There is also some fighting over the first deal, as gas prices go up while transit prices don't seem to need to change as much, and Gazprom gets unhappy about the original deal (although note that in 2006, it was Ukraine that chose to re-open the issue despite then benefitting form a 5-year contract frawmework with favorable prices in that respect, ie a guaranteed volume of gas for free for 5 years).
So imagine Shell coming with its gas at the Russian-Ukrainian border. It will be willing to pay market rates for gas transit - to the Ukrainian gas company. But the gas can still be siphoned out by Ukrainians, becuase they can - the question then become, (i) why would they do that (because gas is valuable and they can onsell it), (ii) who can do something about it (the Ukrianian authorities, but could luck with that), and (iii) what can Shell do (they have nothing to offer, unlike the Gazprom managers who can offer to allocate company income for personal gain)?
Like I said, it would quickly put Ukraine in an interesting spot, and Gazprom in an even more interestign one, because they (well, again, its managers) would actually have solutions that would get Shell some money... if not the amounts they's expect. In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
In the business period of her life, Tymoshenko involved business relations (either co-operative or hostile) with many important figures of Ukraine, first of all, in Dnipropetrovsk. The list includes Pavlo Lazarenko, Viktor Pinchuk, Ihor Kolomoyskyi, Rinat Akhmetov, and, of course, Leonid Kuchma who at that time was the President. All of them were originating from Dnipropetrovsk. As part of her gas-dealing business, Tymoshenko has also been closely linked to the management of the Russian Gazprom.
Or is the Dnipropetrovsk clan the same as the Gazprom faction?
And what is the deal with RosUkrEnergo? A vivid image of what should exist acts as a surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents pursuit of the reality -- John K. Galbraith
