So before I can comment, I need you to explain this bit to me in smaller words, as I think it's really key, but I can't get my mind around it right now:
European Tribune - Comments - How will the EU manage the pending collapse of the US Empire?
Indeed, suppose that the original British Imperial extension into South Asia was driven by the historic swing of Atlantic Europe from net trade deficit to net trade surplus with the balance of the Axial trading system from Europe and Africa in the West through South Asia, to its center in China, and then Japan on its Eastern edge. Even so, it was not an exercise in reversing that trade surplus ... it became a deficit-creating exercise as a bug, not as a feature. However, the American Base-Network Empire has been a deficit-spending enterprise from the outset. The trade-deficit impact of the Base Network Empire has always been a Feature of the system. The economic rationale of the post WWII Military Industrial Complex was to avoid the global recessionary impact of a sustained US trade surplus at the same time as providing for a strong employment economy in the US without recourse to the New Deal mechanisms of the government fulfilling its obligations as Employer of Last Resort. This was not economic insanity in 1946 or 1956 or even 1966 ... but given US Peak Oil in 1968, the first Oil Price Shock and the entrenching of a trade deficit position it was increasingly out of touch with economic reality by 1976 (as shown by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the floating of the US$) ... and after the Second Oil Price Shock, the explosive growth of imported value added in the Auto industry, the collapses in the US Steel Industry, the beginning of the hollowing out of the Middle Income Classes, it was clearly economic insanity by 1986.
Indeed, suppose that the original British Imperial extension into South Asia was driven by the historic swing of Atlantic Europe from net trade deficit to net trade surplus with the balance of the Axial trading system from Europe and Africa in the West through South Asia, to its center in China, and then Japan on its Eastern edge. Even so, it was not an exercise in reversing that trade surplus ... it became a deficit-creating exercise as a bug, not as a feature.
However, the American Base-Network Empire has been a deficit-spending enterprise from the outset. The trade-deficit impact of the Base Network Empire has always been a Feature of the system. The economic rationale of the post WWII Military Industrial Complex was to avoid the global recessionary impact of a sustained US trade surplus at the same time as providing for a strong employment economy in the US without recourse to the New Deal mechanisms of the government fulfilling its obligations as Employer of Last Resort.
This was not economic insanity in 1946 or 1956 or even 1966 ... but given US Peak Oil in 1968, the first Oil Price Shock and the entrenching of a trade deficit position it was increasingly out of touch with economic reality by 1976 (as shown by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the floating of the US$) ... and after the Second Oil Price Shock, the explosive growth of imported value added in the Auto industry, the collapses in the US Steel Industry, the beginning of the hollowing out of the Middle Income Classes, it was clearly economic insanity by 1986.
Incidentally, if you enjoy thinking about these things, I'd highly recommend this book, if you haven't read it already:
Amazon.com: After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire Since 1405: John Darwin: Books
After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire Since 1405 (Hardcover)
And the profits of that carrying trade could be brought home in the form of products from the east.
But it was the Industrial Revolution that caused the real earthquake in the Long Axis economy. South Asia as a region has long balanced its trade deficit to its east with its trade surplus to its west. But the mechanization of textiles led to a situation in which South Asia became a net importer for Europe.
That is the background against which the East India company rose to become a Great Power on the subcontinent and then the British Raj was established.
Historians will disagree over the degree to which the Raj paid its own way early on, but clearly at the 19th century progressed, the cost of maintained the Empire rose more rapidly than the wealth recouped from the Empire, and by the late 1800's, the Continental Economies of the US and Germany were rapidly gaining on the British economy.
The US Base-Network Empire was primarily founded in the aftermath of WWII, with the US in an unchallenged position as core world economy, and pursuing a geopolitical strategy of containment against the USSR. From the outset, the resources for the Base Network was consumption out of a surplus.
And now the fundamental economic question about the Base-Network Empire is, consumption out of what surplus? I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
But then the first question is, to my mind:
Who has a surplus now?
Because the lesson of the book I mentioned is that it's not just about the moments of weakness an empire undergoes, but who is having a moment of strength at the same time.
And I think that matters for your question, because what it means to manage the collapse of an Empire depends a lot on what is replacing it...
Obvious issues:
1) Resource wars. Europe largely has enough water. Does it have the foresight to develop an energy infrastructure which reduces the need for protecting an extended supply chain? I hope so, but I'm not sure...
But there are still issues. The totem resource of high tech leading to exploitation and resource conflicts would be Coltan. So will the EU need to project force into Africa? And what will that mean?
Personally I think that's possibly the biggest moral challenge in forecasting EU force projection, as it's classical empire exploitation stuff, mixed in with competition with other empires (China?)
However, I'm not sure you can replace historical US bases in places like S. Korea (even if the need is there) without a whole round of negotiations with the regional power (China in this case.)
So I guess the conclusion is that the EU needs to get it's diplomatic ass in gear and start solving some world-wide problems as soon as possible, or things could get very turbulent in places as US bases roll back.
4) You've mentioned peace keeping as an issue and problems will remain there, but I think that it won't be worse than it is now. (i.e. Peacekeeping is largely a failing enterprise at the minute... and it won't improve until the consensus for it at the UN improves.) What may need expanding is the natural disaster response capacity, particularly if global warming is going to make for "freakier" weather.
Obviously, the powder keg at the pivot of Western and Central Africa is Nigeria. And wrt Nigeria, I have no clue. I am not an optimist with respect to the Democratic Republic of Congo, but with the DRC I can at least see a way that could be charted back to being a developing nation-state once again ... and with it, obviously, would come greater stability to all of Southern Africa.
But Nigeria, there I'm completely stumped. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
In the DRC, there is the East/West divide, but none of the distinct ethnic groups are a large enough share of the total population to provide the "Big Ethnic Bloc" fights that arise in Nigeria.
Perhaps there is a form of Federalism that can work in Nigeria once the income generated by crude oil wanes, but global Peak Oil will be working to expand crude oil revenues even after oil production volumes peak and then decline. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
But the mechanization of textiles led to a situation in which South Asia became a net importer for Europe.
I would say the combination of mechanization in Britain and british suppression of indigenous textile production and indigenous trade in India, made possible the transfer of the production.
I am not sure I agree on the overstretch. As I see it the expansion was made possible in part through 1) the classic mean of conquering resources and armies and commiting them to further conquest 2) expansion of ecological footprint. The expansion of ecological footprint gave the empire more resources to use, and soe invested in weaponry (for example the Maxim gun) and communications (the brittish did not only rule the waves but also the telegraphy lines) were crucial to expanding and keeping territory.
The common overstretch of the empire either consists of keping territory costing to much, disintegration due to lack of communication and cohesion, or a combination thereof. I would say the brittish empire evaded those fates for a long time, except for the loss of some of the north american colonies. The thing that did it in was that the expansion of ecological footprint could be and was copied. The rise of Continental Economies of the US and Germany was then expanding their ecological footprint, digging up fossile fuels and turning it to goods and sustaining larger populations. Eventually the required tech also had permeated the colonies (communications, weapons, people) and the empire crumbled. But this happened in the mid 20th century, and I would say that the empire was financially benefical to the core for a long time, at least throughout the 19th century. A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!
Certainly under the Imperial Overstretch argument, the British were not suffering Imperial Overstretch under the "First" Empire, or else they would not have been in a position to establish the Raj.
(On the establishment of the Raj, the financial impact is part of the conquest, and not just a consequence, as the conquest of India was primarily with Indian soldiers with the British able to field larger armies because they were in a stronger financial position.)
... the thesis of the Imperial Overstretch argument wrt the British Empire is not that the British never enjoyed a net benefit, but that balance between benefit of the empire and cost of maintaining the empire was tilting toward the cost.
The question of whether the British Empire was passed because it had become overstretched, or became overstretched as a consequence of coping with being passed, is the kind of question I would love to jump into, but I am not sure that it yields any lessons for the current US Overstretch. I'm observing the current Overstretch, rather than inferring it from some pattern of past periods of Imperial Overstretch. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
Incidentally, if you enjoy thinking about these things, ...
I almost succeeded in escaping, but ran headlong into a Uni budget crunch, and being but a peon, had to head back to the US. I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.
