Columnists are nervous of looking silly. It was with hesitation that in August 2004, writing on this page after a Times poll had reported vast economic confidence among the public, I suggested that "a darker melody in a minor key is faintly audible beneath the oom-pah-pah of economic optimism: a persistent, puzzled, inquisitive counterpoint. "Why? Why does there seem to be all this money sloshing around?.." "...Maybe the growing wealth so many of us feel... simply because each of us is prepared every year to set a higher valuation on our fellow citizens' houses, is not a chimera. But I cannot but share... this nagging feeling that a nation of homeowners energetically bidding up the value of each other's property, borrowing on the basis of the inflating figures, then spending the money in hypermarkets every weekend... is somehow riding for a fall." I wondered if I was missing something, but wrote it anyway; was comprehensively demolished by fellow columnists; and, with a shrug of the shoulders, let the subject drop. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/matthew_parris/article4922449.ece
"Why? Why does there seem to be all this money sloshing around?.." "...Maybe the growing wealth so many of us feel... simply because each of us is prepared every year to set a higher valuation on our fellow citizens' houses, is not a chimera. But I cannot but share... this nagging feeling that a nation of homeowners energetically bidding up the value of each other's property, borrowing on the basis of the inflating figures, then spending the money in hypermarkets every weekend... is somehow riding for a fall." I wondered if I was missing something, but wrote it anyway; was comprehensively demolished by fellow columnists; and, with a shrug of the shoulders, let the subject drop.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/matthew_parris/article4922449.ece
... was comprehensively demolished by fellow columnists; and, with a shrug of the shoulders, let the subject drop.
The consensus was overwhelming, and intimidating. It "made its reality', and those that commented on it were seen at not players but, at best, harmless bystanders or, at worst, enemies to be crushed. In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
That's not the way the world really works anymore,"
George Soros, the prominent financier, avoids using the financial contracts known as derivatives "because we don't really understand how they work." Felix Rohatyn, the investment banker who saved New York from financial catastrophe in the 1970s, described derivatives as potential "hydrogen bombs." And Warren Buffett presciently observed five years ago that derivatives were "financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal." One prominent financial figure, however, has long thought otherwise. And his views held the greatest sway in debates about the regulation and use of derivatives -- exotic contracts that promised to protect investors from losses, thereby stimulating riskier practices that led to the financial crisis. For more than a decade, Alan Greenspan has fiercely objected whenever derivatives have come under scrutiny in Congress or on Wall Street. http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/10/09/business/09greenspan.php
George Soros, the prominent financier, avoids using the financial contracts known as derivatives "because we don't really understand how they work." Felix Rohatyn, the investment banker who saved New York from financial catastrophe in the 1970s, described derivatives as potential "hydrogen bombs."
And Warren Buffett presciently observed five years ago that derivatives were "financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal."
One prominent financial figure, however, has long thought otherwise. And his views held the greatest sway in debates about the regulation and use of derivatives -- exotic contracts that promised to protect investors from losses, thereby stimulating riskier practices that led to the financial crisis. For more than a decade, Alan Greenspan has fiercely objected whenever derivatives have come under scrutiny in Congress or on Wall Street.
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/10/09/business/09greenspan.php
Sadly too many were (like Paris above), a bit afraid of looking silly, especially when confronted by "the Oracle":
Time and again, Greenspan -- a revered figure affectionately nicknamed the Oracle -- proclaimed that risks could be handled by the markets themselves. "Proposals to bring even minimalist regulation were basically rebuffed by Greenspan and various people in the Treasury," recalled Alan Blinder, a former Federal Reserve board member and an economist at Princeton University. "I think of him as consistently cheerleading on derivatives." Arthur Levitt Jr., a former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, says Greenspan opposes regulating derivatives because of a fundamental disdain for government. Levitt said that Greenspan's authority and grasp of global finance consistently persuaded less financially sophisticated lawmakers to follow his lead. "I always felt that the titans of our legislature didn't want to reveal their own inability to understand some of the concepts that Greenspan was setting forth," Levitt said. "I don't recall anyone ever saying, 'What do you mean by that, Alan?' " ... "He had a way of speaking that made you think he knew exactly what he was talking about at all times," said Senator Tom Harkin, a Democrat from Iowa. "He was able to say things in a way that made people not want to question him on anything, like he knew it all. He was the Oracle, and who were you to question him?" ibid
Time and again, Greenspan -- a revered figure affectionately nicknamed the Oracle -- proclaimed that risks could be handled by the markets themselves.
"Proposals to bring even minimalist regulation were basically rebuffed by Greenspan and various people in the Treasury," recalled Alan Blinder, a former Federal Reserve board member and an economist at Princeton University. "I think of him as consistently cheerleading on derivatives."
Arthur Levitt Jr., a former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, says Greenspan opposes regulating derivatives because of a fundamental disdain for government.
Levitt said that Greenspan's authority and grasp of global finance consistently persuaded less financially sophisticated lawmakers to follow his lead.
"I always felt that the titans of our legislature didn't want to reveal their own inability to understand some of the concepts that Greenspan was setting forth," Levitt said. "I don't recall anyone ever saying, 'What do you mean by that, Alan?' "
... "He had a way of speaking that made you think he knew exactly what he was talking about at all times," said Senator Tom Harkin, a Democrat from Iowa. "He was able to say things in a way that made people not want to question him on anything, like he knew it all. He was the Oracle, and who were you to question him?"
ibid
"(Greenspan) had a way of speaking that made you think he knew exactly what he was talking about at all times," said Senator Tom Harkin, a Democrat from Iowa. "He was able to say things in a way that made people not want to question him on anything, like he knew it all. He was the Oracle, and who were you to question him?"
While I do not recommend that all college undergraduates be required to take a course on rhetroic, I do think that they should be required to take a course that alerts them to the power of that art to win on style arguments that should loose on substance. The dominance of Friedman and Greenspan and the techniques used by Greenspan should be combed and used as exhibit A. As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."