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All modern constitutions provide for checks and balances against conflicts of interest. Whether they are elective or by appointment is not so much the matter as introducing a measure of chance and a term of office in most cases (the hardly sane J.Edgar Hoover comes to mind). An elected president will have to deal with an autonomous institution whose head was appointed by a previous president. Further any appointee must cope with internal bureaucracies and their experts.

It would be farcical- as is the present situation in Italy- in which whoever arrives to power can force inconvenient autonomous personalities out of their institutional role so as to reinforce personal power. The spoils system must have limits.

In short one must create the conditions where the efficacity of power is effectively balanced by the necessity of regulated conflict between and within institutions.

Another grave problem in law-making in Italy is the possibility to make de facto retroactive laws, ad personam laws, and contra personam laws. Fortunately that does not appear to be the case in the States where constitutional change necessitates a lengthy ratification process that would vanify any personal motivations to action. Further, retroactive laws are expressly forbidden in most constitutional orders.

Thanks very much for your very interesting examples within Danish society. I might add however that the sovereignty of only primary stakeholders within a corpus excludes minority stakeholders thus laying the ground for a tyranny of the majority. Perhaps it's only a question of wording. Modern "democracy" must safeguard the rights of minorities above all.

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Wed Sep 10th, 2008 at 01:50:08 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm afraid that I misworded my sentiment about stakeholders. By "primary stakeholders" I mean those who are directly affected by the governance of the body in question - such as patients in the case of hospitals. As opposed to "secondary stakeholders" who are only indirectly affected - such as a taxpayer in the hospital example.

There is absolutely no requirement in principle that the primary stakeholders represented in the governing bodies must also be the biggest stakeholders. Although of course it will be impractical to include every subgroup of a subgroup of a fraction of a group of primary stakeholders.

In fact, the entire point with this kind of devolution is to empower people who would otherwise be hopelessly in the minority. If you will permit me another Danish example, the city council of Copenhagen wants to implement congestion charges. Now, it just so happens that the mayor of Copenhagen is a Social Democrat and we have an irresponsible government. So the project gets sabotaged by Parliament - rather effectively, unfortunately.

I would argue, however, that Parliament is not the body that has legitimate democratic jurisdiction over this issue, because the majority in Parliament is elected in parts of Denmark that will feel next to no direct impact of a better regulation of traffic in Copenhagen. In effect, this is not government by the consent of the governed: It's government by the consent of the governed plus a lot of people who are only connected with the governed by the arbitrary administrative division called a country border.

To put it a bit more bluntly than it perhaps deserves, it is as absurd for people in Jylland to vote on Copenhagen traffic issues as it is for people in Berlin or Rome to do so. The Copenhagen city council isn't the most legitimate democratic body to decide the issue either, because it doesn't involve all the relevant stakeholders (think, e.g., commuters in the suburbs). But it's a hell of a lot closer.

And indeed, if you poll people I would be willing to bet a bottle of good beer that you would find that the traffic situation in and around Copenhagen is not among the top ten (or even top twenty or top hundred) issues that determine which way a voter in the other side of the country jumps. So not only do those people have no primary stake in the traffic situation in Copenhagen, they most likely cast their vote completely independently of it. That's hardly a democratic mandate in any ordinary sense of the term.

W.r.t. elected vs. appointed positions, I agree completely that what matters is that the interests of the primary stakeholders (in the above sense of the term) are protected. I merely wanted to point out that infatuation with technocracies is just as dangerous, if in different ways, as infatuation with elected bodies. I myself am irritated no end by the people who mindlessly repeat the mantra "well, s/he was elected democratically, so duh!" about some office-holder who does something utterly anti-democratic.

In fact, I had that very discussion with a co-worker about the just-former Danish minister of justice internal security. She (the ex-minister, not the co-worker) is the one who's given the Danish secret police the power to do "administrative deportations" - that is, deport non-EU citizens without trial if the secret police claims that they believe the deportee(s) to be a clear and present danger to Danish security or sovereignty. Oh, and she also gave the police the power to do "preventive arrests" - that is, round up anybody who looks like he is going to make trouble (basically this means football hooligans, communists, anarchists, Greenpeace activists and uppity brown people) and lock them up "preventively" for up to 24 hours. (And those two are just the two worst examples, there are plenty more where they come from...)

By my score that makes her just about the most undemocratic person in the Danish parliament. But "she's democratically elected, so obviously she's a democratic politician." In response to which I usually sneer something about the Hamas government being democratically elected as well.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Thu Sep 11th, 2008 at 03:07:52 PM EST
[ Parent ]
You have an excellent point there on how an extraneous body can effect local decisions, usually, it comes to mind, by granting or blocking funds. I recall the US Federal government used to force states to enforce a 55 mile speed limit by simply cutting federal funding to those states who refused to comply.

In Italy it is a major issue. The Minister of Treasury and the parliament will block funds that are due to a city, province or region simply on partisan political grounds. A classic example is when the previous Berlusconi government blocked money that the state owed to the Region of Sardegna simply because it is run by a Left coalition, and at the same time passed an ad hoc law that rerouted identical but undue funds to Sicily to help the rightwing further consolidate its hold over that region.

Invariably these case make it to the Constitutional Court or the European Court where, after a long time, a favorable sentence to the plaintif is meted out. It is however not an effective victory since there is little to repair the damage done. Further the rightwing government steadfastly ignores unfavourable sentences. After all they needn't pick up the bill.

As far as the present situation in Italy, I will repeat that I do not consider the Italian parliament "democratically elected." Parliamentarians are appointed to office by the winning parties after a sort of beauty pageant formally called an "election."

Have the security laws you mentioned been taken to court or are they an object of a petition for a referendum to abrogate them?

by de Gondi (publiobestia aaaatttthotmaildaughtusual) on Thu Sep 11th, 2008 at 04:44:54 PM EST
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