But the need for records of the exercise of public authority need to go further.
The EU can not be organised as a diplomatic club where elites talk to other elites in secret.
So, the "Constitution" is dead, and maybe Lisbon is, too, but whatever comes next will also have to be a "EU Treaty" agreed by the governments of the member states in the Council. We have also proposed a number of "mini treaties" which do not touch the existing treaties but simply set up a bottom-up constitutional process base around the European Parliament. It is hard to imagine such a treaty 1) being agreed by the Council (turkeys don't vote for christmas); 2) being accepted by the sovereigntist faction in a number of member states (which could possibly carry the day in the UK, Ireland, Denmark, even in France and the Netherlands).
So, is there a way forward for the EU as a political entity, or should we just be content with the single market?
The Yugoslav wars showed the need for a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and here we're discussing the way in which harmonization of civil law (and social contributions, for instance) makes it very hard for people to be mobile in Europe. When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. — John M. Keynes
By the way, I totally agree with any measures that allow people, not just Europeans, to move freely.
Care has to be exercised with some aspects of civil law, on applicable divorce law for example, because some laws are better than others.
[T]he EU is [...] an international treaty organization.
I could imagine a «Common Market Office» within an enlightened constitutional framework regaining the same prestige, results and popular approval as the commission of the sixties.
Within the current treaties we are stuck, I'm afraid, and cannot go forward nor back to the halcyon days of the common market alone. [insert some game-theoretic argument here that I read about but fail to remember anymore :)]
What counts against a (real) Constitution, but inertia?
I agree that it works nowadays like the WTO and that its results are not better. But in the beginnings, it was different. What changed was, however, not the organisation, but the environment.
The legislation would not only increase the Commission's powers, but the Parliaments in an attempt to build a supranational structure and be rid of the power of veto. Because of this President Hallstein won support from the Parliament who had long been campaigning for more powers. Indeed Hallstein played to the Parliament by presenting his policy to the Parliament on 24 March, a week before he presented them to the Council. By this he associated himself with the Parliament's cause and demonstrated how he though the Community ought to be run, in the hopes of generating a wave of pro-Europeanism big enough to get past the objections of member states. However in this it proved that, despite its past successes, Hallstein was overconfident in his risky proposals.[2] When Hallstein put forward his proposals, the Council was already troubled[2] and then-French President, Charles de Gaulle, was sceptical of the rising supranational power of the Commission and accused Hallstein of acting as if he were a head of state. France was particularly concerned about protecting the CAP as it was only accepted by the other states after difficult negotiations and under a majority system it may be challenged by the other members.[3] Empty chair crisis This, and similar differences between France and the Commission, were exacerbated when France took on the Presidency,[3] thereby losing the normal system of mediation. Further more the Commission became marginalised as the debate became one between France and the other members, making the Council the centre of debate. Thus any chance of using the expertise of the Commission to come up with proposals was lost.[2] Finally on 1965-06-30 Paris recalled its representative in Brussels stating it would not take its seat in the Council until it had its way. This "empty chair crisis" was the first time that the operation of the EEC had failed because of a member state[3] and it exposed failures in the Council's workings.[2] Paris continued its policy for six months until the impact upon its economy forced it back into negotiations. Meetings were held in Luxembourg during January 1966 where an agreement was reached. Under the "Luxembourg compromise" a member could veto a decision that it believed would affect its national interests - but it did not detail what kind of national interests or how to resolve a dispute. However since then it had been used so often it became a veto making unanimity in the Council the norm and was removed under the Single European Act.[4] After the crisis, the commission became a scapegoat for the Council, with Hallstein being the only person to lose his job over what happened when the Council refused to renew his term, despite being the most 'dynamic' leader until Jacques Delors.[2]
Empty chair crisis
This, and similar differences between France and the Commission, were exacerbated when France took on the Presidency,[3] thereby losing the normal system of mediation. Further more the Commission became marginalised as the debate became one between France and the other members, making the Council the centre of debate. Thus any chance of using the expertise of the Commission to come up with proposals was lost.[2] Finally on 1965-06-30 Paris recalled its representative in Brussels stating it would not take its seat in the Council until it had its way. This "empty chair crisis" was the first time that the operation of the EEC had failed because of a member state[3] and it exposed failures in the Council's workings.[2] Paris continued its policy for six months until the impact upon its economy forced it back into negotiations. Meetings were held in Luxembourg during January 1966 where an agreement was reached. Under the "Luxembourg compromise" a member could veto a decision that it believed would affect its national interests - but it did not detail what kind of national interests or how to resolve a dispute. However since then it had been used so often it became a veto making unanimity in the Council the norm and was removed under the Single European Act.[4] After the crisis, the commission became a scapegoat for the Council, with Hallstein being the only person to lose his job over what happened when the Council refused to renew his term, despite being the most 'dynamic' leader until Jacques Delors.[2]
But what do you want to say? That the ECE was stuck even then? But what about its accomplishments, its reputation? Do you consider it really a failure?
Regarding the veto: it is a question of homogeneity. You cannot expect a member state to put itself in a permanent minority position. Constitutions as a rule comprise regulations designed to alleviate such fears, say the famous «itio in partes» in the Holy Roman Empire.
When c.1970 the Common Market was accomplished, the union became less homogeneous, both extensionally by adding members, and intensionally by extending its competences. So it is evident that the Council should be dominant, and the veto crucial.
That was unfortunate, because of log rolling and atypical composition of the council (e.g. all police ministers together -- the results are easy to predict). The countervailing power of the Parliament but adds to the confusion, by feigning homogeneity where there is none.
So in my opinion, the fundamental error lay in aspiring to emulate existing states and planning for a kind of superstate.
