Theys some that kills syllables, and theys some that gives birth to new syllables that tweren't never there before. You start at the headwaters of the Tennessee River, its one thing, but by the time you reach the Mississippi, its something else altogether. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
So before I can comment, I need you to explain this bit to me in smaller words, as I think it's really key, but I can't get my mind around it right now:
European Tribune - Comments - How will the EU manage the pending collapse of the US Empire?
Indeed, suppose that the original British Imperial extension into South Asia was driven by the historic swing of Atlantic Europe from net trade deficit to net trade surplus with the balance of the Axial trading system from Europe and Africa in the West through South Asia, to its center in China, and then Japan on its Eastern edge. Even so, it was not an exercise in reversing that trade surplus ... it became a deficit-creating exercise as a bug, not as a feature. However, the American Base-Network Empire has been a deficit-spending enterprise from the outset. The trade-deficit impact of the Base Network Empire has always been a Feature of the system. The economic rationale of the post WWII Military Industrial Complex was to avoid the global recessionary impact of a sustained US trade surplus at the same time as providing for a strong employment economy in the US without recourse to the New Deal mechanisms of the government fulfilling its obligations as Employer of Last Resort. This was not economic insanity in 1946 or 1956 or even 1966 ... but given US Peak Oil in 1968, the first Oil Price Shock and the entrenching of a trade deficit position it was increasingly out of touch with economic reality by 1976 (as shown by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the floating of the US$) ... and after the Second Oil Price Shock, the explosive growth of imported value added in the Auto industry, the collapses in the US Steel Industry, the beginning of the hollowing out of the Middle Income Classes, it was clearly economic insanity by 1986.
Indeed, suppose that the original British Imperial extension into South Asia was driven by the historic swing of Atlantic Europe from net trade deficit to net trade surplus with the balance of the Axial trading system from Europe and Africa in the West through South Asia, to its center in China, and then Japan on its Eastern edge. Even so, it was not an exercise in reversing that trade surplus ... it became a deficit-creating exercise as a bug, not as a feature.
However, the American Base-Network Empire has been a deficit-spending enterprise from the outset. The trade-deficit impact of the Base Network Empire has always been a Feature of the system. The economic rationale of the post WWII Military Industrial Complex was to avoid the global recessionary impact of a sustained US trade surplus at the same time as providing for a strong employment economy in the US without recourse to the New Deal mechanisms of the government fulfilling its obligations as Employer of Last Resort.
This was not economic insanity in 1946 or 1956 or even 1966 ... but given US Peak Oil in 1968, the first Oil Price Shock and the entrenching of a trade deficit position it was increasingly out of touch with economic reality by 1976 (as shown by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the floating of the US$) ... and after the Second Oil Price Shock, the explosive growth of imported value added in the Auto industry, the collapses in the US Steel Industry, the beginning of the hollowing out of the Middle Income Classes, it was clearly economic insanity by 1986.
Incidentally, if you enjoy thinking about these things, I'd highly recommend this book, if you haven't read it already:
Amazon.com: After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire Since 1405: John Darwin: Books
After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire Since 1405 (Hardcover)
And the profits of that carrying trade could be brought home in the form of products from the east.
But it was the Industrial Revolution that caused the real earthquake in the Long Axis economy. South Asia as a region has long balanced its trade deficit to its east with its trade surplus to its west. But the mechanization of textiles led to a situation in which South Asia became a net importer for Europe.
That is the background against which the East India company rose to become a Great Power on the subcontinent and then the British Raj was established.
Historians will disagree over the degree to which the Raj paid its own way early on, but clearly at the 19th century progressed, the cost of maintained the Empire rose more rapidly than the wealth recouped from the Empire, and by the late 1800's, the Continental Economies of the US and Germany were rapidly gaining on the British economy.
The US Base-Network Empire was primarily founded in the aftermath of WWII, with the US in an unchallenged position as core world economy, and pursuing a geopolitical strategy of containment against the USSR. From the outset, the resources for the Base Network was consumption out of a surplus.
And now the fundamental economic question about the Base-Network Empire is, consumption out of what surplus? I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
But then the first question is, to my mind:
Who has a surplus now?
Because the lesson of the book I mentioned is that it's not just about the moments of weakness an empire undergoes, but who is having a moment of strength at the same time.
And I think that matters for your question, because what it means to manage the collapse of an Empire depends a lot on what is replacing it...
Obvious issues:
1) Resource wars. Europe largely has enough water. Does it have the foresight to develop an energy infrastructure which reduces the need for protecting an extended supply chain? I hope so, but I'm not sure...
But there are still issues. The totem resource of high tech leading to exploitation and resource conflicts would be Coltan. So will the EU need to project force into Africa? And what will that mean?
Personally I think that's possibly the biggest moral challenge in forecasting EU force projection, as it's classical empire exploitation stuff, mixed in with competition with other empires (China?)
However, I'm not sure you can replace historical US bases in places like S. Korea (even if the need is there) without a whole round of negotiations with the regional power (China in this case.)
So I guess the conclusion is that the EU needs to get it's diplomatic ass in gear and start solving some world-wide problems as soon as possible, or things could get very turbulent in places as US bases roll back.
4) You've mentioned peace keeping as an issue and problems will remain there, but I think that it won't be worse than it is now. (i.e. Peacekeeping is largely a failing enterprise at the minute... and it won't improve until the consensus for it at the UN improves.) What may need expanding is the natural disaster response capacity, particularly if global warming is going to make for "freakier" weather.
Obviously, the powder keg at the pivot of Western and Central Africa is Nigeria. And wrt Nigeria, I have no clue. I am not an optimist with respect to the Democratic Republic of Congo, but with the DRC I can at least see a way that could be charted back to being a developing nation-state once again ... and with it, obviously, would come greater stability to all of Southern Africa.
But Nigeria, there I'm completely stumped. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
In the DRC, there is the East/West divide, but none of the distinct ethnic groups are a large enough share of the total population to provide the "Big Ethnic Bloc" fights that arise in Nigeria.
Perhaps there is a form of Federalism that can work in Nigeria once the income generated by crude oil wanes, but global Peak Oil will be working to expand crude oil revenues even after oil production volumes peak and then decline. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
But the mechanization of textiles led to a situation in which South Asia became a net importer for Europe.
I would say the combination of mechanization in Britain and british suppression of indigenous textile production and indigenous trade in India, made possible the transfer of the production.
I am not sure I agree on the overstretch. As I see it the expansion was made possible in part through 1) the classic mean of conquering resources and armies and commiting them to further conquest 2) expansion of ecological footprint. The expansion of ecological footprint gave the empire more resources to use, and soe invested in weaponry (for example the Maxim gun) and communications (the brittish did not only rule the waves but also the telegraphy lines) were crucial to expanding and keeping territory.
The common overstretch of the empire either consists of keping territory costing to much, disintegration due to lack of communication and cohesion, or a combination thereof. I would say the brittish empire evaded those fates for a long time, except for the loss of some of the north american colonies. The thing that did it in was that the expansion of ecological footprint could be and was copied. The rise of Continental Economies of the US and Germany was then expanding their ecological footprint, digging up fossile fuels and turning it to goods and sustaining larger populations. Eventually the required tech also had permeated the colonies (communications, weapons, people) and the empire crumbled. But this happened in the mid 20th century, and I would say that the empire was financially benefical to the core for a long time, at least throughout the 19th century. A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!
Certainly under the Imperial Overstretch argument, the British were not suffering Imperial Overstretch under the "First" Empire, or else they would not have been in a position to establish the Raj.
(On the establishment of the Raj, the financial impact is part of the conquest, and not just a consequence, as the conquest of India was primarily with Indian soldiers with the British able to field larger armies because they were in a stronger financial position.)
... the thesis of the Imperial Overstretch argument wrt the British Empire is not that the British never enjoyed a net benefit, but that balance between benefit of the empire and cost of maintaining the empire was tilting toward the cost.
The question of whether the British Empire was passed because it had become overstretched, or became overstretched as a consequence of coping with being passed, is the kind of question I would love to jump into, but I am not sure that it yields any lessons for the current US Overstretch. I'm observing the current Overstretch, rather than inferring it from some pattern of past periods of Imperial Overstretch. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
Incidentally, if you enjoy thinking about these things, ...
I almost succeeded in escaping, but ran headlong into a Uni budget crunch, and being but a peon, had to head back to the US. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
Our infrastructure needs a major overhaul in order to:
From the Wikipedia supercarrier article, regarding the British QE class:
Giving evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee, the First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Alan West explained that interoperability with the United States Navy was as much a deciding factor of the size of the carriers as the firepower of the carrier's airwing: "I have talked with the CNO (Chief of Naval Operations) in America. He is very keen for us to get these because he sees us slotting in with his carrier groups. He really wants us to have these, but he wants us to have the same sort of clout as one of their carriers.10
"I have talked with the CNO (Chief of Naval Operations) in America. He is very keen for us to get these because he sees us slotting in with his carrier groups. He really wants us to have these, but he wants us to have the same sort of clout as one of their carriers.10
Sure, light carriers are handy for swatting pirates, but are they more handy than an equivalent amount of resources, yard time and man-hours spent building corvettes or submarines?
- Jake If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.
Frigates and corvettes would be the larger share of such a navy, with two or three escort carriers to allow the smaller ships to operate in tasks on sea-lanes beyond the reach of land based aircraft.
An EU navy would not want a massive number of big ships, and while any military vessel could be used to create mischief, the modern light aircraft / heavy helicopter carrier would seem best suited to complementing a backbone of frigates and corvettes, in particular when acting in support of sea-lane protection and disaster relief.
Obviously two largeish light aircraft carriers already exist in one of the EU navies, but as alluded to above, are due to be de-commissioned and replaced with super carriers ... which seems to me to be a step in the wrong direction, and so its no surprise to me that the Pentagon had a hand in the decision.
Fortunately France seems to be backing away from participation in the supercarrier boondoggle. If the Hayugo class helicopter carrier costs around ¥110b, that is around €800m, considerably less than the roughly £2b (~€2.5b?) that the Queen Elizabeth class was supposed to cost sometime last year. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
... so there's three EU Sea Control Ships, even after the Invincible class UK light carriers are decommissioned.
You need planes to patrol a sea lane over the horizon, you need helicopters for anti-piracy in sea-lanes, you need them to be on ships if there is not going to be a arm-twisted-behind-back-friendly-base onshore, if you are going to send helicopters up you need to be able to provide them with air cover.
On an EU basis, all up, three mean that you can have two task forces at two hot spots and still have a reserve. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
You could run two simultaneous taskforces as an emergency measure, but it wouldn't be sustainable in the long term.
Regards Luke -- #include witty_sig.h
In which case, four would be needed to support one extended mission and one on call, or for classical escort missions ... which the five spread across the EU at the moment would cover. After 2015, there would be the three light carriers for one extended mission and the amphibious assault vessels on call, acting a classical escorts, or other short-term tasks. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
I mean, if the objective is to get a convoy from point A to point B without having it attacked by guys in rubber dinghys armed with rusty kalashnikovs... won't one to three perfectly ordinary non-aircraft-equipped ships suffice?
It's not like we'll be having running battles with pirates equipped with American destroyers or privateers in Chinese light cruisers... Not unless things get rather a lot nastier than they are now.
Strategic in terms of ensuring that Europe is a compelling trade partner on fair trade terms for the Mahgreb, West Central Asia, Arabia, West Africa?
And while ecological sustainability implies that all regions should have food self-sufficiency and energy self-sufficiency as goals, a goal of self-sufficiency does not mean autarky ... Fortress Europe would be a much grimmer place to live than a Europe that is viewed by its neighbors as a compelling trade partner. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
When we make sure, that all we produce all what we need ourselves, which path for development will be open for Africans?
Building a domestic industry to satisfy their domestic needs? Charging fairer prices for the resources that we'll need during the transition?
Besides, I didn't say we shouldn't trade with them on fair terms. I just said we shouldn't make supply of certain critical products dependent on trade.
Finally, I happen to think that we owe quite a lot of reparations to quite a lot of African countries - even if not necessarily for the crimes of the various and sundry colonial empires (although they are far more recent and serious than is generally acknowledged), then at least for many of the post-colonial - ah - incidents where Western(TM) interests have been put before local interests by meddling (ex-)colonial powers.
Isn't this giving up on the possibility for taking the way of cooperation? Not using the advantages of cooperation will make it economically much more attractive then really not to be engaged at all.
Considering the way Western(TM) powers have historically behaved in the rest of the world, I'm not sure "not being engaged at all" is a bad thing for the rest of the world.
Snark aside, I am not a particularly strong believer in the notion that the developing world needs Western Benevolence(TM). It seems to me that what quite a lot of the developing world needs is for The West(TM) to stop stealing its resources, and stop instigating the wars and propping up the dictatorships that facilitate the looting.
I am quite confident, in fact, that if we engaged the developing world in a fair and honest fashion, we could come to an equitable agreement on how to manage the transition period during which the third world needs our technology and we need their natural resources.
Yes, there are probably countries that are too tyrannical, too corrupt, too politically unstable or otherwise have a sufficiently appalling political culture that it it will be the next best thing to impossible to engage them constructively. But I am not convinced that they are in the majority.
It seems to me that what quite a lot of the developing world needs is for The West(TM) to stop stealing its resources, and stop instigating the wars and propping up the dictatorships that facilitate the looting.
Sarko's recent emphasis on embracing the southern shore of the Mediterranean as part of the European economic zone would seem obviously intelligent and potentially mutually beneficial, if intelligently pursued. The entire Mediterranean basin was once and can again be a single economic area. It is impossible to believe that this idea originated with him. Nor should his advocacy taint the idea.
Development and integration of this area into a common economy on a basis of mutual benefit could greatly enhance the influence of the EU in the world and possibly defuse some of the religious tensions festering in France, Holland and Germany. It would provide a venue for the profitable employment of multi-lingual second and third generation African and North African immigrants to Europe. It could be a win on many levels. As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
Charging fairer prices for the resources that we'll need during the transition? I think the prices for that resources are already rather high. The resource rich countries often suffer already a form of Dutch Desease. But of course the natural resources are not distributed equally in the developing world. To assume the developing world as one solidaric block is pretty nonsense.
Besides, I didn't say we shouldn't trade with them on fair terms. I just said we shouldn't make supply of certain critical products dependent on trade. But agriculture is one low level product, which doesn't need too much capital. Another thing especially in norther Africa would be solar energy. As well rather critical I would say. We don't buy enough toys, that for many countries the export of toys is a valid option.
incidents where Western(TM) interests have been put before local interests by meddling (ex-)colonial powers. Again very unequally distributed, and strongly in those countries, which may indeed have enough natural resources to have built their economy for some time around trading resources.
Considering the way Western(TM) powers have historically behaved in the rest of the world, I'm not sure "not being engaged at all" is a bad thing for the rest of the world. Civilisatory colonisation was a huge step forward in Africa. But even when you disagree with that, now that they had contact, and currently live depending on imported technology with too many people to feed in their traditional ways of life, insulation would hardly work for them.
It seems to me that what quite a lot of the developing world needs is for The West(TM) to stop stealing its resources, and stop instigating the wars and propping up the dictatorships that facilitate the looting. I don't consider trade as stealing. The dictatorships support is mostly a cold war relict. Regime change brings instability. But for most resources not even a stable country is really needed. Sanctions hit the full population far more than any dictator. It is not clear to me, what you propose, that we don't buy stuff from developing countries of which they have little use at all? Because paying them well is propping up dictatorships and paying them little is stealing?
I am quite confident, in fact, that if we engaged the developing world in a fair and honest fashion, we could come to an equitable agreement on how to manage the transition period during which the third world needs our technology and we need their natural resources. I hope so, but don't think so. Most of the developing world is gouverned by people, who care more for themselves than for their people, pretty indipendent of Western involvement or not. Especially Africa suffers extremely from tribal wars and racism among groups foreigners can hardly identify. Many African nations need massive interference with their internal affairs to reconciliate, similar as on the Balcan. Obviously we are not willing to play such a role, as it would be denounced as colonialism. But the view the West is responsible for the lack of development in most poor countries is far from reality. But for going for cooperation, one needs reliable partners. Left on their own, it is not likely that poor countries become reliable. I predict therefore, I do not widh, that 'Fortress Europe' will be much closer description of 2050 than intensive cooperation. Der Amerikaner ist die Orchidee unter den MenschenVolker Pispers
Snark aside, I am not a particularly strong believer in the notion that the developing world needs Western Benevolence(TM). It seems to me that what quite a lot of the developing world needs is for The West(TM) to stop stealing its resources, and stop instigating the wars and propping up the dictatorships that facilitate the looting. I am quite confident, in fact, that if we engaged the developing world in a fair and honest fashion, we could come to an equitable agreement on how to manage the transition period during which the third world needs our technology and we need their natural resources.
multiple recc's! ~"When an inner situation is not made conscious, it appears outside as fate." Karl Jung~
When do you get sold? In the end, might makes right. Nothing has changed since the caveman.
What will be the focus of EU projection of force, once the US Base-Network Empire collapses? Anti-piracy? Support of UN peace-keeping missions ... where the frictions caused by millions of climate crisis refugees are likely to increase the need for peace-keeping, but may undermine the ability to put them together. Fending off the actions of aggressively hostile states in the immediate neighborhood while playing balance of power politics further abroad?
I would say the focus will be on preventing people from following their resources into the EU. Thus Frontex started the other year:
Frontex - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Special European forces of rapidly deployable border guards were created by EU interior ministers in April 2007 to assist in border control, particularly on Europe's southern coastlines.[2] Frontex's European Patrols Network began work in the Canary Islands in May 2007.[3]
Though the main thrust continues to be making sure our friendly dicatators south of the Mediterrenean keeps those migrants from coming through. That might give reson to prop them up once in a while, bombing some village with locals who oppose the central power etc. You know, fighting terrorism.
And then we also have the protection of direct resuorce extraktion. Somewhere down the line locals may take shoots at subsidised european fishing fleets vacuuming the seas. Then an anti-pirate force is necessary. Like outside Somalia today. And speaking of Somalia lets not forget dumping toxic waste, that is also someting that can get locals pissed and require naval presence.
This is not what EU should do (that list has Jake formulated), but what it will do. As the EU structure limits the publics power to a minimum - in particular when it comes to deciding the forms for decisions - it will continue the current trends of protecting institutionalised interests. A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!
Yeah, 1970/71. The Texas Railway Commission did not remove all supply quotas until '71 ... Christmas '70 makes as good a 70/71 date as any. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
Does the Chinese trade surplus have a "global recessionary impact"? That is, does the savings glut theory have any merit? A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith
And assuming that there is really a Western™ elite that can move its seat from Britain to the US back to the EU through NATO, what are its actual goals and how will those influence the European response to the diminishing power of the US? A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith
