Gen Stewart added: "I spent a significant amount of my time `consenting and evading' US orders... Things got sticky...when I refused to conduct offensive operations against [al-Sadr's] Mahdi Army as directed [by the US]. This resulted in the UK being demarched by the US, by [Paul] Bremer [the US proconsul in Iraq] through State [the US State Department] to the UK Ambassador in Washington." A "demarche" in this context was a formal diplomatic reprimand of a kind not normally handed out to friendly allies such as Britain. Gen Stewart said that the US military "were mortified" that it had got so far and said he "was always fully supported in the UK by the Chief of Defence Staff and Chief of Joint Operations."
Gen Stewart added: "I spent a significant amount of my time `consenting and evading' US orders... Things got sticky...when I refused to conduct offensive operations against [al-Sadr's] Mahdi Army as directed [by the US]. This resulted in the UK being demarched by the US, by [Paul] Bremer [the US proconsul in Iraq] through State [the US State Department] to the UK Ambassador in Washington."
A "demarche" in this context was a formal diplomatic reprimand of a kind not normally handed out to friendly allies such as Britain. Gen Stewart said that the US military "were mortified" that it had got so far and said he "was always fully supported in the UK by the Chief of Defence Staff and Chief of Joint Operations."
From December 2005
The Dutch troops deployed in Iraq had a very different relationship with the locals than did the Americans, but American heavy-handedness ended up negatively affecting the Dutch mission. Radio Netherlands: Stay friendly, get tough or get out?The position of the Dutch troops stationed in southern Iraq is becoming more precarious. According to Defence Minister Henk Kamp and military personnel on the ground, the atmosphere among the local Shiite population has grown noticeably worse over recent weeks - a direct consequence of the US military campaign in the Shiite holy city of Najaf, which lies just north of the "Dutch" province of al-Muthanna. The regional authorities are also said to be less cooperative than before. Meanwhile, a perceptible increase in the level of popular support for radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr and his armed militia forces has also been reported.A consequence of all these factors is that the cautious and friendly attitude of the Dutch troops in al-Muthanna province appears to be meeting an ever more unappreciative audience, while the number of attacks targeting the Netherlands' military forces in the area is showing a similarly rapid growth. The low point came just last Saturday with the death of a 29-year-old Dutch military police sergeant in Ar Rumaythah. Back home in the Netherlands, a tiny group of concerned relatives and friends of the troops in Iraq launched a campaign on Tuesday this week which - within the space of 24 hours - engendered political reactions, promises to re-examine the security situation and possibly even recall parliament for an emergency debate on the issue. Juan Cole has also suggested that part of the reason for the precipitous departure of the Spanish troops from Najaf in May last year was that the US demanded that the Spanish troops "get Sadr dead or alive", which the Spanish commander in Najaf understandably refused to do. Sensing that the US was going to ignite the gunpowder keg under their feet anyway, the Spanish withdrew a couple of months ahead of schedule. Informed Comment: Thursday, March 24, 2005El Pais is reporting the disputes between Spanish military commanders in Najaf and US officers. The Spanish officers were appalled that Gen. Rick Sanchez wanted them to call in bombing strikes on civilian targets (a frequent US tactic in urban warfare in Iraq), and refused, sending in commandos to a hospital instead. Likewise, the Spanish declined to move against the Sadr Movement for fear of massive turbulence, so the US sent in special ops forces to arrest an aide to Muqtada al-Sadr anyway. (It is just unimaginable that the US would endanger the 1200 Spanish troops in Najaf in this high-handed way. It has been alleged to me by someone who should know that Dan Senor played a key role in this move). As the Spanish predicted, the sudden and still unexplained US assault on the Sadrists produced a massive uprising that threw the South into turmoil for two months. The Spanish by that time were fed up and the new Zapatero government determined to withdraw the Spanish military. Given how high-handedly the US treated them, you cannot blame Madrid for wanting no further part of the increasing Iraq quagmire. What comes across most strongly in this report is a general European officer-class repugnance at heavy-handed US military tactics, including especially the use of aerial bombing on civilian targets where guerrillas were present.
Radio Netherlands: Stay friendly, get tough or get out?
The position of the Dutch troops stationed in southern Iraq is becoming more precarious. According to Defence Minister Henk Kamp and military personnel on the ground, the atmosphere among the local Shiite population has grown noticeably worse over recent weeks - a direct consequence of the US military campaign in the Shiite holy city of Najaf, which lies just north of the "Dutch" province of al-Muthanna. The regional authorities are also said to be less cooperative than before. Meanwhile, a perceptible increase in the level of popular support for radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr and his armed militia forces has also been reported.
A consequence of all these factors is that the cautious and friendly attitude of the Dutch troops in al-Muthanna province appears to be meeting an ever more unappreciative audience, while the number of attacks targeting the Netherlands' military forces in the area is showing a similarly rapid growth. The low point came just last Saturday with the death of a 29-year-old Dutch military police sergeant in Ar Rumaythah. Back home in the Netherlands, a tiny group of concerned relatives and friends of the troops in Iraq launched a campaign on Tuesday this week which - within the space of 24 hours - engendered political reactions, promises to re-examine the security situation and possibly even recall parliament for an emergency debate on the issue.
Juan Cole has also suggested that part of the reason for the precipitous departure of the Spanish troops from Najaf in May last year was that the US demanded that the Spanish troops "get Sadr dead or alive", which the Spanish commander in Najaf understandably refused to do. Sensing that the US was going to ignite the gunpowder keg under their feet anyway, the Spanish withdrew a couple of months ahead of schedule.
Informed Comment: Thursday, March 24, 2005
El Pais is reporting the disputes between Spanish military commanders in Najaf and US officers. The Spanish officers were appalled that Gen. Rick Sanchez wanted them to call in bombing strikes on civilian targets (a frequent US tactic in urban warfare in Iraq), and refused, sending in commandos to a hospital instead. Likewise, the Spanish declined to move against the Sadr Movement for fear of massive turbulence, so the US sent in special ops forces to arrest an aide to Muqtada al-Sadr anyway. (It is just unimaginable that the US would endanger the 1200 Spanish troops in Najaf in this high-handed way. It has been alleged to me by someone who should know that Dan Senor played a key role in this move). As the Spanish predicted, the sudden and still unexplained US assault on the Sadrists produced a massive uprising that threw the South into turmoil for two months. The Spanish by that time were fed up and the new Zapatero government determined to withdraw the Spanish military. Given how high-handedly the US treated them, you cannot blame Madrid for wanting no further part of the increasing Iraq quagmire. What comes across most strongly in this report is a general European officer-class repugnance at heavy-handed US military tactics, including especially the use of aerial bombing on civilian targets where guerrillas were present.
Matters came to a head in March 2004 when - without even telling Britain - the Americans arrested a key lieutenant of al-Sadr and shut down his newspaper. All Iraq, including the British sector, burst into flames. General Stewart, who said, he "was trying to neutralise Sadr through the use of local Iraqis and succeeding," refused a direct US order to "conduct offensive operations" against the Sadr militia, causing a massive row which went all the way to Washington and a rare diplomatic reprimand from the US to a friendly ally.
Our documents detail the outbreak of trouble in a US-UK military relationship which has continued to deteriorate since, with many in the Pentagon feeling "let down" by the "weak" British. But ultimately, history may have shown that the Americans were more right than we were. By 2006-7, Britain's softly-softly tactics had left Basra in near-anarchy - while in Baghdad the US "surge" had brought about a significant reduction in violence.
Nevermind that
The so-called "Dutch" approach (which is largely copied from the Canadians but let the Americans not hear that) has shown to be relatively effective (but not faultless) at least in more low-populated areas. I've no idea whether it has been applied in more densely populated, urbanised areas or, if it has, how effective it has been.
Am I misunderstanding you? Because it seems to me that the European goals were the realistic and legitimate.
To be a little more specific: even if the idiot American neocons had stood back and gave full control of the occupation to European allies (including command over US occupation troops), I don't see how they could have achieved more than relative peace on the surface until a pull-out a year or two later. After which all hell would have broken loose -- and if they stayed longer, all hell would have broken loose anyway. For,
I always viewed Britain's Special Relationship as a grand delusion, and Britain as an integral part of Europe, only in denial.
Hostility between British and American military leaders revealed - Telegraph
"Despite our so-called `special relationship,' I reckon we were treated no differently to the Portuguese."
As I've mentioned previously, kings do not consult with vassals over policy. We are merely a Foreign Legion, there to do their bidding, but otherwise keep out of the way.
It is regrettable that belief in this special relationship and consequent extra clout persists in spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. As Paul Simon said;-
I am just a poor boy Though my story's seldom told I have squandered my resistance For a pocket full of mumbles such are promises All lies and jests Still a man hears what he wants to hear And disregards the rest keep to the Fen Causeway
I think it was a relevant strand to the British refusal to joining the Vietnam War.
Saldy this is now forgotten keep to the Fen Causeway
It was quite evident that the guys on the ground could see that policy was pointing in the wrong direction but they were powerless to affect it.
If only we could have had a copy of "Imperial Life in the Emerald City" before we wnet in. But the neocons wouldn't have paid attention even then. I don't hold to the conspiracy theory slant of "Shock doctrine", but it was clear that the neocons did view the enterprise in a certain piratical way as an opportunity to plunder both the Iraqi and US Treasury keep to the Fen Causeway
I don't hold to the conspiracy theory slant of "Shock doctrine", but it was clear that the neocons did view the enterprise in a certain piratical way as an opportunity to plunder both the Iraqi and US Treasury.
My British colleague soon discovered, to his utter horror, that despite the common language and Common Law, nothing about doing daily business in California was close as to what he expected: Social Security, driving license (he quoted to me: "You must drive on the pavement"), bank account, car buying, credit cards, etc... everything was foreign to him about as much as it was to me. Except that, as a non-Anglophone, I kinda expected everything to be different; he didn't at first.
He was definitely not expecting so many - and so profound - differences between the US and the UK and, least of all, to find his own experiences so similar than those of a - gasp - Frenchman. Europeans think a hundred miles is a long way. Americans think a hundred years is a long time.
America is, for a Brit, a strangely odd place. keep to the Fen Causeway
