For example, "the US are the ultimate guarantors of our security" is certainly in the minds of people strolling NATO headquarters in Brussels, and probably in the majoprity of European politicians, but every European? And what follows that, is not a standard divide-and-conquer narrative; one ignoring the much more complex relationships in and via the EU Council? *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
They fail to take responsibility where they should (for example, on Russia); they fail to get what they want out of the US (for example, visa-free travel); they acquiesce when America chooses to strongarm them (except in the economic relationship); they adopt courses of action not out of conviction but in order to propitiate their patron (for example, Afghanistan); and they suffer from US policies not specifically directed against them but which nonetheless have adverse consequences for them (for example, Israel/Palestine).
And deferring to the US as what one top French official described to us as "le grand frère égalisateur" has other advantages: it allows Europeans to stop other Europeans getting above themselves. Italians can hope to use American clout to keep Germany off the UN Security Council; Germany can ignore French "pretension" in suggesting that the French nuclear deterrent could protect Germany; and Dutchmen and Danes are frank that their Atlanticism owes much to a wish to see France and Germany held in check.
..is not extra-EU foreign policy, it is intra-EU relations seen through an Atlanticist filter. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
To qualify, Dutch transatlanticism has ebbed somewhat in the last Balkenende government, which has mainly been due to the mutual reaching out between Balkenende and Sarkozy on the one hand and the degree of toxicity of G.W. Bush on the other hand. I am not confident that this will be a lasting change of direction.
However, in the actual context of that paragraph, I don't think they play that much a role in allowing "Europeans to stop other Europeans getting above themselves". (So I agree that there's nothing in that paragraph that's not roughly correct, but there is an implication that these are main factors.)
To give another direction to this sub-discussion; I'm only at pdf page 17 now so don't know if it is covered later, but, IMO, there is a logical sequence of these European attitudes:
That, so far, every second paragraph comes back to an implication that some American foreign policy objective would be in Europe's interests, too; that the sorry state of affairs usually ends up being something where Europe failed to live up to Obama admin expectations, and the resolution to European foreign policy paralysis tends to look like doing something in America's stead. (I'm on page 17.)
But, to again highlight that I see this as a bold departure anyway, here is the last of four recommendations on how Europeans could 'maintain and strengthen transatlantic cooperation':
In Chorus, not Solo. If they are to count for something in Washington's world view, EU member states need above all to speak and act together, thus bringing their collective weight to bear. This is as true in relation to the US as it is in relation to Russia or China - only even more difficult. The current practice of banking on some bilateral "special relationship" in a European competition for Washington's favour simply invites the US to continue to divide and rule. Worse, by hamstringing Europeans as effective partners for the US, it is also undermining the transatlantic relationship as a whole.
A frequent problem of policies and institutions that do not exist is that they are imparted with a purpose they are unlikely to serve by those who argue on behalf of their creation. Thus does U.S. presidential candidate John McCain seek a 'League of Democracies' that would engage in bolder democracy promotion and create freer markets. Thus does Anne Applebaum dream of the leaders of the UK, France and Germany coming to the White House, pledging to solve Afghanistan. Thus, likewise, does the English foreign policy community desire a common European foreign and defence policy that will stand up to Russia.
Point taken. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
Among the illusions that European governments find hard to shake off, we identify four which are particularly damaging - the beliefs that:... American and European interests are at bottom the same - and apparent evidence to the contrary only evidences the need for the US to pay greater heed to European advice;
I hope to find them fleshing out that point when I read on, but probably not tonight. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
Europe is not threatened by Russia. It generally knows how to negotiate energy deals with it, even if it is done on a quasi-national-champion per quasi-national-champion basis (I'd note that no other practical alternative to negotiating with Gazprom has ever been proposed). It can cohabitate with it on most international issues.
Russia is the big bogeyman created by the militaro-industrial complex to generate the appearance of a need for US "protection." (Note: I'm not saying Russia is not authoritarian, just that it's not really dangerous to Europe. Relations with the "near abroad" (the FSU) are dominated by oligarchic issues as much as anything and Europe is better off not getting involved in issues it doesn't understand or care about). In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
Many in Eastern Europe would argue that security dependence on the US is no illusion, but brute fact in the face of Putin's reassertive Russia. Yet, as US Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently attested: "As someone who used to prepare estimates of Soviet military strength for several presidents, I can say that Russia's conventional military, although vastly improved since its nadir in the late 1990s, remains a shadow of its Soviet predecessor. And adverse demographic trends in Russia will likely keep those conventional forces in check."5 Even after recent major increases financed by surging energy prices, Russian defence spending is still significantly lower than that of the EU member states as a whole. In fact, even on the basis of purchasing power parity, last year's Russian defence budget was roughly equivalent to those of the UK and France combined. Europe as a whole continues to spend twice as much as Russia on defence.6
Whatever the details, the implication is that Russia is NOT a threat. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
On energy, we mostly need to get out of our insane current neolib policies to eliminate the notion of that energy threat (or reframe it as the larger threat of depletion to deal with it as such). In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
Among the illusions that European governments find hard to shake off, we identify four which are particularly damaging - the beliefs that: European security still depends on American protection; American and European interests are at bottom the same - and apparent evidence to the contrary only evidences the need for the US to pay greater heed to European advice; the need to keep the relationship close and harmonious therefore trumps any more specific objective that Europeans might want to secure through it; and "ganging up" on the US would be improper - indeed, counterproductive - given the "special relationship" that most European states believe they enjoy with Washington. In this report we aim to show how these illusions induce in European governments and elites an unhealthy mix of complacency and excessive deference towards the United States - attitudes which give rise to a set of strategies of ingratiation that do not work. Such attitudes and strategies fail to secure European interests; fail to provide the US with the sort of transatlantic partner that it is now seeking; and are in consequence undermining the very relationship for which Europeans are so solicitously concerned.
In this report we aim to show how these illusions induce in European governments and elites an unhealthy mix of complacency and excessive deference towards the United States - attitudes which give rise to a set of strategies of ingratiation that do not work. Such attitudes and strategies fail to secure European interests; fail to provide the US with the sort of transatlantic partner that it is now seeking; and are in consequence undermining the very relationship for which Europeans are so solicitously concerned.
That this European infantility and submission is one seen from Washington, becomes explicit on pages 12 and 13:
Thus far, the Obama administration has seen European governments broadly living down to their expectations. It has found them weak 10 and divided - ready 11 to talk a good game but reluctant to get muddy. Seen from Washington, there is something almost infantile about how European governments behave towards them - a combination of attention seeking and responsibility shirking. ... Europe's confused but essentially submissive approach to transatlantic relations frustrates Americans, but also sells their own interests short... Afghanistan provides an ongoing demonstration of the consequences of European governments' failure to take real responsibility for a conflict that they claim is vital to their national security interests.
...
Europe's confused but essentially submissive approach to transatlantic relations frustrates Americans, but also sells their own interests short...
Afghanistan provides an ongoing demonstration of the consequences of European governments' failure to take real responsibility for a conflict that they claim is vital to their national security interests.
Frivolous translation: "I hoped you'll fight my war in Afghanistan, but you're such pussies!"
The way thery put the Obama-era re-invention of Empire, BTW:
President Obama ... Europeans miss the implications of the self-avowed pragmatism of his administration. ... it believes that the creation of a web of international partnerships is the best way to ensure that, even in a globalised world, America remains the "indispensable nation".
As for Afghanistan, the report says this:
Develop a European strategy for Afghanistan. This might mean getting out, or getting further in, or just changing tack. But what it most directly means is starting to substitute European interests for Washington's smiles and frowns as the star to navigate by. This means a proper debate within the EU or among those most closely involved to determine just what Europe wants and needs from Afghanistan. The recent call by the European Big Three for an international conference may - may - imply a belated recognition.
You're cherry-picking.
You too :-) There are endless passages both before and after the above detailing American frustrations with Europe not acting in its own declared interests/not taking responsibility in Afghanistan. [In addition, I confused page numbers and pdf page numbers -- I was only one-sixth the way in and haven't read the above when writing my previous comment.] *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
