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The EU has never been about abolishing national interests but always about managing them in a manner that is about convenience for Europe's political classes, with a heavy emphasis on consensus arrived at through secret and unwieldy bureaucratic procedures.

That's actually a reasonably accurate description. The thing is - is it a bad thing? If you replace "unwieldy bureaucratic" by "complex technocratic", you get the description of the mostly competent work done by the EU.


But as the current financial crisis has rushed headlong towards economic recession it is abundantly clear that institutions created for the benefit of diplomats and mandarins are not up to the job of stabilising febrile market institutions or getting cash (where it should be) into productive investments not dodgy bets on dodgier loans.

  1. Why should market institutions be stabilised? Aren't markets supposed to do that on their own? If you admit to the fact that they need "stabilising by institutions" then you make the case for the very existence of mandarins (those that run said institutions) and the diplomats (that hash out the rules for such institutions)

  2. The fact is, the institutions regulating financial markets were unfortunately made for the benefit of the mandarins or the diplomats, but for the players in the financial markets, thanks to their heavy lobbying of said mandarins and diplomats (and wooing too, so maybe it WAS for the benefit of mandarins, in their second careers in the financial world...)

So I read you as making the case for a more powerful bureaucracy in Brussels...

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Sun Oct 12th, 2008 at 01:08:54 PM EST
That's actually a reasonably accurate description.

I'm not certain "is about convenience for Europe's political classes" is a proper characterisation. Even cattle trading at the EU Council and struggling with the Commission (and the EP) aren't necessarily convenient for our political classes... but it is certainly more convenient for the rest of us that they don't go for "the ultimate national interest" and end conflicts with wars instead. Like they did for the prior five millenia.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Sun Oct 12th, 2008 at 01:48:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Basically, I am arguing for democracy - both in relations to markets and the state.

Both the EU and the financial market institutions are all too often founded on the principle, or fetish, that people can, should not, be in control (globalisation).

My point about stabilising markets is an observation not a prescription.

I really do not think, even if it were possible, that financial institutions run on behalf of mandarins and diplomats (you yourself note the overlap with the wider oligarchy) could benefit the common good.

My point is that both state and markets are unable to represent the general interest at a time when that question comes to the fore.

The "nationalisation" of banks under the current conditions will not alter this situation or clarify the question of what (and who) the economy is for.

In fact, pretty much all the actors involved would go the distance to avoid this question being asked at all.

Both the EU and the parasitic financial sector organise ("independent" central bankers and all) around evading or denying this question.

by Bruno Waterfield (brunowaterfield(at)gmail(dot)com) on Mon Oct 13th, 2008 at 04:29:29 AM EST
[ Parent ]
What does democracy look like in a market, other than regulation?
by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Mon Oct 13th, 2008 at 04:36:05 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Planning
by Bruno Waterfield (brunowaterfield(at)gmail(dot)com) on Mon Oct 13th, 2008 at 07:06:37 AM EST
[ Parent ]
And you think the EU is bad? His screed against excessive planning is about the only sensible thing Hayek had to say.

Seriously, how much planning, or to what extent, do you mean?

by Colman (colman at eurotrib.com) on Mon Oct 13th, 2008 at 12:41:09 PM EST
[ Parent ]
My point is that both state and markets are unable to represent the general interest at a time when that question comes to the fore.

In that picture, is the EU really important?

The "nationalisation" of banks under the current conditions will not alter this situation or clarify the question of what (and who) the economy is for.

Can I interpret this in the sense that it's not clear if it is to benefit shareolders, or creditors, or depositors, or the economy as companies, or the economy as jobs; or some wider sense?

Both the EU and the parasitic financial sector organise ("independent" central bankers and all) around evading or denying this question.

For me, the above implies that the EU all about the economy -- or at least that its economically relevant aspects are independent of others.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Mon Oct 13th, 2008 at 06:12:36 AM EST
[ Parent ]
  1. Yes. Because, in my argument, the EU is a way of bypassing public debate and accountability - without which talk of a general interest is meaningless. In a recession a public debate about the general interest is vital or else we will just get austerity, job cuts and lower living standards (the instinct of those that rule us)
  2. It is not really nationalisation because while the state may own it does not control. The state is just another stakeholder. The books have not been opened either (as far as I know).
  3. I don't think that the EU is any more independent of its economic evasions as the Brtish state.
by Bruno Waterfield (brunowaterfield(at)gmail(dot)com) on Mon Oct 13th, 2008 at 07:13:44 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Accountability is at the heart of your comments, and I understand better your initial post in that light.

Maybe it's worth commenting here on the origins of the EU bureaucracy, which was modelled on the top layers of the French State bureaucracy, ie a quasi-aristocracy, with a lot of power and not much accountability to the general public, but two redeeming features: (i) joining it is merit-based, using pretty objective criteria, and (ii) a sense of public service was part of the ethos.

The old French 'grand bargain' was that the top bureaucrats got power for life, in exchange for running things competently and including the interests of the general population as part of their mandate. Thus a focus on infrastructure and public services, provided in a highly centralised way.

The good thing is that thanks to that bargain, the State was able to hire the best minds of the country, because it provided the most rewarding jobs - except in monetary terms.

But the bargain was, to a large extent, undermined by the clash with the increasingly dominant anglo-saxon way, with a focus on accountability to shareholders (monetary returns rather than engineering completeness), a quicker turnover of people based on results, and rewards for the best people in the form of lots of money - and accountability in the form of votes that can kick people out. The French system (and the EU bureaucracy) gets perverted when the elites that are entrenched in positions of power for life can also get away with earning lots of money, by squeezing the plebes from the previously granted socially shared advantages. In that case, you get the worst of both worlds - entrenched elites able to ignore the plebes.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Mon Oct 13th, 2008 at 09:38:15 AM EST
[ Parent ]
  1. I do agree that national governments can use the European Council, not to mention the Council, as a way of bypassing public debate and accountability. But certainly not the European Parliament. (The Commission is yet another thing, but I leave that to Jérôme.)

    However, In last Sunday's agreement on separate but parallel bank saving packages at the special EU summit on the financial crisis counter-measures, what I find noteworthy is that the national governments felt pressured to respond to public debate: in particular the talk about constraining manager renumerations. (Yesterday, German finance minister Peer Steinbrück got a quite heavy grilling in a public TV interview on the German €500 billion package.)

    So, I don't think debate on general interest was bypassed this time, even if of course I'd wish a much stronger debate on it. More, as the national nature of the bailout plans indicates, I think it's still the disconnect of the nation states separately and that of markets that really matter, not their use of the EU.

  2. From the little of what I heard of the German, Austrian, French and Spanish plans so far, the state would control. The state would not exert total control, but more than simply its voting weight: the credits would be given on condition of letting the finance ministers or central banks set terms (including at management decision level) and review financial conduct.

    Now, putting such power in the hands of a finance minister is of course a bouble-edged sword: he could both choose to completely overhaul and micro-manage banks, or to be done with it and allow bank CEOs free rein without much oversight. (But, this is again a question of the accountability of national governments.)

  3. That's a significantly weaker point. Methinks the EU is primarily organised around political aims, even if the bulk of its current legal institutions and texts and budget deals with economic issues (even the Common Market has political aims).


*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Tue Oct 14th, 2008 at 04:18:01 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Supplement: it is also noteworthy that Paulson, too, changed the US bailout package from one aimed at acquiring bad assets from banks to one injecting capital by buying stakes in banks.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Tue Oct 14th, 2008 at 04:20:07 AM EST
[ Parent ]
... for relying almost exclusively on an analytical toolkit that is incapable of addressing a number of critical factors (intrinsic uncertainty being among them) ...

... on this occasion, I must applaud the way that so many mainstream economists have latched onto and pushed the basic fact that a solvency crisis cannot be solved after it has broken simply by paying fair market value for assets that are on the books.

With so many "serious" people pushing for an equity stake as a preferable alternative to overpaying for troubled assets, it becomes hard for even a former Lehman Bros. CEO to ignore.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Tue Oct 14th, 2008 at 01:56:08 PM EST
[ Parent ]

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