All attempts to save the DSB Bank, which was put under central bank supervision a week ago, have failed. On Monday morning the Amsterdam court made the bankruptcy final, after it had given the consumer bank three respites to find an alternative solution. Dirk Scheringa, the founder and owner of DSB, on Friday announced an American investor was seriously interested in buying his company. He has previously tried to persuade a consortium of Dutch banks to take over his ravaged bank after it succumbed to negative publicity surrounding its mortgages and insurance policies. NRC Handelsblad discovered Saturday that Lone Star Funds, an investment firm from Texas, had approached DSB. The private equity firm specialises in buying distressed companies and assets, such as toxic mortgage loans. But on Sunday the company pulled out of negotiations after studying DSB's books.
Dirk Scheringa, the founder and owner of DSB, on Friday announced an American investor was seriously interested in buying his company. He has previously tried to persuade a consortium of Dutch banks to take over his ravaged bank after it succumbed to negative publicity surrounding its mortgages and insurance policies.
NRC Handelsblad discovered Saturday that Lone Star Funds, an investment firm from Texas, had approached DSB. The private equity firm specialises in buying distressed companies and assets, such as toxic mortgage loans. But on Sunday the company pulled out of negotiations after studying DSB's books.
Attempted a sketch of a diary, but developments kept on coming, carried by tempestuous waves of media storm.
Scheringa, who seems to blame everyone except himself, has pointed fingers to minister of Finance Wouter Bos and the DNB, the central bank, blaming them for "destroying" his company. He also hints that Lone Star Funds pulled out after they phoned someone at the ministry. Probabaly a reference check.
Now, if a locust company such as Long Star Funds doesn't even want to salvage the DSB - what does that say of the status of the DSB?
Federal investigators are gearing up to file charges against a wider array of insider-trading networks, some linked to the criminal case against billionaire hedge-fund manager Raj Rajaratnam that shook Wall Street last week, people familiar with the matter said. The pending crackdown, based on at least two years of investigation, targets securities professionals including hedge- fund managers, lawyers and other Wall Street players, the people said, declining to be identified because the cases aren't public. Some probes, like the one focused on Rajaratnam, rely on wiretaps. Others stem from a secret Securities and Exchange Commission data-mining project set up to pinpoint clusters of people who make similar well-timed stock investments. Investigators have struggled to build cases against large institutional investors such as hedge-fund managers, who often deflect regulatory queries about suspiciously timed bets, arguing they're statistical flukes amid millions of trades. The case against Rajaratnam, built on recorded conversations within a web of alleged conspirators, offers a glimpse of how U.S. investigators are using more aggressive tactics to cut through the blizzard of trading and trace the flow of information.
The pending crackdown, based on at least two years of investigation, targets securities professionals including hedge- fund managers, lawyers and other Wall Street players, the people said, declining to be identified because the cases aren't public. Some probes, like the one focused on Rajaratnam, rely on wiretaps. Others stem from a secret Securities and Exchange Commission data-mining project set up to pinpoint clusters of people who make similar well-timed stock investments.
Investigators have struggled to build cases against large institutional investors such as hedge-fund managers, who often deflect regulatory queries about suspiciously timed bets, arguing they're statistical flukes amid millions of trades. The case against Rajaratnam, built on recorded conversations within a web of alleged conspirators, offers a glimpse of how U.S. investigators are using more aggressive tactics to cut through the blizzard of trading and trace the flow of information.
Every weekday at 8:35 a.m., Galleon Group's 70 analysts, portfolio managers and traders pack into a conference room on the 34th floor of the IBM Building, a gray- green polished granite skyscraper on New York's Madison Avenue. Tardy arrivals are fined $25. At the head of the table, Chief Executive Officer Raj Rajaratnam fires off questions to the staff of his $3.7 billion hedge fund firm: Which companies' margins are peaking? What would change your mind about this stock? What's the risk of that company failing to win an expected contract? The 52-year-old billionaire expects his analysts to have an edge: better information than anyone else, say people who have attended the meetings. U.S. prosecutors allege that Rajaratnam's own edge was illegal. He was arrested on Oct. 16 at his home on Manhattan's Sutton Place, charged with using inside information to trade shares including Google Inc., Polycom Inc., Hilton Hotels Corp. and Advanced Micro Devices Inc., according to complaints. Five other defendants also were arrested in New York and California in a $20 million scheme that prosecutors say is the largest-ever insider trading case involving hedge funds. "Every trader wants an edge, and there are many gray areas when it comes to aggressive research," said Ron Geffner, a lawyer at New York-based Sadis & Goldberg LLP, whose clients include hedge funds. "But if you trade on material, non-public information that comes from a company insider who is breaching his fiduciary duty, odds are that it is illegal."
At the head of the table, Chief Executive Officer Raj Rajaratnam fires off questions to the staff of his $3.7 billion hedge fund firm: Which companies' margins are peaking? What would change your mind about this stock? What's the risk of that company failing to win an expected contract? The 52-year-old billionaire expects his analysts to have an edge: better information than anyone else, say people who have attended the meetings.
U.S. prosecutors allege that Rajaratnam's own edge was illegal. He was arrested on Oct. 16 at his home on Manhattan's Sutton Place, charged with using inside information to trade shares including Google Inc., Polycom Inc., Hilton Hotels Corp. and Advanced Micro Devices Inc., according to complaints. Five other defendants also were arrested in New York and California in a $20 million scheme that prosecutors say is the largest-ever insider trading case involving hedge funds.
"Every trader wants an edge, and there are many gray areas when it comes to aggressive research," said Ron Geffner, a lawyer at New York-based Sadis & Goldberg LLP, whose clients include hedge funds. "But if you trade on material, non-public information that comes from a company insider who is breaching his fiduciary duty, odds are that it is illegal."
Oct. 19 (Bloomberg) -- Federal investigators plan to charge at least 10 securities professionals with insider trading, some linked to the criminal case against billionaire hedge-fund manager Raj Rajaratnam that shook Wall Street last week, people familiar with the matter said. The pending crackdown, more than two years in the making and among the biggest undercover operations into insider trading, may yield charges against hedge-fund managers and their associates as early as this week, the people said, declining to be identified because the cases aren't public. Authorities had planned to arrest Rajaratnam this week as part of a broader sweep, expediting it after learning he had bought a plane ticket to travel to London on Oct. 16, one person said. The case against Rajaratnam, built on recorded conversations within a web of alleged conspirators, offers a glimpse of how U.S. investigators are using more aggressive tactics to identify illegal trades hidden within a blizzard of hedge-fund investments. Additional probes stem from a secret Securities and Exchange Commission data-mining project set up to pinpoint clusters of people who make similar well-timed stock investments. Some probes, like the one against Rajaratnam, rely on wiretaps. "If you're going to shoot the king, you better shoot to kill," said Bradley Bennett, a law partner at Baker Botts LLP in Washington who formerly focused on insider-trading cases as an SEC investigator. "If they're going to take on a billionaire, they need to have the strongest possible cases. The defendant's own words are the strongest possible evidence."
The pending crackdown, more than two years in the making and among the biggest undercover operations into insider trading, may yield charges against hedge-fund managers and their associates as early as this week, the people said, declining to be identified because the cases aren't public. Authorities had planned to arrest Rajaratnam this week as part of a broader sweep, expediting it after learning he had bought a plane ticket to travel to London on Oct. 16, one person said.
The case against Rajaratnam, built on recorded conversations within a web of alleged conspirators, offers a glimpse of how U.S. investigators are using more aggressive tactics to identify illegal trades hidden within a blizzard of hedge-fund investments. Additional probes stem from a secret Securities and Exchange Commission data-mining project set up to pinpoint clusters of people who make similar well-timed stock investments. Some probes, like the one against Rajaratnam, rely on wiretaps.
"If you're going to shoot the king, you better shoot to kill," said Bradley Bennett, a law partner at Baker Botts LLP in Washington who formerly focused on insider-trading cases as an SEC investigator. "If they're going to take on a billionaire, they need to have the strongest possible cases. The defendant's own words are the strongest possible evidence."
On the surface, this looks like 2003 and 2004 when the previous housing, credit, commodity and equity bubbles started to inflate, helped by low nominal interest rates and a lack of inflation. There is one big difference, though. This bubble will burst sooner....In mid-September both measures concluded that the US stock market was overvalued by some 35 to 40 per cent. The markets have since gone up a lot more than the moving average of earnings. You can do the maths....We could be in for a period of extreme price instability, in both directions, as central banks lose control.This is exactly what the economist Hyman Minsky predicted in his financial instability hypothesis.** He postulated that a world with a large financial sector and an excessive emphasis on the production of investment goods creates instability both in terms of output and prices.... Our present situation can give rise to two scenarios - or some combination of the two. The first is that central banks start exiting at some point in 2010, triggering another fall in the prices of risky assets. In the UK, for example, any return to a normal monetary policy will almost inevitably imply another fall in the housing market, which is currently propped up by ultra-cheap mortgages.Alternatively, central banks might prioritise financial stability over price stability and keep the monetary floodgates open for as long as possible. This, I believe, would cause the mother of all financial market crises - a bond market crash - to be followed by depression and deflation.
This is exactly what the economist Hyman Minsky predicted in his financial instability hypothesis.** He postulated that a world with a large financial sector and an excessive emphasis on the production of investment goods creates instability both in terms of output and prices.... Our present situation can give rise to two scenarios - or some combination of the two. The first is that central banks start exiting at some point in 2010, triggering another fall in the prices of risky assets. In the UK, for example, any return to a normal monetary policy will almost inevitably imply another fall in the housing market, which is currently propped up by ultra-cheap mortgages.
Alternatively, central banks might prioritise financial stability over price stability and keep the monetary floodgates open for as long as possible. This, I believe, would cause the mother of all financial market crises - a bond market crash - to be followed by depression and deflation.
:-)
(At least one person will get the joke.)
A picture is worth a thousand words to describe Elliot Waves:
ET. "Giving math to the millions!"
The euro has become a currency on steroids. Its relentless nominal and real appreciation since the end of 2000 was briefly interrupted in the second half of 2008, but resumed with a vengeance during 2009. The strength of the currency is hurting the exporting and import-competing sectors of the Euro Area. Unemployment and excess capacity continue to rise. The euro's excessive strength is also contributing to a significant and persistent undershooting of the rate of inflation the ECB deems to be consistent with price stability in the medium term: headline HICP inflation in December 2008 was 1.60 percent in December 2008, hit zero in May 2009 and has been negative since then. .... What accounts for the strength of this über-currency? The profession's inability to understand, let alone predict, things monetary is amplified when it comes to explaining or predicting the relative price of (at least) two currencies. Nevertheless, any disinterested observer would be hard-pushed to avoid the conclusion that the Eurozone is paying the price for the ECB's excessively tight monetary policy. The ECB's monetary policy is excessively tight in relation to the ECB's self-imposed quantitative expression of its Treaty-based price stability mandate. In the ECB's own words: "The primary objective of the ECB's monetary policy is to maintain price stability. The ECB aims at inflation rates of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term." There is no doubt in my view that the ECB has an asymmetric interpretation of its price stability mandate. Excessive inflation is to be avoided at all cost. However, excessive deflation can be tolerated and rationalized.
The ECB's monetary policy is excessively tight in relation to the ECB's self-imposed quantitative expression of its Treaty-based price stability mandate. In the ECB's own words: "The primary objective of the ECB's monetary policy is to maintain price stability. The ECB aims at inflation rates of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term."
There is no doubt in my view that the ECB has an asymmetric interpretation of its price stability mandate. Excessive inflation is to be avoided at all cost. However, excessive deflation can be tolerated and rationalized.
In a January 2009 interview with NBC's Tom Brokaw, Warren Buffett criticized leveraging "to the sky," and creating "phony instruments [RMBSs, CDOs, et al.] that fool other people so you stick money in your pocket." In 2002, he claimed over-the-counter derivatives are "financial weapons of mass destruction"1 and participants who account for them have "enormous incentives to cheat." 2 Warren Buffett, the blogosphere's "Oracle of Omaha," often chastises the financial community. If you cost him money, he's liable to write an expose. He posts annual shareholder letters on a low-tech website and seems to labor under the assumption that rational people eagerly read his blog. Congress and regulators are dismissive of Buffett's hyperbolic rhetoric; it is fit only for a banana republic. .... Hank Paulson, Ben Bernanke, and Tim Geithner10 ignored the historic ravings of the most successful living investor, and fueled some of the bombers piloted by Wall Street before finance's Pearl Harbor. After they used taxpayer money to save the system and enriched the culpable with no strings attached, Buffett said "it could have turned out a lot differently," and called each of them a four-letter word. The label was undeserved. (The word was "hero." ARG) Four-letter words aside, Warren Buffett raised a good point. It could have--and should have--turned out a lot differently. But it's not too late. Buffett called the crisis an economic Pearl Harbor and said that "Wall Street owes the American people one at this point."8 During World War II, we imposed an excess profits tax. We should impose a 95% excess profits tax--or windfall profits tax--on certain financial institutions (including Goldman Sachs) enriching themselves with ongoing low-cost Fed funding and debt guarantees.We should impose a 95% excess profits tax--or windfall profits tax--on certain financial institutions (including Goldman Sachs) enriching themselves with ongoing low-cost Fed funding and debt guarantees. (My bold)
Warren Buffett, the blogosphere's "Oracle of Omaha," often chastises the financial community. If you cost him money, he's liable to write an expose. He posts annual shareholder letters on a low-tech website and seems to labor under the assumption that rational people eagerly read his blog. Congress and regulators are dismissive of Buffett's hyperbolic rhetoric; it is fit only for a banana republic. .... Hank Paulson, Ben Bernanke, and Tim Geithner10 ignored the historic ravings of the most successful living investor, and fueled some of the bombers piloted by Wall Street before finance's Pearl Harbor. After they used taxpayer money to save the system and enriched the culpable with no strings attached, Buffett said "it could have turned out a lot differently," and called each of them a four-letter word. The label was undeserved. (The word was "hero." ARG)
Four-letter words aside, Warren Buffett raised a good point. It could have--and should have--turned out a lot differently. But it's not too late. Buffett called the crisis an economic Pearl Harbor and said that "Wall Street owes the American people one at this point."8 During World War II, we imposed an excess profits tax. We should impose a 95% excess profits tax--or windfall profits tax--on certain financial institutions (including Goldman Sachs) enriching themselves with ongoing low-cost Fed funding and debt guarantees.We should impose a 95% excess profits tax--or windfall profits tax--on certain financial institutions (including Goldman Sachs) enriching themselves with ongoing low-cost Fed funding and debt guarantees. (My bold)
When the financial system almost imploded in the fall of 2008, one of the primary responses by the Federal Reserve was the issuance of an unprecedented amount of FX liquidity lines in the form of swaps to foreign Central Banks. The number went from practically zero to a peak of $582 billion on December 10, 2008. The number of swaps outstanding was almost directly inversely correlated with the value of the dollar (much more on that shortly). A graphic representation of this can be seen below: The topic of skyrocketing liquidity swaps was in fact the headline feature of one of the numerous grillings of the Chairman by the inimitable Alan Grayson...(You have probably seen Grayson mocking and laughing at Bernanke in a public hearing.) And while Bernanke was not very interested in getting caught up in providing actual explanations, the Bank of International Settlements just released a major paper titled "The US dollar shortage in global banking and the international policy response" which goes on to demonstrate just how it happened that Fed chief Ben Bernanke in essence bailed out the entire developed world, which was facing an unprecedented dollar shortage crisis due to the sudden implosion of FX swap lines and other mechanisms which until that point were critical in maintaining the dollar funding shortfall for virtually every foreign Central Bank. The BIS provides the following big picture perspective: The funding difficulties which arose during the crisis are directly linked to the remarkable expansion in banks' global balance sheets over the past decade. Reflecting in part the rapid pace of financial innovation, banks' (particularly European banks') foreign positions have surged since 2000, even when scaled by measures of underlying economic activity. As banks' balance sheets grew, so did their appetite for foreign currency assets, notably US dollar-denominated claims on non-bank entities. These assets include retail and corporate lending, loans to hedge funds, and holdings of structured finance products based on US mortgages and other underlying assets. During the build-up, the low perceived risk (high ratings) of these instruments appeared to offer attractive return opportunities; during the crisis they became the main source of mark to market losses. How exactly did this improper perception of funding risk manifest itself? The accumulation of US dollar assets saddled banks with significant funding requirements, which they scrambled to meet during the crisis, particularly in the weeks following the Lehman bankruptcy. To better understand these financing needs, we break down banks' assets and liabilities by currency to examine cross-currency funding, or the extent to which banks fund in one currency and invest in another. We find that, since 2000, the Japanese and the major European banking systems took on increasingly large net (assets minus liabilities) on-balance sheet positions in foreign currencies, particularly in US dollars. While the associated currency exposures were presumably hedged off-balance sheet, the build-up of net foreign currency positions exposed these banks to foreign currency funding risk, or the risk that their funding positions (FX swaps) could not be rolled over. Once again, the specter of everyone (and in this case it really means everyone) doing the same trade: sound familiar? This is eerily similar to what happened to basis traders in late 2008 (nothing pretty) when the balance of the trade was so skewed to one side, that there was nobody willing or able to take the opposing side, leading to massive wipe outs for everyone who participated. It is also comparable to the situation prevalent in equity markets currently. What is now unquestionable, and what will be made clear shortly, is that the dollar trade is precisely what the basis trade, or any other trade, would have ended up being for any and every Central Bank that had a funding mismatch in dollars after the Lehman bankruptcy (all of them), had the Federal Reserve not stepped in and become the lender of last resort to the entire world.
The topic of skyrocketing liquidity swaps was in fact the headline feature of one of the numerous grillings of the Chairman by the inimitable Alan Grayson...(You have probably seen Grayson mocking and laughing at Bernanke in a public hearing.)
And while Bernanke was not very interested in getting caught up in providing actual explanations, the Bank of International Settlements just released a major paper titled "The US dollar shortage in global banking and the international policy response" which goes on to demonstrate just how it happened that Fed chief Ben Bernanke in essence bailed out the entire developed world, which was facing an unprecedented dollar shortage crisis due to the sudden implosion of FX swap lines and other mechanisms which until that point were critical in maintaining the dollar funding shortfall for virtually every foreign Central Bank.
The BIS provides the following big picture perspective:
The funding difficulties which arose during the crisis are directly linked to the remarkable expansion in banks' global balance sheets over the past decade. Reflecting in part the rapid pace of financial innovation, banks' (particularly European banks') foreign positions have surged since 2000, even when scaled by measures of underlying economic activity. As banks' balance sheets grew, so did their appetite for foreign currency assets, notably US dollar-denominated claims on non-bank entities. These assets include retail and corporate lending, loans to hedge funds, and holdings of structured finance products based on US mortgages and other underlying assets. During the build-up, the low perceived risk (high ratings) of these instruments appeared to offer attractive return opportunities; during the crisis they became the main source of mark to market losses.
How exactly did this improper perception of funding risk manifest itself?
The accumulation of US dollar assets saddled banks with significant funding requirements, which they scrambled to meet during the crisis, particularly in the weeks following the Lehman bankruptcy. To better understand these financing needs, we break down banks' assets and liabilities by currency to examine cross-currency funding, or the extent to which banks fund in one currency and invest in another. We find that, since 2000, the Japanese and the major European banking systems took on increasingly large net (assets minus liabilities) on-balance sheet positions in foreign currencies, particularly in US dollars. While the associated currency exposures were presumably hedged off-balance sheet, the build-up of net foreign currency positions exposed these banks to foreign currency funding risk, or the risk that their funding positions (FX swaps) could not be rolled over.
Once again, the specter of everyone (and in this case it really means everyone) doing the same trade: sound familiar? This is eerily similar to what happened to basis traders in late 2008 (nothing pretty) when the balance of the trade was so skewed to one side, that there was nobody willing or able to take the opposing side, leading to massive wipe outs for everyone who participated. It is also comparable to the situation prevalent in equity markets currently.
What is now unquestionable, and what will be made clear shortly, is that the dollar trade is precisely what the basis trade, or any other trade, would have ended up being for any and every Central Bank that had a funding mismatch in dollars after the Lehman bankruptcy (all of them), had the Federal Reserve not stepped in and become the lender of last resort to the entire world.
Cheap Fed money financed US real estate loans. Wall Street repackaged these and, obligingly, sold them to European banks wanting in on US profit opportunities. First there were mortgage backed securities and matching credit default swaps.
The banks needed US dollars to play, but if they just went and got them, they would be exposed to exchange rate risk on their balance sheets. Tres gauche! A more elegant solution seemed to be to just enter into currency, or FX, swaps and pair the swaps with matching futures options as hedges. This way the bank only needs actual foreign currency when the obligation comes due---normally. And of course AIG was a highly rated supplier of credit default swaps.
Proceeding in this manner, the banking sector in numerous countries could accumulate dollar obligations that were greater than the GDP of the country in which they operated.
The fly in this ointment was the small possibility that everyone would need dollars at the same time, as dollar obligations greatly exceeded available dollars. This, of course, is exactly what happened. But not to worry! Helicopter Ben is here! He will sent in the helicopters with cash. And so he did, to the tune of half a trillion US$. Then some Europeans thought: "Poor US taxpayer! This is not good for their currency" Then they thought: Hey, that is our international reserve currency.
The demand for dollars was most acute in Nov and Dec. '08, and the value of the dollar soared. Then Paulson threw a dollar banquet, called the TARP, for the TBTF banks, and people started looking at all the money the Fed was creating, in conjunction with Treasury, and the US $ began its slide towards its present value. But this is only the background.
Alas alack! I grow too soon old and too late wise! I should have bought precious metals and euros for Christmas '08. As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
Is David Bloom Wrong About the Dollar?
As I have previously noted, HSBC currency chief David Bloom doesn't think that the dollar will rally when the stock market next tanks: The dollar rallied last year because we had a global liquidity crisis, but we think the rules have changed and that it will be very different this time [if there is another market sell-off]. Is he right? I have argued that the new dollar carry trade could very well unwind during the next crash, which could create an enormous need for dollars. I've also pointed out that many top economists say that the problem with America's banking system was not really a liquidity crisis, but an insolvency crisis. Now, Tyler Durden has written a must-read summary of a new report by BIS which shows that the real liquidity crisis last year was among European banks, which were hugely overexposed to the dollar (in amounts many times greater than their GDPs, in some cases), and so they were desperate to raise dollars last year when the market crashed.
The dollar rallied last year because we had a global liquidity crisis, but we think the rules have changed and that it will be very different this time [if there is another market sell-off].
Is he right?
I have argued that the new dollar carry trade could very well unwind during the next crash, which could create an enormous need for dollars. I've also pointed out that many top economists say that the problem with America's banking system was not really a liquidity crisis, but an insolvency crisis.
Now, Tyler Durden has written a must-read summary of a new report by BIS which shows that the real liquidity crisis last year was among European banks, which were hugely overexposed to the dollar (in amounts many times greater than their GDPs, in some cases), and so they were desperate to raise dollars last year when the market crashed.
About 12.2% of Californians are out of work, according to the state's latest calculations, and some economists are predicting that the state won't start creating jobs until late 2010. So what can the state's 2 million unemployed do in the meantime to better qualify themselves to get one of those jobs? Higher education may not be the answer, according to a study released today. About 2.7 million "middle-skill" jobs will be created in the state by 2016, according to the study by the Workforce Alliance, Skills2Compete and the California EDGE Campaign. Middle-skill jobs refer to those that require more than a high school diploma but less than a four-year college degree. They include jobs in construction, healthcare, law enforcement and many other fields. "Federal funds from the stimulus bill are expected to create new jobs and many of these will be middle-skill, especially in green jobs, construction, manufacturing and transportation," the report says. "Matching the skills of our workforce to meet this demand will help our economy recover more quickly and prepare us for better times ahead." The report calculates that about half of all jobs in California fell into the middle-skill category in 2008, and predicts that about 43% of all job openings in the next seven years will be middle-skill. Low-skill jobs will account for a quarter of all job openings over the same time period, and high-skill jobs will make up 32% of openings. The problem: A shortage of middle-skill workers could develop because the state has cut back on the training of those skills. State budget cuts have drastically reduced funding to community colleges and adult education centers, for example.
About 2.7 million "middle-skill" jobs will be created in the state by 2016, according to the study by the Workforce Alliance, Skills2Compete and the California EDGE Campaign. Middle-skill jobs refer to those that require more than a high school diploma but less than a four-year college degree. They include jobs in construction, healthcare, law enforcement and many other fields.
"Federal funds from the stimulus bill are expected to create new jobs and many of these will be middle-skill, especially in green jobs, construction, manufacturing and transportation," the report says. "Matching the skills of our workforce to meet this demand will help our economy recover more quickly and prepare us for better times ahead."
The report calculates that about half of all jobs in California fell into the middle-skill category in 2008, and predicts that about 43% of all job openings in the next seven years will be middle-skill. Low-skill jobs will account for a quarter of all job openings over the same time period, and high-skill jobs will make up 32% of openings.
The problem: A shortage of middle-skill workers could develop because the state has cut back on the training of those skills. State budget cuts have drastically reduced funding to community colleges and adult education centers, for example.
Unions at Spain's Opel plant Monday rejected a plan on its future by its Canadian auto parts manufacturer Magna International and called for a vote on strike action, a union member said.Canadian auto parts manufacturer Magna International wants to cut around 1,300 of the 7,000 staff at the Opel factory in the northern town of Figueruelas and move some production to Germany."The last proposal from Magna has been rejected," said Julio Vela, a member of the works committee and of the UGT union.
Unions at Spain's Opel plant Monday rejected a plan on its future by its Canadian auto parts manufacturer Magna International and called for a vote on strike action, a union member said.
Canadian auto parts manufacturer Magna International wants to cut around 1,300 of the 7,000 staff at the Opel factory in the northern town of Figueruelas and move some production to Germany.
"The last proposal from Magna has been rejected," said Julio Vela, a member of the works committee and of the UGT union.
