That has been my experience. Now, may I add this for practice, Ginsberg's dissenting opinion on Ledbetter v Goodyear, and to emphasize: Discovery is such an expensive project, plaintiffs in either the US or UK are easily discouraged from pursuing "rights." (Contrary to claims that the subsequent Ledbetter Act will produce "frivolous" lawsuits.) Whatever DDA prescribes must be provide material support for litigation by the "disadvantaged" who seek remedy of discrimination. In that sense the "market power" or resources of government may be marshaled for real "affirmative action."

Ginsberg notes

Title VII proscribes as an "unlawful employment practice" discrimination "against any individual with respect to his compensation ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a)(1). An individual seeking to challenge an employment practice under this proscription must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days "after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." §2000e-5(e)(1). See ante, at 4; supra, at 2, n. 1.

. . . In Bazemore, we unanimously held that an employer, the North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service, committed an unlawful employment practice each time it paid black employees less than similarly situated white employees. 478 U. S., at 395 (opinion of Brennan, J.). Before 1965, the Extension Service was divided into two branches: a white branch and a "Negro branch." Id., at 390. Employees in the "Negro branch" were paid less than their white counterparts. In response to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which included Title VII, the State merged the two branches into a single organization, made adjustments to reduce the salary disparity, and began giving annual raises based on nondiscriminatory factors. Id., at 390-391, 394-395. Nonetheless, "some pre-existing salary disparities continued to linger on." Id., at 394 (internal quotation marks omitted). ...

[D]ifferent in kind from discrete acts," we made clear, are "claims ... based on the cumulative effect of individual acts." Id., at 115. The Morgan decision placed hostile work environment claims in that category. "Their very nature involves repeated conduct." Ibid. "The unlawful employment practice" in hostile work environment claims, "cannot be said to occur on any particular day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). The persistence of the discriminatory conduct both indicates that management should have known of its existence and produces a cognizable harm. Ibid. Because the very nature of the hostile work environment claim involves repeated conduct,

"[i]t does not matter, for purposes of the statute, that some of the component acts of the hostile work environment fall outside the statutory time period. Provided that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability." Id., at 117. ...

The realities of the workplace reveal why the discrimination with respect to compensation that Ledbetter suffered does not fit within the category of singular discrete acts "easy to identify." A worker knows immediately if she is denied a promotion or transfer, if she is fired or refused employment. And promotions, transfers, hirings, and firings are generally public events, known to co-workers. When an employer makes a decision of such open and definitive character, an employee can immediately seek out an explanation and evaluate it for pretext.

There is indeed much to learn from US history of these matters.

Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.