| ||| ||||| ||||||| ||||||| ||||||||| age phase out ||||||||| ||||||||| ||||||| ||||||| ||||| ||||| reduced base, making up for increased lifetime
However, fertility was not always the same. So there are e.g. babyboomers. There outphasing has not yet really started, so at the moment the number of children makes nearly up for the number of dying people (partially less than expected because of longer life spans), but when the baby boomer generation dies, there most likely won't be a baby boom of corresponding magnitude. Aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaahrg
In the meantime, the "pensions crisis" might be a political problem, not really an economic impossibility to provide a dignified standard of living for everyone. All economics is political economy. When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
More concrete I have from destatis the picture below. It shows in blue the number of people older than 65 years per 100 people between 20 and 65. In green the number of people below 20, as the sum of these people is expected to be those who can't earn their own income. For the modelling it is assumed, that net immigration will be around the value of the last ten years (so slightly higher than currently), constant fertility and some reasonable assumption about life expectancy.
What makes economic stress is not the absolut level, but the change, if one assumes productivity gains. So from the mid 20s to the mid 30s Germany will suffer, but untill about 2020, there it will be less painfull than the last 15 years. (In Germany the baby boomers started later than in the US, only around the mid 50s, so they start to ordinary retire around 2020) Aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaahrg
