarily useful. It is called "Scientismo." Here is its creed: Be kind to others; do not lie, steal, or murder; and oblige your children to master mathematics and science to the best of their abilities or 17 demons will torture you with hot tongs for eternity after death. If I could spread this faith to billions, I have little doubt that we would live in a better world than we do at present. Would this suggest that the 17 demons of Scientismo exist? Useful delusions are not the same thing as true beliefs.
3. Atheism is bad: Rather than argue for the truth of their religious beliefs, or produce evidence that religion is useful, apologists for God often attack atheism as though it were another religion. We are told that atheism is dogmatic, intolerant, irrational, etc. This homily has the virtue of being easy to remember and reproduce--and it now reverberates ceaselessly within the echo-chamber of American religious discourse. It relies, however, on a many false ideas about atheism. On Christmas eve of this year, I published an essay in the Los Angeles Times entitled "10 Myths - and 10 Truths - about Atheism" in which I attempted to set the record straight. I won't repeat these points here. Those interested can find this article on my website.
It is however also easily turned around: Atheism is true: As Atheism is not a coherent theory, and there are many shades and variation, it cannot be true, as some of the statements contradict each other. Atheism is useful: Atheist convictions might be useful, but that in no way suggests their legitimacy. Religion is bad: Rather than argue for the truth of Atheism, or produce evidence that atheism is useful, apologists for Atheism often attack Religion as though it were a scientific theory. It relies, however, on a many false ideas about religion
Sorry, i am not spending much time here to develop it, someone linguistically more able could make this more fun. And I am also not making a serious argument here. My point however is thus:
There are legitimate (who is to judge?) questions from atheists about the human condition and their answers are of value, legitimate, self sufficient, but they are only touching on the tiniest of area of interest for a person of faith. While atheist remain unaware of that, their arguments with people of faith are entirely futile. (As are discussions among people of faith, if they are ignorant of the other persons faiths details, history, dogmatic limitations etc.)
While atheist remain unaware of that, their arguments with people of faith are entirely futile. (As are discussions among people of faith, if they are ignorant of the other persons faiths details, history, dogmatic limitations etc.)
Sigh - yet again - Dawkins is NOT primarily concerned with very committed religious people - believe it or not he's not stupid and knows very well that rational argument is unlikely ( it CAN happen) to influence them. Try reading the diary for what he IS trying to do and some examples of success.
Do you really think I have to read everything about fairies before I dismiss belief in fairies, or Thor, etc., etc. ? Maybe it's because I'm a Londoner - that I moved to Nice.
I grew up with being harassed by Mennonites who were eager to save me.
As the presence of atheists who are involved with religion hints at, not all religious people KNOW some absolute truths. Some religions, like Unitarians, are - (at lest the congregation I attended when I was growing up) mostly atheist based. I think it would be a major disservice to Unitarians to claim they KNOW some absolute truths.
aspiring to genteel poverty
If they are "atheist based" what makes them a religion ?
Anyway, to repeat what was made clear in the diary, it's just wrong to suggest that Dawkins traets all religions, or groups within religions as exactly the same. He's made it clear in several places that of course there are non-extremist Christians (as is obviously the case with Muslims, etc.). That he acknowledges that - as I've pointed out in another comment, is evident from the fact that his criticism of nice, moderate Christians is that they lend respectability to the more aggressive, extreme groups. I also quoted an example of him working with leading Christians in the UK who are themselves concerned about extremist Christians and their attempts to spread creationism. Maybe it's because I'm a Londoner - that I moved to Nice.