Is your working hypothesis that the PRC government 'compensates' for the exchange rate deterioration by exerting control over the volume of public and private exports/imports? (Also, when staying "stable", what timeframe do you consider?)

I think such a hypothesis would need some further evidence to be seriously considered. Meanwhile, to spell out the big picture in the two diagrams:
(1) all the short-term variation in EUR/CNY is explained by volatility in the EUR/USD rate, while on a longer term, the slow and steady decline of the USD/CNY rate does indicate management (which does involve diversifying assets);
(2) the dollar depreciates relative to the Euro faster than relative to the renminbi, thus the Chinese exchange rate policy is steadily beneficial to US manufacturers, but at the same time still steadily worsening for Eurozone manufacturers.

But it is hard to sustain export growth when one is busy haranguing ones trading partners and goading them into boycotting your goods.

Boycotts could cut more into imports than exports in absolute numbers, so the trade deficit with the PRC would decline.

I submit the boycott calls and the nationalist protests against Western pro-Tibet protests (some participants of which are nasty like all nationalists) are topical to the issue of Eurozone external trade, even if not to the presentation of January and February statistics.

Myself, I don't think much of PRC products boycotts over Tibet, but I see stronger reasons. I am for long the view that neoliberal free-trade policy helps a race to the bottom, that in wages and labour rights and environmental/consumer protection regulations; and for that reason, I also or long think that the EU should make trade with the PRC conditional on improvements in environmental, work safety standards and labour rights. (But fat chance our Democracy warriors will recognise trade unions as a vehicle of democracy.)

_{*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.}