So as the original seems no longer available, here's a quick summary I posted on StrategyTalk back in 2006 (heavily abridged cut-and-paste to give an idea of Najibullah Lafraie's main points):
The initial American idea in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11 was not to do what the Soviet army had done -- not to commit a large force, but to work with allied Afghan militias, a small contingent of Special Forces and massive use of airpower. But once the military option was adopted, there proved to be no way but to follow the Soviet path. (...) If the situation remains as it is, NATO may be forced soon to commit even more troops to Afghanistan. But a grave mistake is inherent in this approach. It overlooks the critical fact that the American and NATO forces are no longer part of a solution in Afghanistan, but part of the problem. After the removal of the Taliban, American and ISAF troops were welcomed as liberators. But they have overstayed their welcome. Now, after countless mistakes, they have turned a large part of the population against them. They are now seen as another "infidel" army trying to occupy their country. If the international community wants to deny the Taliban and their allies an important recruiting tool, it must withdraw Western troops from Afghanistan as soon as possible. This suggestion may seem irresponsible. Without the military support of the international community, the Karzai government would not be expected to survive more than a few months. But that would not be the case if the withdrawal of the American and NATO troops took place as part of a well-planned, comprehensive solution of the Afghanistan problem. The following elements could form the basis of such a plan: - Formation of a Muslim international peacekeeping force under UN command. (...) - A stronger focus on training Afghan national army and police. (...) - A new intra-Afghan dialogue. (...) - A fresh focus on human development. (...) - Curtailing interference by neighbors.
But once the military option was adopted, there proved to be no way but to follow the Soviet path.
(...) If the situation remains as it is, NATO may be forced soon to commit even more troops to Afghanistan.
But a grave mistake is inherent in this approach. It overlooks the critical fact that the American and NATO forces are no longer part of a solution in Afghanistan, but part of the problem.
After the removal of the Taliban, American and ISAF troops were welcomed as liberators. But they have overstayed their welcome.
Now, after countless mistakes, they have turned a large part of the population against them. They are now seen as another "infidel" army trying to occupy their country.
If the international community wants to deny the Taliban and their allies an important recruiting tool, it must withdraw Western troops from Afghanistan as soon as possible.
This suggestion may seem irresponsible. Without the military support of the international community, the Karzai government would not be expected to survive more than a few months.
But that would not be the case if the withdrawal of the American and NATO troops took place as part of a well-planned, comprehensive solution of the Afghanistan problem.
The following elements could form the basis of such a plan:
- Formation of a Muslim international peacekeeping force under UN command. (...)
- A stronger focus on training Afghan national army and police. (...)
- A new intra-Afghan dialogue. (...)
- A fresh focus on human development. (...)
- Curtailing interference by neighbors.
I agree that the downside of a NATO pullout will be the potential downfall of the Karzai government.
With regard to "- A stronger focus on training Afghan national army and police.(...)" I do believe that there is a strong focus in that area and there's been a great deal of things achieved.
To achieve what you propose, it is imperative for the UN and the intl community to put pressure on the Karzai govt to do more than what they're doing today, to exert more effort in policing their own ranks and perhaps and realistically, to be less sensitive when solutions are put on the table eg, when he asked for the recall of the British and Irish conduits to the Taleban who in fact had managed to get some Taleban on side, and when Karzai himself criticized the nomination of Lord Ashdown as "coordinator".
Dunno, but I'm not yet prepared to condemn Karzai out of hand. After all, he wasn't simply a tame western-nutured puppet inserted by force of arms, he'd got elected by the Loya Jirga and has withstood 3 recent attempts on his life without bloodthirsty retaliation-crackdowns asfaik?. Here's his bio, judge for yourself. Noting in particular that he's Pashtun, educated partly in Afghanistan partly in India and is able to communicate "in their own lingo" and on their own cultural terms with the major regional plays plus western/international ones, speaks Pashto, Persian, Urdu, Hindi, English and French - not all that common amongst Afghani leaders/tribal chieftains, I'd say? And he's somehow managed to maintain good relations with both India and Pakistan, both Iran and the US - quite a juggling act! Through the last few years, I've also noted how frequently and determinedly he's reprimanded the US/NATO about the high civilian deathtolls caused by their reliance on airstrikes. So when I first read about his ejection of the two UK/EU officials aka UK spooks from Helmand, these were my immediate gut-reactions:
UK spies trying to negotiate a "separate peace" with the Taliban... without informing Karzai's govt.? Tch tch. (...)...as the Afghan war appears essentially unwinnable, the Afghan government only-naturally believes these men were MI6 spooks working for an inclusive peace-deal with the Taliban, only-logically with Karzai's head - or at very least his defenestration - as part of its price.
On that episode and its implications, did you see the very interesting thread on MoonOfAlabama entitled "Imperial Catfighting in Afghanistan"? My perceptions were slightly different from those in Bernhard's nonetheless-admirable opening post so I chipped in with my views towards the end of the thread (posts 19 and 22) under my alternative nik "parvati_ roma". Another good MoA contrib. worth reading on this aspect: "Afghanistan Update - Kill Karzai". "Ignoring moralities is always undesirable, but doing so systematically is really worrisome." Mohammed Khatami
