On the other hand, there were some interesting comments on this diary, both on- and off-topic. So, I've decided to sign up and post. I'm going to try and stick to the original topic.
Amidst the snark, there were at least two substantive criticisms of Migeru's original diary, posted by yours truly. You may read these two points here. There are follow-up comments, starting here.
My comments below won't make much sense unless you read these.
In my opinion, neither of my two substantive points were addressed adequately by the progressives, either here or at Atlantic Review.
The meaning of "true human rights" in an Iraqi context was never addressed. Do we accept the idea that human rights are universal? If so, irony rules the day, since this was one of the core neo-con assumptions. Still, if we agree about universal human rights, while obviously disagreeing about the success and even the sincerity of the neo-cons re human rights, it would represent progress. Do we agree? If so, how does Europe plan to convince the Iraqis that European "true human rights" aren't part of a hidden agenda?
The Surge in Iraq was discussed briefly. Given how bad things were in 2006-7, I think that to completely dismiss the obvious progress since then is unfair. I accept the larger point that this progress could be reversed at any time, and there are many cynical yet plausible reasons to fear this. Nevertheless, the momentum for now at least is away from civil war, not towards it, and any European engagement in Iraq must take that into account in some way..
Perhaps even more important is a larger question -- given Europe's commitment to policy by consensus, which is powerful but time-consuming, how can Europe participate meaningfully in a situation as volatile as Iraq? Migeru proposes Judo as an analogy for how European soft power (and, I suspect, very modest resource commitment as far as Iraq is concerned!) might be leveraged in order to make a meaningful difference. But Judo requires an ability to rapidly detect and respond to changing conditions on the ground that simply isn't compatible with the need to wait until consensus evolves. Perhaps a more appropriate analogy might be a 'sea change' in which slow, almost invisible, but ultimately inexorable processes cause change. This would take advantage of one of the strengths of policy by consensus: that a true consensus, once achieved, is enduring. But I fear this is all moot; as far as I can tell, there still no sign of any European consensus on Iraq.
I look forward to your constructive response to my criticism. Entertaining snark is also appreciated. Mean-spirited or preaching-to-the-choir, echo-chamber snark, not so much. __ I am the most conservative Unitarian-Universalist you will ever meet.
On hidden agendas, I don't think the EU has credibility to convince anyone it doesn't have one. I have said that Turkey is the only country in the region that the EU has any leverage with, and that we're pissing that leverage away by racist islamophobic posturing, and also that thinking of the EU as "postcolonial" is "may be" (heh) naive. On the other hand, it doesn't even have an agenda as consensus among the EU is hard to come by. I am mystified that anyone, starting with the European Council of Foreign Relations, would be thinking Europe needs to get involved or else we're doomed.
The Surge in Iraq was discussed briefly. Given how bad things were in 2006-7, I think that to completely dismiss the obvious progress since then is unfair. I accept the larger point that this progress could be reversed at any time, and there are many cynical yet plausible reasons to fear this. Nevertheless, the momentum for now at least is away from civil war, not towards it, and any European engagement in Iraq must take that into account in some way...
On the larger question I think we are basically in agreement. Consensus-based "soft power" will only get us so far. This may be the most that can be expected of Europe in Iraq, which isn't much and moreover can only take place if the players in and around Iraq are minimally cooperative. Case in point: Turkey. If Turkey decides Iraqi Kurdistan poses a credible internal separatist threat there's very little the EU can do to convince them otherwise. We're having enough trouble getting Turkey to even recognize that the Kurds are an ethnic and cultural minority. When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
I confess I was assuming you'd have a certain commitment to defending your original post. Instead you seem to be treating the post as a sort of hypothetical -- if Europe had credibility on true human rights (you say it doesn't -- yet another point on which we disagree!), then here is how we might proceed re Iraq. This gets us nowhere. If a perfect record on human rights were a precondition for credibility on human rights, then human rights would have very few advocates indeed. What's needed are more advocates, as many as possible, not perfect advocates.
As to colonialism, that originated before the Enlightenment, and continued in spite of the Enlightenment, not because of it. Just as the absurd doctrine of Social Darwinism doesn't discredit Darwin's theory of evolution, Europe's colonial past doesn't discredit a true concern for human rights.
In a different comment on this diary, you asked,
Who are the American counterparts of European Atlanticists?
Well, we exist, and we want to talk, but we get frustrated. Other than Atlantic Review, where are the European Atlanticists willing to disembark from their Utopian Isle and treat with us, mere mortals though we be? __ I am the most conservative Unitarian-Universalist you will ever meet.
I'd like to refer to your last comment:
where are the European Atlanticists willing to disembark from their Utopian Isle and treat with us, mere mortals though we be?
I don't know if this is addressed to us or not, because I'm not sure we'd self describe as Atlanticists (not that there's a "we" here: some might, and some might not). I'd say that a strongly expressed trend here on ET is disappointment that European politicians seem to think that Atlanticism = aligning with the US (and criticism of those Americans who also conflate "democracy" and "dialogue" with aligning with US interests and policies). I don't think people call for a hostile relationship with the USA, but for a more independent-minded one, and a willingness to standup to what could be described as US abuses or bullying (cf Guantanamo, rendition flights, anti-satellite missiles) - but such policies are often described are hostile anyway (see how the French are treated, when they are probably the USA's more reliable ally when the shit really hits the fan).
Again, we're a lot more critical of Europeans than of Americans - but we do think that, while there still can be common causes and interests between the USA and Europe, it is bad policy for Europeans to ignore the differences and in particular to let itself be tainted with complicity with all the abuses of the Bush years. In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
a willingness to standup to what could be described as US abuses or bullying (cf Guantanamo, rendition flights, anti-satellite missiles) - but such policies are often described are hostile anyway
I agree that Atlanticism must mean something different than mere Americanism (i.e. not just "aligning with the US"). I would like to think that because of our shared values and history, we are all in some sense Atlanticists. That would mean we think N. America and Europe should have an enduring, special relationship that is more than just normal diplomatic relations between countries at peace.
Are there really that many people in Europe (or on Eurotrib) who see the Atlantic relationship as no more meaningful, special, close, enduring, or exceptional than Europe's relationships with other major powers like Russia or China?
In my opinion, the reason Atlanticism too often ends up looking like Americanism is that there is no consensus as to what Europe wants. Naturally, you are against "US abuses or bullying"...but what are you in favor of? As we've seen right here on this diary...in spite of the fact that European countries are some of the most democratic, open, plural, free societies the world has ever known, some European progressives still somehow feel they are not credible or worthy enough to peacefully advocate human rights!
Also, I would like to learn more about how the French "are probably the USA's more reliable ally when the shit really hits the fan". Certainly, France has been a reliable US ally at times, but surely the UK, Canada, and perhaps even Australia or Israel have generally been more reliable? I am not trying to attack the French, or distract anyone with UK-French rivalries...I am just wondering if there are facts that I am somehow missing?
Perhaps the word "ally" assumes that the UK and the others don't qualify as allies, but rather, are vassal states of some sort. Therefore, of the remaining countries in the world, France has been the most reliable. That position I could at least understand, even though it is absurd.
it is bad policy...to let itself be tainted with complicity with all the abuses of the Bush years
Again, the Utopian excuse...you don't dare speak up for human rights (except to criticise America) because you might sound like Bush. This is indeed unserious, even petulant. This isn't a policy, it is the abdication of a policy. __ I am the most conservative Unitarian-Universalist you will ever meet.
John in Michigan USA:
Perhaps the word "ally" assumes that the UK and the others don't qualify as allies, but rather, are vassal states of some sort.
At the moment, the regime in Washington is not standing up for human rights or democracy; quite the contrary, in fact (I have elaborated on the reasoning behind this conclusion downthread and will not repeat it here). So I fail to see a contradiction in a pro-human rights/anti-Bush stance.
Further, you will note that there is plenty of speaking out in favour of human rights on this site, on a variety of issues arising in a variety of countries across the globe, so I am a bit unsure how you came to the conclusion that anyone here is afraid to speak up for human rights.
Finally, I am not sure why you think that geopolitics should be driven by geographical, cultural or historical sentiments. I think that politics should be driven by policy. And there is no law of nature that says that Europe and the USA will always be in better agreement on matters of policy than - say - Europe and Mercosur or Europe and the African Union.
Even if you disagree with putting policy above history and culture when forming geopolitical alliances, I would point out that Europe has an even longer history of interaction with North Africa, Russia, and the Middle East than with North America, and that the European culture(s) have as much in common with the Russian and Mediterranean cultures as with the American culture.
- Jake If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.
Yes, and this is why we hold Americans to a higher standard than "no worse than Saddam" (or "no worse than Putin", or "no worse than the French").
And this is why we are especially critical of the absolute hypocrisy of our current batch of leaders, but in particular the current White House, on the topic of human rights, civil rights and freedoms.
how the French "are probably the USA's more reliable ally when the shit really hits the fan". Certainly, France has been a reliable US ally at times, but surely the UK, Canada, and perhaps even Australia or Israel have generally been more reliable?
Being able to stand up to the big boy on the block to remind him of harsh truths, and being able generally to disagree, gives a higher value to agreement when it matters.
And France has probably done more than any other Western country in the fight against actual Islamic terrorism, given our experience over the past 25 years.
it is bad policy...to let itself be tainted with complicity with all the abuses of the Bush years Again, the Utopian excuse...you don't dare speak up for human rights (except to criticise America) because you might sound like Bush. This is indeed unserious, even petulant. This isn't a policy, it is the abdication of a policy.
You misunderstand my point. Being supportive of the Bush administration today does not only mean being supportive of its stated goals - it also means being non critical of Guantanamo, the deadly occupation of Iraq, rendition flights and the so forth. And these really make it hard to claim you have any human right credentials.
In general, "do what I say, not what I do" is not good policy. It is especially so about the rule of law.
The rightwing has hijacked a number of positive words (like "freedom", "reform", "human rights"), distorted them beyond recongition, and made a specialty of criticizing the left for renouncing these concepts whenever it criticzes the right's grotesque version of it. Now that's unserious and petulant. In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
I don't think anybody argues that one must have a perfect human rights record to promote human rights or that one must solve all the world's problems in one go.
But does it not become just a little bit... discordant, shall we say, when democracy is promoted not in those countries where The West(TM) has most leverage and the human rights situation is most appalling (think Colombia and Saudi Arabia) but in countries where The West(TM) has little leverage and the human rights situation is not nearly as bad (think Venezuela).
If one did not know better, one might almost be tempted to conclude that the principal motivation for "democracy promotion" a la Iraq is to be found less in a sincere desire to promote democracy and human rights than in a desire for geopolitical dominance.
This analysis is what underpins the conclusion that Washington (and their European fellow travellers) do not have democracy and human rights as their primary objective in Iraq - or anywhere else.
I will leave it to the reader's judgement whether this stance is pragmatist or utopian.
I think that what is needed is more sincere advocates of democracy. And rather fewer damning-with-faint-praise "advocates" who use "democracy promotion" as a thin veil for otherwise naked colonialism. Because the latter kind give democracy a bad name.
Again, I will leave it to the reader's judgement whether this stance is pragmatist or utopian.
You and others spend words trying to convince me, or someone, that the US cannot possibly be sincere about human rights or democracy in Iraq. I of course disagree, but it would take us way off-topic to go into why. Based on the other comments on this diary, you seem to be preaching to the choir. I suppose you and others have to assert your bona fides out of fear you'll be attacked by your supporters for responding to me. My supporters do that too sometimes. But none of it addresses the topic at hand: what should Europe do in Iraq?
I think that what is needed is more sincere advocates of democracy
Sounds good to me. Meanwhile, "On hidden agendas, I don't think the EU has credibility to convince anyone it doesn't have one." says Migeru. What is your response?
Forget about what you call Washington's "European fellow travellers". Pretend you are the EU President, you speak for a majority of the EP, AND have the ear of the Commission and the Council, and that no European national governments are in a position to block your policies. What is your plan to convince Iraqis that you are a sincere advocate?
Once you've convinced them, what do you propose to actually do to advance the cause of human rights, in Iraq specifically?
I categorically reject the idea that the powerful, prosperous countries of Europe, and the many learned diplomats who, unlike Americans, are dedicated students of world geography and culture, are somehow impotent in this matter. If the answer is, nothing can be done, then we are back to Utopianism, aren't we? __ I am the most conservative Unitarian-Universalist you will ever meet.
You and others spend words trying to convince me, or someone, that the US cannot possibly be sincere about human rights or democracy in Iraq. I of course disagree, but it would take us way off-topic to go into why.
I would be very interested in such a diary. And I am certain that I am not the only one.
Based on the other comments on this diary, you seem to be preaching to the choir.
I was responding to your comment. Specifically, I was challenging an assumption made in your comment. The reasoning underpinning this challenge can be found elsewhere as well, but I thought it courteous to provide a summary, as you are new to the site and may not be familiar with all the idiosyncrasies of the regular contributors.
But none of it addresses the topic at hand: what should Europe do in Iraq?
Paying war reparations would be a good start. In cash or in infrastructure, whichever the Iraqi people prefer.
Of course, finding out which the Iraqi people prefer is not necessarily easy, since the invasion and subsequent civil war seems to have done a fairly comprehensive job of smashing Iraqi civil society.
I think that what is needed is more sincere advocates of democracy Sounds good to me. Meanwhile, "On hidden agendas, I don't think the EU has credibility to convince anyone it doesn't have one." says Migeru. What is your response?
I think Mig's assessment is substantially correct. Mostly because Europe as currently configured does have several not-so-very-hidden agendas in the Mideast, none of which have much to do with democracy and human rights.
And even if we were to reform ourselves completely tomorrow and start promoting democracy and human rights with complete sincerity and irregardless of dirty colonialist interests, it would likely take a while before we had convinced the rest of the world that we were sincere. Trust once lost, and all that.
How many decades do I have?
Snark aside, transparency would probably be a good place to start, as would asking the locals what they would like to happen in their area. If they want a hospital, then set up a hospital. If they want a school, then set up a school. If they want to bug out, give them safe transport to wherever they want to go to. If they want us to fuck off, then leave.
Of course, in a society as smashed as the Iraqi, precisely who to ask what "the local community" wants is no simple task in and of itself. But going door-to-door and asking "what can we do for you" and "who would you trust to represent you in the community" might be a way to get a handle on it.
Also: Use local labour, use local materials, use local designs, unless the locals specifically ask for foreign stuff or manpower. The locals probably know how to build things for the local climate better than foreign contractors. And even if they don't, it's their place. If they prefer local designs even though they may be somewhat less efficient, then that's their decision.
And if they decide to change their minds midway, don't get all huffy. It's their project. They can cancel or rearrange it midway if they like.
The trickiest item to handle will probably be security, because at some point security is going to involve hitting someone over the head with a big stick. I'd like to keep the stick-hitting to an absolute minimum, though, partly because not everyone in the local community will agree on who needs to be hit over the head and how hard, and partly because so far hitting people over the head doesn't seem to have worked all that well.
At least some of the violence in Iraq is undoubtedly due to simple gangster activity. To an extent, gangsters can be bought off, and we should do that as far as it goes. Give them honest work to do (remember the part about using local labour?) and pay them a more than honest wage. That should solve most of the gangster problem. There will probably still be organised crime rings in Iraq many years from now who will trace their origins to the present civil war, but I think that vast improvements are possible with relatively little effort.
Equally undoubtedly, some of the violence is political in nature. I will leave it to those more qualified than myself to give a prescription for how to best resolve political conflicts in a society where the social contract has collapsed and the political factions do not trust one another to honour agreements. I can think of several templates, but none of them are particularly appealing.
However, assuming that the political actors are reasonably sane and are motivated primarily by material grievances - such as a desire to have reliable access to water, control natural resources, have credible guarantees that they will not be murdered in their sleep, etc., it should be possible to hammer out compromises. Especially if the rest of the world is willing to pony up enough money and resources to make political negotiations a positive-sum game.
Oh, and while I am discussing how to improve the image of Europe in the eyes of the world in general and the Iraqi people in particular, I would also point out the positive influence of an international criminal court and an international war crimes tribunal. Once we started actually prosecuting prime ministers and presidents and generals and war profiteering fatcats from Western(TM) countries, it would send a powerful message that human rights violations are not merely a pretext for colonial wars or a standard that only brown people and Russians have to adhere to.
I am also a big fan of truth and reconciliation. There has been so much death and so many crimes and so many years of war that almost everybody in Iraq is going to be a criminal in some way or another in somebody's eyes. Even if you believe that the best way to get to the truth and provide closure for the victims is a full dress trail (I don't, incidentally), the sheer scale of the devastation will make it impossible to carry out consistently in post-bellum Iraq.
One thing that we should object to - nay, condemn in the strongest possible terms - is any sign that the victors from the civil war start making kangaroo kourts and imprison/execute the losers wholesale simply for the crime of losing a civil war.
But ultimately, how Iraq - or whatever states might form from it as the result of a peace agreement - is going to deal with its victims and its executioners must be up to the Iraqi people. We can cajole, we can commend, we can recommend, we can support, we can condemn or we can argue. But if we impose a "patent solution," it would probably backfire.
Well, once we've brokered a stable peace, helped them rebuild their country, brought most of the higher echelons of our own war criminals to trial, midwifed a truth and reconciliation process, there are a variety of ways in which our grandchildren could promote democracy, liberty and human rights.
Cultural exchange programmes, scientific conferences and presenting an open society that allows Iraqis to experience a society based upon equality, liberty and democracy (of course, that requires that we have such societies to embed them in, should they accept the invitation...), just to name a few of the measures at our disposal.
We may not convince them. We may not convince their children. Or their children's children. But enlightenment has a lot going for it, and it is not going to go away (well, it might, but then we have bigger problems than how to get Iraqis to trust us...).
If the answer is, nothing can be done, then we are back to Utopianism, aren't we?
Not necessarily. The situation might reach the point where nothing can be done to salvage the situation because there is literally nothing left to salvage. If Iraq is turned into a smoking, glass-rimmed crater, for instance. I would hardly call that scenario Utopian, however. Maybe Dystopian, though.
Other than Atlantic Review, where are the European Atlanticists willing to disembark from their Utopian Isle and treat with us, mere mortals though we be?
Also, you sound like "an American counterpart of European Atlanticists" but many of the commenters to nanne's cross-post on Atlantic Review sound nothing like that.
I confess I was assuming you'd have a certain commitment to defending your original post. Instead you seem to be treating the post as a sort of hypothetical -- if Europe had credibility on true human rights (you say it doesn't -- yet another point on which we disagree!), then here is how we might proceed re Iraq.
But instead of traditional geopolitical power-plays and grand-chessboard strategy, assume that the EU's concern would simply be to help Iraq contain the bleeding, restore a semblance of dignity and respect for human rights, and allow a civil society to emerge from the ashes. What would be the strategy, and what would be the roadblocks along the way?
The context of my piece was to respond to Joerg's latest On Iraq, it's time to call Europe. "Call Europe to do what, exactly?" is my answer.
OK, now I see more clearly what you're saying.
It also took me a while to understand the paradox (to me at least) that you are pro-Europe, and pro-EU, and even pro-Lisbon...and yet you also fear that most of your leaders (who are also pro-EU) are irredeemably corrupt vassals of NATO -- so corrupt that they cannot even speak legitimately on issues of human rights. Won't these same leaders, or their colleagues drawn from Europe's bureaucracy, be responsible for implementing Lisbon (or whatever variation or subsection of Lisbon that eventually passes)?
This takes some getting used to.
I suppose the genius of the Lisbon treaty is, the language is so vague and general (except where it is technical and obscure), it becomes an empty vessel into which anyone and everyone can pour their ideals and aspirations.
I understand your skepticism re Europe's role in Iraq, and I share it, although probably for different reasons. Still, you did tentatively answer your own question ("Call Europe to do what, exactly?"), by suggesting a Judo approach focusing on improving the human rights situation. I just wish you had thought that through more, and were more committed to defending it, hypothetical though it may be.
What do you think of my suggestion that the right approach might look less like Judo, and more like a sea change?
Here is how a sea change strategy might work.
A 2005 UPI article (no longer available online, at least not that I can find) talks about how, in Auvergne, France they set up state-sponsored classes to address the problem that many French imams can barely preach in French. In what I think is a separate initiative, Dominique de Villepin, as Minister of the Interior, had talked about universities to train and certify (if that's the right word) Imams. These imams already have the training in Arabic and Koranic studies, so they can speak authentically to Muslims; they will now be also be trained (dare I say, vetted?) in the principles of French laity.
This is a model we couldn't possibly pursue in the US, due to separation of church and state.
So, a sea change strategy might be to set up an exchange program so that these French imams could meet with their Iraqi counterparts.
Now, if the goal were to turn Iraqi clerics into clones of French clerics, who for example would be required to support a hijab ban in schools, I could see how you might say this was neo-colonialist, or at least, inappropriate for Iraq.
But what if the point of these seminars were merely to teach, and demonstrate, the principles of sound financial management, accountability, and good government (don't fudge the accounting, have transparency in government and business, don't underpay civil servants and then expect them to steal or take bribes to feed their families, etc)?
Also, more controversially, perhaps academics could help Iraqis separate archaic tribal customs from the rest of Islamic teachings? In 2006 Turkey's Directorate of Religious Affairs started a three year "Hadith project" to do just that. Source. Another source.
This would take years to implement, and face formidable cultural barriers, yet it seems worth trying and might even work. It seems ideally suited to Europe's soft power, and its academic nature means it wouldn't require the sort of broad and deep consensus that would be needed for more active measures in Iraq.
What do you think? __ I am the most conservative Unitarian-Universalist you will ever meet.
This "reform Islam" project would require a stable political climate and very low level violence if any to even begin to think about implementing it.
Anyway, it's not like the EU doesn't do anything like "teaching and demonstrating the principles of good government". Check out this list: ongoing missions include
But I don't think that's viable as long as there is a significant insurgency. Which brings us back to Judo.
It also took me a while to understand the paradox (to me at least) that you are pro-Europe, and pro-EU, and even pro-Lisbon... and yet you also fear that most of your leaders (who are also pro-EU) are irredeemably corrupt vassals of NATO -- so corrupt that they cannot even speak legitimately on issues of human rights.
Won't these same leaders, or their colleagues drawn from Europe's bureaucracy, be responsible for implementing Lisbon (or whatever variation or subsection of Lisbon that eventually passes)?
So, the "problem" with Europe is not the EU, it's the national governments, IMHO.
You may find my diary The Bigger Picture informative, or maybe not.
Anyway, you only have to look at what happened with the CIA flight/prison scandal, with the passenger data transfers, the SWIFT data protection violation, the EU's stance on Israel's war on Lebanon in 2006, and the proposed missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, and the recognition of Kosovo, to understand why many on this site think that our governments (and the EU Council as a result) are corrupt US vassals. It seems that at the EU Commission (below the political appointee level) they have no illusions about being able to have a constructive relationship with the US... When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
But what if the point of these seminars were merely to teach, and demonstrate, the principles of sound financial management, accountability, and good government
I didn't mean to suggest that Europe should teach Iraqi imams how to be good accountants. I mean that European imams trained in the principles of laic society might be able to engage Iraqi imams and establish the philosophical or theological basis for the conclusion that nothing in the nuts and bolts of good government is a threat to Islam, and that in fact, good government is required for Islam to flourish.
For example, one of the major barriers to good government is the taboo on open debate, and its corollary, an irrational obsession with conspiracy theories. Might there be some sort of positive alchemy between Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani's Quietist tradition, which has ancient roots in Islam, and European-trained imams? Perhaps Europe could engage on that front.
and might even work
By that I don't mean it would directly lead to in peace or human rights in Iraq. What I mean by "work" is, set the stage for the outbreak of good government, in which imams don't necessarily have a direct role, but do preach things like accountability, open dealings as opposed to secret pacts, that sort of thing.
This is what I was getting at, way back when I asked, what does the Iraqi concept of human rights have in common with the Western view. Human rights are universal, in the same sense that math or science are universal, but they still have to be taught. One could start with the basics, such as addressing the Iraqi (or indeed, Middle Eastern, but not necessarily Muslim) cultural taboo against open discussion.
...
Or, maybe there is just no way that European soft power can help in Iraq... __ I am the most conservative Unitarian-Universalist you will ever meet.
Now, as far as I was aware, Sistani does not agree with Khomeini's doctrine on the rule of the Jurisprudents, and that appears to be a position that he shared with his predecessors. He is not interested in leading a political movement (unlike Sadr), and he has been consistent in demanding more democratic (even secular liberal) government practices such as when he insisted (and gained that as a concession from the US) that the Iraqi Constitution be approved in referendum.
Other than that, I'm out of my depth. When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
A few examples of many:
From what I've read, Iraqi domestic politics are just as byzantine. It becomes so pervasive, people actually do engage in conspiracies preemptivly, since they're convinced everyone around them must also be conspiring. This creates a vicious cycle of conspiracies that takes on a reality all its own.
Why not deploy some of Europe's soft power to debunk the more fantastic of these, with long-term goal of breaking the vicious cycle, while avoiding controversial issues like Colonialism, Palestine and Geopolitics in general? __ I am the most conservative Unitarian-Universalist you will ever meet.
You seem to misunderstand the reason that people create conspiracy theories.
To take an example, there is no obvious rational reason for the invasion of Iraq, and people like simple stories, so they make up the one that seems simplest to them: Iraq was invaded so the US could take the oil (with a side order of mendacity by whoever you happen not to like).
That the Iraqi invasion was the result of a collection of forces acting in their own perceive short-term interests in such a way that it became possible for the Bush regime to invade Iraq without any great overarching conspiracy is more complicated to explain than the "simple" conspiracies. On top of that, an analysis of the reasons for the Iraq war would be less than flattering to an awful lot of players in Iraq, the US, the Middle East and Europe. I'm not sure that explaining that Iraq was, in part, invaded because it meant that arms manufacturers would make more profits is going to have a positive effect on the Iraqi zeitgeist.
Well, perhaps, but the institutional framework is different.
While one should always be careful with transatlantic parallels, I think that a useful comparison would be to the civil rights movement in the US. Would you trust most of the US states to protect civil rights for gays (or for blacks thirty years ago)? Not a chance. Why, then, trust the federal government to protect them - isn't the federal government just as corrupt as the local governments?
Now, it's been a couple of years since I was up-to-date on what the American counter-creationists and gay rights people were doing. But last I heard, they still considered the federal constitution a superior platform for promoting civil rights compared to most of the state constitutions, and the federal bureaucracy was seen as less bigoted than the state bureaucracies.
In principle one can apply the same reasoning to the EU: The federal level may well be able to stand up to the neo-cons currently ruling in Washington despite the state governments being a gang of Quislings. Or at least more so than the collaborationist state governments. For whatever reason, that in fact seems to be the case (the torture flight investigation, for instance, was initiated at the federal level and opposed strongly at the state level).
As for your cultural exchange model for what Europe can do in Iraq, well, i kinda like it - at least as long as it is a part of a bigger process. In fact I believe I included academic exchange in my own suggestion. I'm not sure that the clergy would be the best venue of exchange, but then again, that may simply be my Scandinavian secularism speaking.
yet you also fear that most of your leaders (who are also pro-EU) are irredeemably corrupt vassals of NATO
They are NOT pro-EU! Brown is not, Berlusconi is not, Sarkozy is not. Just because they say they are (and I fail to see where Brown or Berlusconi even do that!) does not mean they are. Just look at their policies!
Merkel is better, and she also has, coincidentally, the most critical position towards the US nowadays. In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
This is a huge topic. We have achieved a certain exchange of viewpoints (although not much agreement, but that's to be expected) based on certain common understandings or problems we identified. However, on other points we seem to be writing from wildly divergent narratives that make it very difficult to avoid irritating misunderstandings.
For example, take 9/11. I can understand how reasonable people might argue that the fact of 9/11 was "used", "exploited", or even "enhanced" by various, bottom-feeding Western interests and powers to produce the situation we are in today.
But the idea that 9/11 itself might not be a fact, i.e. that some or all of the 9/11 operation itself might have been non-al-Qaeda, has been hinted at far too often here. As is typical with such rhetoric, allegations are rarely specific; it is always questions that are being raised and never answered, or if answered, never accepted. Questions that are designed to inhibit debate, not foster it. Questions that depend on the truism that we will never know, with metaphysical certainty, all that happened on that day and the period leading up to it. When points are specific, they are hypothetical, or involve some other form of rhetorical legerdemain. A certainty or perfection is demanded before committing to anything, when life demands that we commit, and even act, in the face of uncertainty, error, and failure.
I'm not suggesting those of you who use this type of rhetoric are irrational -- I assume you are all decent, rational people unless I can prove otherwise :-P Nor am I unfamiliar with the alternative theories re 9/11 -- I have considered them, and find them...how to put this nicely...well, I find them lacking in explanatory power i.e. useless. Too often, they are used to maintain a self-congratulatory echo chamber that is well insulated from new ideas and information.
And yes, that happens with my supporters as well, and I try to fight it when it does.
A typical example is the persistent reliance on, and faith in, boilerplate Progressive solutions and rhetoric, all quite reasonable, but all ignoring the fact that UN envoy de Mello, who represents these progressive ideals and policies as much as is humanly possible, tragically encountered the same problems and resistance as did those trying to implement Neo-Con ideas.
But, but, but! Having failed, the Neo-Cons changed their strategy, and now we have the so-called Surge. The modest progress so far is nevertheless far more that conventional wisdom expected. Will it be enough? Have we learned anything from our failure? Impossible to say until more time has passed...but at least we tried something new.
Meanwhile, when they even acknowledge the problem, Progressives in my experience tend to blame the US for insufficient support, or the wrong kind of support, or just for being there with guns, as if Iraq was a peaceful garden before we arrived. Are European Progressive ideas so finely engineered that they can't possibly share space with America's more rough and muscular Progressivism? Did Bush have de Mello killed? Bizarrely, I find myself having to consider that some people here just might answer: yes and yes.
Without much of a consensus on 9/11, or the state of things in Iraq, or other issues of that type, it becomes very difficult to advance complex points when I have no idea how to judge if my audience shares enough of my assumptions to make the exercise worthwhile.
So, I plan to give this topic a rest.
I like the eurotrib blogging system (scoop) and I may drop by from time to time with polite but devastating comment-fu, here and there. So you'll have that to look forward to.
Until then,
- John __ I am the most conservative Unitarian-Universalist you will ever meet.
Where you might find some divergent opinion is the significance of this event. On the face of it, it doesn't seem too terribly important. New Yorkers were and are still more at risk for death-by-mugger or death-by-traffic-accident than death-by-fedayeen. It seems quite disproportional to start wars or suspend the constitution over something that is by any cold-blooded, statistical measure much less significant than - say - hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico or earthquakes in California.
If one wants to be even more cold-blooded, one might actually even argue that the casualties on 9/11 were "collateral damage" - it's been reported that there was a CIA office in one of the towers, which by Israeli Defence Force standards make the entire city bloc a legitimate military target in the hunt for terrorists (if you disagree with my designation of the CIA as a terrorist organisation, I refer you to the School of the Americas and the ongoing, CIA-supported terrorist campaign against the civilian population of Colombia).
Now, I disagree vehemently with the Israeli definition of military target, but it seems a little bit hypocritical to endorse IDF murders in the Gaza concentration camp out of one side of the mouth and complain out of the other side of the mouth about terrorists when what goes around eventually comes around.
But I digress. My core point is that the fundamental facts - the identities of the hijackers, the serial numbers of the planes, etc. are substantially (albeit, I must admit, not universally) accepted hereabout.
Nor am I quite sure how de Mello's demise, however tragic, signals a massive failure of any progressive agenda. Aid workers sometimes get shot when they go into war zones. That's always tragic, but Iraq is hardly unique in this respect.
Yes, some engineers, diplomats and doctors will be injured and killed if we send them to help rebuild Iraq. Those who choose to go should be aware of that fact. And stuff is going to get blown up as well, sometimes even before (or frustratingly fast after) it's completed. However, from looking at conflicts past and present, I would hazard the guess that the cost both in money and human lives would be lower than that of continued occupation.
Now that has me interested, In what way was it "Different?" to my mind it just appears to be "More of the same" and what would you call the major achievements of the surge?
As for the 9/11 denialists, people do appear here every now and then and get subjected to reasonable rigour. I've not seen anyone whose denial has survived examination, although there are some questions that still deserve examination. Any idiot can face a crisis - it's day to day living that wears you out.
"The Patton of Counterinsurgency" -- Don't be distracted by the tone of the article, which may seem a bit over the top, but concentrate on the details of the strategy. The Surge's modest increase in troop strength was only a part of the change, and probably not even the most important part. That is why I sometimes call it the "Surge" or "the so-called Surge".
"Anatomy of the Surge" -- defines the pre-Surge policies that failed, discusses the blunders and false starts that preceded the Surge, and looks at the source of the perception that the Surge was just more of the same.
"Perseverance Pays Off in Baghdad" -- discusses the indigenous Shiite efforts similar to the Sunni Awakening Councils.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) -- these are the engineers and civil society types that go in after understandings have been reached with local powers (e.g. Awakening Councils, which go by various names depending on what part of Iraq you're talking about), and after Iraqi or coalition forces have cleared an area. I don't have articles handy at the moment, but Google should provide.
I have suggested, and other commenters here have acknowledged, that the situation in Iraq might be improving, based on coalition casualty reports, Iraq Body Count, media reports, bloggers in-country, etc. I will leave you to do your own research.
The question of how much of this is due to the Surge, and how much due to other factors, will have to wait for another diary or comment; for now, I just want to convince you that in fact we are not just doing more of the same in Iraq.
There are some reports that even the UN is slowly coming back into the picture in Iraq. But my point is that after the de Mello disaster, the UN, and by extension, the non-coalition community, gave up on the Iraqis, whereas we did not. That is why it is sometimes so frustrating to be lectured erm advised by our UN EU friends about how we need to try this and that instead of guns. Your thoughtful suggestions did occur to us, and we are implementing them. In spite of all the boys and their toys stuff on YouTube, we really don't just ride around Iraq blowing things away. But it is a very, very tough neighborhood.
Could it be that whatever media sources you are using for information on Iraq, simply haven't picked up on these stories yet? __ I am the most conservative Unitarian-Universalist you will ever meet.
The second thing I note is that the articles describe a shift emphasis away from empowering the central government and towards empowering existing local power structures. They describe negotiated peace and even alliances with local armed groups that may or may not support the central Iraqi government. They describe infrastructure projects (using primarily local labour, I note :-P). Pay off the young men who would otherwise form the militias (or - even better - give them honest work to do for an honest wage). [1]
In other words, it looks like the US strategy is moving towards what has been suggested here on ET already. I have to admit that this surprises me. It appears that even the Bushies' strategy for Iraq is saner than I have been giving them credit for so far.
Further, this movement is correlated with the apparent success (at least as measured by the metrics we have examined so far). So - keeping in mind that correlation is not quite the same thing as causation - I would be tempted to claim some level of vindication for The Plan(TM).
- Jake
[1] As an aside, I cannot help but note that this kind of program would never get approval if it were proposed to mitigate crime in the slums of a US city. Why, using state-created jobs for the explicit purpose of reducing unemployment and unemployment-related crime, that's positively Socialist! Or at least French :-P If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.
That should be "a shift in emphasis" obviously.
it looks like the US strategy is moving towards what has been suggested here on ET already.
The temptation to snark the hell out of this remark is very hard to resist.
But I will.
Instead, I will just say that I would very be interested in seeing links showing that The Plan(TM), or something like it, was seriously considered on ET 18 or more months ago i.e before or during the time when we were formulating the Surge strategy.
Absent that, wouldn't be more accurate to say that JakeS has just unintentionally appropriated, and implicitly validated, major elements of the current US strategy in Iraq?
Seriously, you ET'ers need to realize that whatever sources of information you rely on for Iraq have not served you well in this case.
Maybe you should broaden your reading list? I'm not talking about Commentary, Weekly Review, and the WSJ editorial page, which are of course partisan sources. Thank you for being willing to read them at least.
Start with Michael Yon:
...whose work is endorsed by none other than Joe Galloway...yes, The Joe Galloway.
Also check out:
You may have heard of some of these, but based on your general take on Iraq you need to pay more attention to them. They are invaluable, first hand sources. They tell the good, the bad, and the ugly. Only a close-minded partisan would dismiss them as partisan. __ I am the most conservative Unitarian-Universalist you will ever meet.
Instead, I will just say that I would very be interested in seeing links showing that The Plan(TM), or something like it, was seriously considered on ET 18 or more months ago i.e before or during the time when we were formulating the Surge strategy. Absent that, wouldn't be more accurate to say that JakeS has just unintentionally appropriated, and implicitly validated, major elements of the current US strategy in Iraq?
It validates the reconstruction part of the US strategy. I won't attempt to asses the military part of it, because my information regarding that part is insufficient and so is my expertise in the area. But the emphasis still given to the military component in the official propaganda (see your links, for instance) gives me the impression that the Surge is 1/3 sanity and 2/3 staying the course.
I expressed surprise at the presence of any sanity at all, because frankly I didn't expect that. But that doesn't make it impressive.
Since I didn't sneak peek at the Pentagon's Iraq strategy while formulating mine - and since I haven't kept abreast of the developments in Iraq beyond noting the development in the American casualty figures occasionally, I think it's fair to say that this is a case of parallel evolution. We can argue about who discovered the strategy first, but I am happy to concede the honours, because I haven't seen it spelled out before.
But the major premises - that the central government isn't viable, that there needs to be more building and negotiation and considerably less reliance on purely military solutions have been around since forever, or at least since before I started frequenting the site (which was before the Surge started).
I am not sure I see how they failed us. The task was to come up with a viable strategy for Iraq. We did.
You raised a number of objections in another thread, and I made a number of replies, but I haven't seen anything so far that would kill my plan dead if sufficient political will to implement it existed.
Another task was to determine whether it would be wise for Europe to support the current US stance in Iraq. So far my impression is that it is not.
This is based partially on the fact that the US strategic stance still appears to be sufficiently far removed from what I think would be most effective that it might very well be more effective to use European resources to set up a separate effort. And partly on the fact that the apparent long-term objectives of the US in Iraq (basing rights, containment of Iran, installation of one or more pliable client states, securing the Iraqi oil for US-based corporations, padding the pocketbooks of various and sundry war profiteers, etc.) are not particularly savoury.
Finally, none of the current American stance addresses the part of the problem that resides at least partially outside Iraq, namely documenting and dealing with the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed fairly massively by all sides in the conflict. So far, the US and their European fellow-travellers appear to be in complete denial that there might be a problem here, which is not exactly the most constructive attitude, to put it mildly...
So while our information was incomplete, it wasn't sufficiently incomplete to substantially change the strategic picture; at least not from where I sit.
So I went trawling for diaries and stories on Iraq deom 18+ months ago, and I found this:
As an aside, I cannot help but note that this kind of program would never get approval if it were proposed to mitigate crime in the slums of a US city.
Surely you must be kidding me? In the US we do this stuff all the time.
Well, not the Surge, but community-building. The difference is, it is done primarily on the local level, recently quite successfully in cities like New York which were supposed to be the intractable, textbook examples of the failure of capitalism.
Unlike the socialists, we haven't lost site of the fact that government doesn't create jobs, it just re-allocates them, usually badly and with "unexpected" side-effects. That is why we try to keep the efforts local, and try to keep in mind that the only long-term solution involves jobs that are real, i.e. self-sustaining without subsidy. Unfortunately, we too often forget, (arrg! Ethanol! How I hate thee!) and disaster ensues.
One of the enduring misunderstandings that Europeans have about the USA is, they assume that if the national government isn't doing something, then nothing real or substantial is being done. And in most European countries, that would be a fair assumption.
Worse, the European press, reflecting and reinforcing the group-think of the European governing elites, goes to ridiculous extremes to perpetuate this stereotype.
But in the US it is the opposite: All the real work goes on in the private sector, both for-profit and non-profit, and at the state and local level. Our federal anti-poverty, etc. programs are some of the least effective American institutions that exist.
Indeed, part of the reason the so-called "Surge" strategy has been so popular with the troops is, community building comes naturally to them.
They are citizen-soldiers.
Will it work? I dunno. But Iraqis are certainly beginning to take notice. Europe should too. __ I am the most conservative Unitarian-Universalist you will ever meet.
One of the enduring misunderstandings that Europeans have about the USA is, they assume that if the national government isn't doing something, then nothing real or substantial is being done.
It's not a misunderstanding, because it mostly isn't.
It's nice that the US is a veritable capitalist utopia of convivial communality, but if all anyone can see is the shanty-town poor when you visit the rougher areas, it's hard to be convinced that there's a plan at all, never mind that the plan is working.
If you don't have a government ethic of communality - which the US doesn't, particularly - then it's no surprise that federal programs don't currently work.
That doesn't mean they can't in principle, it means you no longer have the culture to do them properly, which isn't quite the same thing.
So if you're going to tell me that the glories of free enterprise have stepped in to fill the gap across the US, I'm going to have to ask what evidence there is that this has made any real difference.
If the private sector is so all-powerful, it should surely have solved the problem by now. It's not as if there's been a lot of hostility to private efforts from Washington for the last decade or so.
And yet - the trend has been for lower wages, longer hours, poorer infrastructure, and more unemployment. What's wrong with this picture?
As for job creation - are you saying the New Deal didn't actually work at all? The freeways, the dams, the infrastructure were just pointless make-work?
Unlike the socialists, we haven't lost site of the fact that government doesn't create jobs, it just re-allocates them,
This is simply false. If you have involuntary unemployment, the state can indeed create jobs out of thin air.
They may not be meaningful (then again, they may be - railroad construction and operation, for instance, is something The Market(TM) does badly if at all). But even if they aren't meaningful - even if it is just a matter of digging holes in the ground - it will still stimulate demand for other, worthwhile production.
If the government finances this through direct taxation of wealth (and/or the high incomes that usually correlate with wealth), or runs a temporary deficit, the net result is a transfer of demand to the present - where it can pull an economy out of a recession - from the future - where it, if the economy has been managed properly - will be recouped during a boom. Or from such excess demand harvested during a past boom.
All the real work goes on in the private sector, both for-profit and non-profit, and at the state and local level. [My emphasis]
If you need charity, then the government isn't doing its job.
Snark aside, you're not even right about the government not doing constructive work. Right off the bat, I can think of only two parts of US infrastructure that works as well as or better than the German equivalent: The National Park Service and the Interstate Highways. Both are Federal operations.
So, Bremmer and Rumsfeld are out of the picture and saner heads are finally taking charge of the US strategy, and hopefully once Bush and Cheney are out as well things will improve some more? When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
