Looking at this it can be seen that the real strategic battle is between keeping the Western way of life going and descending into some form of anarchy over time.
Your friend's thinking seems to beg the question throughout. He assumes both hostile exterior forces that threaten to overwhelm "the Western way of life" (whatever that is), and entropy within, "descending into some form of anarchy", society going to the dogs. These are standard fundamentals of a conservative outlook. They would line up fairly well with Republican assumptions of the need for the War on Terror/civilisation clash coupled with the "right" side in the culture wars. Does that give me an inkling of what he means by "the Western way of life"?
But I can't for the life of me see how fighting the Pashtun tribes in the Afghan mountains (again) will further the cause your friend assumes is essential. Unless this helps:
A far better way is to spread our way of life into the developing world although this also is not cheap and this is exactly what we are attempting in Afghanistan.
This is now so close to nineteenth-century colonialism, to the "white man's burden", that I'm tempted to remind him that this is exactly what the Victorian British attempted in Afghanistan. They were rightly seen as invaders and never subdued the territory. Which is what is almost certain to happen again.
What expense of blood and treasure, how much increased world tension, are we willing to go to, on the basis of such an outdated, reactionary worldview?
I knew my friend's position would be very very unpopular here at ET if not outright UNTENABLE (and I warned him) but I decided to publish it in this diary because I too believe that the only way forward is to GO forward.
The harm's been done and through NATO and Western NGOs in situ can only soldier on -- even if it means picking up the pieces of a thoroughly foul adventure that was started by the Americans.
Unless of course, others have other propositions?
I would like very much to have YOUR own take based on a your own question:
"What expense of blood and treasure, how much increased world tension, are we willing to go to, on the basis of such an outdated, reactionary worldview?"
Pashtun Suicide Terrorism---an Update International Terrorism Monitor--Paper No. 370 (by Indian counter-terrorism expert B. Raman)
Like the Khalistanis and other terrorist/insurgent organisations of India, the Pashtuns, who live on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, did not believe in suicide terrorism. (...) In fact, none of the ethnic groups of Afghanistan---the Pashtuns, the Uzbeks or the Tajiks--- practised suicide terrorism. Even the advent of bin Laden and his Al Qaeda into Afghanistan in 1996 could not induce them to take to suicide terrorism. That was why for killing Masood on September 9, 2001, through an act of suicide terrorism, he had to depend on Arab volunteers. However, the position started changing after the US troops started their military operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda on October 7, 2001. The Pashtuns and the Uzbeks also started practising suicide terrorism. (...) The torrent of anti-US anger in the Pashtun tribal areas has now been joined by an equally strong torrent of anti-Pakistani Army and anti-Musharraf anger, with each aggravating the other. The Pakistani security forces have literally been reeling under the impact of this spreading prairie fire of Pashtun suicide terrorism. (...) This Pashtun anger on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border can be contained and hopefully reduced only by a change in the present counter-terrorism methods of the American and Pakistani Armed Forces, which involve a disproportionate use of force, resulting in a large number of civilian casualties (...).
Like the Khalistanis and other terrorist/insurgent organisations of India, the Pashtuns, who live on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, did not believe in suicide terrorism. (...) In fact, none of the ethnic groups of Afghanistan---the Pashtuns, the Uzbeks or the Tajiks--- practised suicide terrorism.
Even the advent of bin Laden and his Al Qaeda into Afghanistan in 1996 could not induce them to take to suicide terrorism. That was why for killing Masood on September 9, 2001, through an act of suicide terrorism, he had to depend on Arab volunteers. However, the position started changing after the US troops started their military operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda on October 7, 2001. The Pashtuns and the Uzbeks also started practising suicide terrorism. (...)
The torrent of anti-US anger in the Pashtun tribal areas has now been joined by an equally strong torrent of anti-Pakistani Army and anti-Musharraf anger, with each aggravating the other. The Pakistani security forces have literally been reeling under the impact of this spreading prairie fire of Pashtun suicide terrorism. (...)
This Pashtun anger on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border can be contained and hopefully reduced only by a change in the present counter-terrorism methods of the American and Pakistani Armed Forces, which involve a disproportionate use of force, resulting in a large number of civilian casualties (...).
Remember this from back in September 2006?
Top soldier quits as blundering campaign turns into 'pointless' war (UK Times)
THE former aide-de-camp to the commander of the British taskforce in southern Afghanistan has described the campaign in Helmand province as "a textbook case of how to screw up a counter-insurgency". "Having a big old fight is pointless and just making things worse," said Captain Leo Docherty, of the Scots Guards, who became so disillusioned that he quit the army last month. "All those people whose homes have been destroyed and sons killed are going to turn against the British," he said. "It's a pretty clear equation -- if people are losing homes and poppy fields, they will go and fight. I certainly would. "We've been grotesquely clumsy -- we've said we'll be different to the Americans who were bombing and strafing villages, then behaved exactly like them." (...)
"Having a big old fight is pointless and just making things worse," said Captain Leo Docherty, of the Scots Guards, who became so disillusioned that he quit the army last month.
"All those people whose homes have been destroyed and sons killed are going to turn against the British," he said. "It's a pretty clear equation -- if people are losing homes and poppy fields, they will go and fight. I certainly would.
"We've been grotesquely clumsy -- we've said we'll be different to the Americans who were bombing and strafing villages, then behaved exactly like them." (...)
See also this analysis of what has gone wrong and proposal for an alternative solution from Afghanistan's pre-Taleban minister of foreign affairs (1992 to 1996), Najibullah Lafraie:
The Way Out of Afghanistan is to Get Out "Ignoring moralities is always undesirable, but doing so systematically is really worrisome." Mohammed Khatami
So as the original seems no longer available, here's a quick summary I posted on StrategyTalk back in 2006 (heavily abridged cut-and-paste to give an idea of Najibullah Lafraie's main points):
The initial American idea in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11 was not to do what the Soviet army had done -- not to commit a large force, but to work with allied Afghan militias, a small contingent of Special Forces and massive use of airpower. But once the military option was adopted, there proved to be no way but to follow the Soviet path. (...) If the situation remains as it is, NATO may be forced soon to commit even more troops to Afghanistan. But a grave mistake is inherent in this approach. It overlooks the critical fact that the American and NATO forces are no longer part of a solution in Afghanistan, but part of the problem. After the removal of the Taliban, American and ISAF troops were welcomed as liberators. But they have overstayed their welcome. Now, after countless mistakes, they have turned a large part of the population against them. They are now seen as another "infidel" army trying to occupy their country. If the international community wants to deny the Taliban and their allies an important recruiting tool, it must withdraw Western troops from Afghanistan as soon as possible. This suggestion may seem irresponsible. Without the military support of the international community, the Karzai government would not be expected to survive more than a few months. But that would not be the case if the withdrawal of the American and NATO troops took place as part of a well-planned, comprehensive solution of the Afghanistan problem. The following elements could form the basis of such a plan: - Formation of a Muslim international peacekeeping force under UN command. (...) - A stronger focus on training Afghan national army and police. (...) - A new intra-Afghan dialogue. (...) - A fresh focus on human development. (...) - Curtailing interference by neighbors.
But once the military option was adopted, there proved to be no way but to follow the Soviet path.
(...) If the situation remains as it is, NATO may be forced soon to commit even more troops to Afghanistan.
But a grave mistake is inherent in this approach. It overlooks the critical fact that the American and NATO forces are no longer part of a solution in Afghanistan, but part of the problem.
After the removal of the Taliban, American and ISAF troops were welcomed as liberators. But they have overstayed their welcome.
Now, after countless mistakes, they have turned a large part of the population against them. They are now seen as another "infidel" army trying to occupy their country.
If the international community wants to deny the Taliban and their allies an important recruiting tool, it must withdraw Western troops from Afghanistan as soon as possible.
This suggestion may seem irresponsible. Without the military support of the international community, the Karzai government would not be expected to survive more than a few months.
But that would not be the case if the withdrawal of the American and NATO troops took place as part of a well-planned, comprehensive solution of the Afghanistan problem.
The following elements could form the basis of such a plan:
- Formation of a Muslim international peacekeeping force under UN command. (...)
- A stronger focus on training Afghan national army and police. (...)
- A new intra-Afghan dialogue. (...)
- A fresh focus on human development. (...)
- Curtailing interference by neighbors.
I agree that the downside of a NATO pullout will be the potential downfall of the Karzai government.
With regard to "- A stronger focus on training Afghan national army and police.(...)" I do believe that there is a strong focus in that area and there's been a great deal of things achieved.
To achieve what you propose, it is imperative for the UN and the intl community to put pressure on the Karzai govt to do more than what they're doing today, to exert more effort in policing their own ranks and perhaps and realistically, to be less sensitive when solutions are put on the table eg, when he asked for the recall of the British and Irish conduits to the Taleban who in fact had managed to get some Taleban on side, and when Karzai himself criticized the nomination of Lord Ashdown as "coordinator".
Dunno, but I'm not yet prepared to condemn Karzai out of hand. After all, he wasn't simply a tame western-nutured puppet inserted by force of arms, he'd got elected by the Loya Jirga and has withstood 3 recent attempts on his life without bloodthirsty retaliation-crackdowns asfaik?. Here's his bio, judge for yourself. Noting in particular that he's Pashtun, educated partly in Afghanistan partly in India and is able to communicate "in their own lingo" and on their own cultural terms with the major regional plays plus western/international ones, speaks Pashto, Persian, Urdu, Hindi, English and French - not all that common amongst Afghani leaders/tribal chieftains, I'd say? And he's somehow managed to maintain good relations with both India and Pakistan, both Iran and the US - quite a juggling act! Through the last few years, I've also noted how frequently and determinedly he's reprimanded the US/NATO about the high civilian deathtolls caused by their reliance on airstrikes. So when I first read about his ejection of the two UK/EU officials aka UK spooks from Helmand, these were my immediate gut-reactions:
UK spies trying to negotiate a "separate peace" with the Taliban... without informing Karzai's govt.? Tch tch. (...)...as the Afghan war appears essentially unwinnable, the Afghan government only-naturally believes these men were MI6 spooks working for an inclusive peace-deal with the Taliban, only-logically with Karzai's head - or at very least his defenestration - as part of its price.
On that episode and its implications, did you see the very interesting thread on MoonOfAlabama entitled "Imperial Catfighting in Afghanistan"? My perceptions were slightly different from those in Bernhard's nonetheless-admirable opening post so I chipped in with my views towards the end of the thread (posts 19 and 22) under my alternative nik "parvati_ roma". Another good MoA contrib. worth reading on this aspect: "Afghanistan Update - Kill Karzai". "Ignoring moralities is always undesirable, but doing so systematically is really worrisome." Mohammed Khatami
