Display:
Stupid question time: If the Fed is a private entity and it isn't doling out government dime, then what is all the fuss about? The Fed wanted to bail out some rich fatcats who got overeager on the race track exchange. So what?

The fact that so many knowledgeable people around these parts are shouting bloody murder about it tells me that someone is being ripped off. But damned if I can see who the sucker is if it's not the taxpayers. And you're saying it isn't the taxpayer? Or are you saying that it is the taxpayer, but in some indirect fashion?

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 09:37:12 AM EST
[ Parent ]
People tend to forget that money loaned is created for the purpose. And the Fed is the monetary authority.

These loans were not made at the expense of the Treasury, but at the expense of the Dollar itself, and of the underlying "Full Faith and Credit of the US Government". On this last point, I wasn't aware that the Fed had loaned over $20bn to Bear Stearns, but I was aware that the $30bn loaned to JP Morgan was in the form of allowing toxic-waste "subprime" assets as collateral instead of the "prime" US Treasuries customarily used as collateral. And even then, my memory was faulty...

Times Online: Bear Stearns sold to JPMorgan Chase under Federal Bank pressure

As part of the deal, America's central bank has effectively underwritten $30 billion worth of Bear's toxic sub-prime mortgage-backed bonds, to protect JP Morgan Chase shareholders. It is also providing special financing to JP Morgan Chase - of an undisclosed sum. Terms of the deal are unknown, and it is not clear whether such special financing is to cover the cost of JP Morgan's emergency loan to Bear made late on Thursday night.
[Murdoch Alert]

But, in any case, the crisis is the result of bankers creating money to lend to themselves and each other through the Fed's dereliction of its monetary oversight duty, and now the Fed continues to create money to bail them out. Ultimately, this is an "inflation" or "devaluation" tax on every holder of US$ on the planet, but first and foremost for American residents.

When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 09:56:44 AM EST
[ Parent ]
So basically, the Fed has been printing something on the order of 50 million $1000 bills and handed them to the fatcats?

Which, of course means that the suckers are everyone who isn't among the recipients. That makes sense...

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 10:21:45 AM EST
[ Parent ]
But that's after the fat cats already printed a boatload of money for themselves under the Fed's nose, which isn't supposed to happen. When the bezzle became too big to pass unnoticed, the Fed discontinued the M3 money supply statistical series on the argument that it doesn't correlate with economic activity as well as M2.

When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 10:25:49 AM EST
[ Parent ]
More Socratic questions:

I understand how they printed the money (asset bubbles, cheap credit, etc.). But how were the Fed supposed to prevent that (if it had been doing its job)? It could have raised interest rates. But is that really the only weapon at its disposal?

Which interest rates can it change at all, by the way? The way I heard the story the central banks can only change the rate they charge from the banks - but if the banks can make money for themselves without the central bank, then what kind of fulcrum does the CB have?

Or does the CB control the ratio of "funnymoney" that banks can print to "real money" that they must have in stock to do so?

And what is "real" money anyway? Does "funnymoney" become "real money" once it's been loaned out and then re-deposited by the guy who took out the loan?

We seem to keep running into this relationship between central banks and the rest of the world. Maybe someone should write a Central Banking For Dummies diary and stick it somewhere we can find it. (Fortunately I'm not knowledgeable enough about the subject to do so myself :-P)

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 10:51:13 AM EST
[ Parent ]
According to JK Galbraith in The Great Crash 1929, the bubble of 1925-9 wasn't due to low interest rates, which were in the double digits but still below the average return of the stock market indices which still justified borrowing to gamble on stocks. One of the things that could have been used, in hindsight, would have been a tightening of the margin requirements (ultimately making it impossible to trade shares on credit if the margin requirement reaches 100%) but the SEC was created (and given the power to set margin requirements) only as part of the New Deal after 1932.

But the current crisis has little to do with margin requirements. It is really directly about skirting the banking regulation and the monetary policy limits of the Fed. The banks have done an end-run around banking and credit regulation with securitization and off-balance-sheet "special investment vehicles". I am not sure monetary policy tools like interest rates would have been effective at all. Tightening reserve requirements wouldn't have helped either because essentially what banks have done is outsource the credit risk from money creation by loans, which is what reserve requirements protect banks against, to institutions with no reserve requirements.

I have been called wrong a couple of times on my interpretation of just how regulation was skirted in the subprime case, so I can't say I know how this could have been prevented. However, it does appear that Greenspan was warned about both the lending practices going on in the subprime sector, as well as the financial risks, and chose to do nothing. The blame probably lies squarely with the Fed as bank regulator, not as monetary authority.

When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 03:57:05 PM EST
[ Parent ]
But houses are no stocks. After all people were living in those houses and I doubt that many people are willing to take negative armotisation mortgages. Even if the house price goes on upwards for some more time, you still have the debt and you can't sell your house without some form of replacement. When your house price goes up so much, then probably your replacement would be expensive, too. So you would  always end up in trouble.
So people look on the loan and what they can pay back and decide. With higher interest strong relative movements are much less likely. The principal to income ratio would be better, the houses would be easier to heat. I doubt as well that there would have been no credit crisis at all, but I would have been smaller.

For complex phenomena there is usually more than one way to influence them. Interest rates would have been one in this case. Mortgage lending regulation another, higher reserve requirements yet another, and there are probably even more. Using more than one measure to reach a goal is usually a good idea.

Der Amerikaner ist die Orchidee unter den Menschen
Volker Pispers

by Martin (weiser.mensch(at)googlemail.com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 04:25:31 PM EST
[ Parent ]
But houses are no stocks. After all people were living in those houses and I doubt that many people are willing to take negative armotisation mortgages. Even if the house price goes on upwards for some more time, you still have the debt and you can't sell your house without some form of replacement. When your house price goes up so much, then probably your replacement would be expensive, too. So you would  always end up in trouble.
So people look on the loan and what they can pay back and decide.
If people had reasoned that way we wouldn't be talking about a subprime crisis. Moreover, there were "many" people who took negative-equity or interest-only mortgages. And there is now a higher default rate than anyone expected because people with no equity in their houses are just walking away from them and such a behacioural change just wasn't factored into the mortgage valuation models.

When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 05:04:15 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Right, as walking away is often even perfectly legal, it is really a subbrain crisis on the side of the lenders.

But still as the banks had to figure in some risk, higher interest would have led to lower leverage?

Der Amerikaner ist die Orchidee unter den Menschen
Volker Pispers

by Martin (weiser.mensch(at)googlemail.com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 06:12:45 PM EST
[ Parent ]
And maybe I'm not that convinced.
The problem is very concentrated on adjustable mortgages, and threatening there even to go in the near prime and prime sector. Too low rates as well lead to higher volatility in rates and make therefore adjustables much more dangerous. As an example look to the variation of lead interest set by the Fed and by the ECB over one cycle. The ECB goes about from 2 - 4%, so we are speaking of a doubling. The Fed goes from 1 - 5.25 % or so, that is more than a fivefold.
With negative interest rates, as the US had for some time, it simply makes sense to buy tinned food on credit and sell it later for profit.

Der Amerikaner ist die Orchidee unter den Menschen
Volker Pispers
by Martin (weiser.mensch(at)googlemail.com) on Thu May 15th, 2008 at 07:55:41 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Greenspan invented this scam in 1977 and was subsequently offered the chair of the FRB, having proved himself a thorough despicable, innovative marketer. Besides which Congress repealed Glass-Steagall to create entrants, a supply chain for debt production.

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
by Cat on Thu May 15th, 2008 at 07:44:43 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Who set margin requirements before the SEC existed?

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Thu May 15th, 2008 at 08:08:18 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The exchanges or the brokers themselves? I don't know.

When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu May 15th, 2008 at 04:53:13 PM EST
[ Parent ]
JakeS:
So basically, the Fed has been printing something on the order of 50 million $1000 bills and handed them to the fatcats?

Not "handed": "loaned", secured by a heap of crap. But it's the Treasury at risk on these Fed loans, as I understand it.

Heads the banks win, tails the tax-payer loses.

Only Treasuries can "hand" : which is of course a pinko subversive act undertaken only by cheese-eating surrender monkeys and the like....

"Any economic unit can emit money. The serious problem is to get it accepted" Hyman Minsky

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 10:58:14 AM EST
[ Parent ]
More than that, because the Fed has been systematically lying about the real rate of inflation, it's been possible for the banks to inflate away indebtedness, push down the real rate of pay and also score a government bail out, which will magically have no apparent inflationary effect.

Unlike wage demands.

So there will be no reason not to try to push for more bail outs in future, because - clearly - apart from making the dollar wobble for a week or so, this deal hasn't had any real effect on the real economy.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 10:26:45 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Terms of the deal are known and were publicly available at EDGAR and at BSC websites 17 March the day after the deal was done. At the time of the merger, JPM was carrying $91 trillion and BSC $13 trillion in notional derivatives; these figures are documented by OCC and BSC's 10-K filing, Jan 2008. Incidentally, Federal Reserve Bank of New York president, Timothy Geithner, represented the FRB in negotiations between JPM and BSC.

You are absolutely correct: "These loans were not made at the expense of the Treasury, but at the expense of the Dollar itself, and of the underlying "Full Faith and Credit of the US Government".

BSC is not an FDIC-insured bank, but JPM is on several accounts as it is a bank holding company with retail and commercial operations. Both bank's however are two of the FRB's 20 primary dealers of US treasuries. (more links here) The Primary Dealer Credit Facility was created the day that the JPM-BSC merger was announced, 16 March. These are the facilities for primary dealers as of 28 March. You will note also the Term Discount Window created 17 Aug 2007; at that time Bush and Bernanke announced a plan to "rescue" homeowners by extending FHA origination and insurance underwriting. This was a public signal that Treasury and FRB understood the MBS market and housing values were collapsing. OFHEO was not amused. By Dec 2007 reserve system non-borrowed funds were negative, and FRB established the Term Auction Facility.

And there is no law prohibiting or limiting FRB underwriting precisely because three of the FRB "core banks" are primary dealers and LIBOR panelists -- BoA (which has been "asked" to absorb Countrywide), JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup. I don't need to tell you that "the market" is forcing BoE to validate LIBOR panelists' compliance. In effect, the only thing keeping treasury yield level (USD) is market confidence in these institutions capacity to deflate housing value and suppress dilution (inflation) as directed by the US Congress.

I doubt "insider trading" triggered a panic or the JPM-BSC. Any institutional fund manager paying the slightest attention to BSC litigation, exposure, margins, or rumor of default, under the conditions described above would have pulled have pulled out ($17B over two days, iirc) at the first opportunity the last 10K was filed because they were well aware the company's market cap was bogus.

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.

by Cat on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 06:27:35 PM EST
[ Parent ]
MarketTrustee:
I doubt "insider trading" triggered a panic or the JPM-BSC.

Did JPM pick up BSC "on the cheap" in your view?

They already increased the offer from $2.00 to $10.00 per share of course...

"Any economic unit can emit money. The serious problem is to get it accepted" Hyman Minsky

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 07:14:18 PM EST
[ Parent ]
That was still cheap.

But what was the point of that move? Was it just a bit of fake haggling to stop the markets going into meltdown and ruin the party for everyone?

Or had someone made their money by then, so it didn't matter if prices started to climb back up again?

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 07:25:54 PM EST
[ Parent ]
ThatBritGuy:
Or had someone made their money by then, so it didn't matter if prices started to climb back up again?

Quite.

The fact that they increased the price by 500% with such alacrity indicates there was a little slack in there.....

"Any economic unit can emit money. The serious problem is to get it accepted" Hyman Minsky

by ChrisCook (cojockathotmaildotcom) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 07:57:14 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Cheap, yes. For one, the deal is a stock trade. There is no JPM cash on that table. And if I remember correctly, the $10 ps revision to the Merger Agreement occurred at month end. By then fin/biz reporters had detected alleged "insider trading" by Coyne et al --personal stakes >3% plus fund managers-- to pump the share market value after 16 March. Their strategy, I imagine, was to leverage threats of shareholders' litigation over the initial strike price. I don't know if there have been further revisions to the Merger Agreement JPM option price, $2.00 ps, on BSC shell, operations remaing liquidation and settlements.

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
by Cat on Thu May 15th, 2008 at 07:28:11 AM EST
[ Parent ]
No question is stupid, especially if asked in a Socratic spirit...

When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed May 14th, 2008 at 10:30:50 AM EST
[ Parent ]

Display:
Login
. Make a new account
. Reset password
Recommended Diaries
Clipping the wings of a judge
by Migeru - Feb 10
31 comments

Hunger March wins PR battle
by DoDo - Feb 9
3 comments

Romania: protests change government
by DoDo - Feb 8
6 comments

Sarkozy: Enemies Ahoy!
by afew - Feb 10
15 comments

Murdoch - Outsourcing and Hubris
by ceebs - Feb 3
18 comments

Obama wins GOP Primaries (to date)
by Frank Schnittger - Feb 8
8 comments

LQD: Unsustainable irrigation
by Melanchthon - Feb 9

Bristol Pound
by ChrisCook - Feb 7
14 comments

Recent Diaries
Sarkozy: Enemies Ahoy!
by afew - Feb 10
15 comments

Clipping the wings of a judge
by Migeru - Feb 10
31 comments

LQD: Unsustainable irrigation
by Melanchthon - Feb 9

Hunger March wins PR battle
by DoDo - Feb 9
3 comments

Obama wins GOP Primaries (to date)
by Frank Schnittger - Feb 8
8 comments

Romania: protests change government
by DoDo - Feb 8
6 comments

Answers to the Renewable Energy Consultation
by Luis de Sousa - Feb 7

Bristol Pound
by ChrisCook - Feb 7
14 comments

The Imitation Of Germany
by afew - Feb 4
31 comments

Strange Fruit
by Frank Schnittger - Feb 4
14 comments

Murdoch - Outsourcing and Hubris
by ceebs - Feb 3
18 comments

Mismatch with the Natural Gas Market
by Luis de Sousa - Feb 3
22 comments

The Future of Economics
by ARGeezer - Feb 2
191 comments

Desert Island Discs - Helen's distortions
by Helen - Jan 31
48 comments

Gorila
by DoDo - Jan 29
14 comments

Rail News Blogging #7
by DoDo - Jan 29
15 comments

Obama's State Of The Union: LQD
by Crazy Horse - Jan 25
74 comments

Democracy Technology
by gmoke - Jan 24
1 comment

The Hydrogen dream
by Luis de Sousa - Jan 24
49 comments

ET Paris Meet-Up 2012 (2 UPDATE)
by afew - Jan 23
113 comments

More Diaries...
Occasional Series