*Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
Former French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua, sentenced to one year in prison for his role in the illegal sale of arms to Angola in the 1990s, said then president Jacques Chirac was fully aware of what was going on.
... It is not a good time to be French in Francophone Africa, except if you are a high official from Paris privately visiting a strongman's palace. As democracy slips in country after country in the region, France often quietly sides, once again, with the once-and-future autocrats. <...> French officials have discouraged scrutiny of African leaders' corruption, the fruits of which often end up in Paris. A French good-government group's campaign to expose and recover the "ill-gotten gains" of three of the most notorious leaders -- the late Omar Bongo of Gabon, Denis Sassou-Nguesso of the Congo Republic and Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea -- has been opposed by the prosecutor of the French Republic on the grounds that the group has no standing to sue, and that the facts are "ill defined." In fact, the group, Transparency International, had set out in detail the leaders' extensive luxury real-estate holdings in Paris. Last month, an appeals court in Paris agreed with the prosecutors. Reports of the luxuries to which Mr. Biya treated himself on his Paris visit "enormously shocked people," said Jean Faustin Kinyock, president of the National Human Rights League in Cameroon, and the French were seen as complicit. Analysts said that the sentiment was pervasive. "People don't like France because France isn't helping Africans freely choose their leaders," said Achille Mbembe, a political scientist and historian at the University of Witwatersrand in South Africa. "And the democratic process is blocked, practically everywhere."
<...>
French officials have discouraged scrutiny of African leaders' corruption, the fruits of which often end up in Paris. A French good-government group's campaign to expose and recover the "ill-gotten gains" of three of the most notorious leaders -- the late Omar Bongo of Gabon, Denis Sassou-Nguesso of the Congo Republic and Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea -- has been opposed by the prosecutor of the French Republic on the grounds that the group has no standing to sue, and that the facts are "ill defined."
In fact, the group, Transparency International, had set out in detail the leaders' extensive luxury real-estate holdings in Paris. Last month, an appeals court in Paris agreed with the prosecutors.
Reports of the luxuries to which Mr. Biya treated himself on his Paris visit "enormously shocked people," said Jean Faustin Kinyock, president of the National Human Rights League in Cameroon, and the French were seen as complicit.
Analysts said that the sentiment was pervasive. "People don't like France because France isn't helping Africans freely choose their leaders," said Achille Mbembe, a political scientist and historian at the University of Witwatersrand in South Africa. "And the democratic process is blocked, practically everywhere."
Germany's once-proud Social Democrats suffered an historic defeat on election day in September. Now, the party is gathered in Dresden to begin the search for answers -- and for a fresh start. But a new poll indicates the road to recovery is, if anything, getting longer. It was the kind of election result that can mark a party for years to come. In German general elections on Sept. 27, the Social Democrats -- a party with a proud history stretching all the way back to 1875 -- suffered a colossal defeat. After 11 years in government, the party received just 23 percent of the vote, its lowest result ever in post-war Germany...."We want to get together and take a critical look at ourselves," Andrea Nahles, tapped to be the party's next general secretary, told the German television station ARD this week. "There is going to be a generational shift. If the SPD wants to recover its traditional strength, then things can't remain as they are."
Germany's once-proud Social Democrats suffered an historic defeat on election day in September. Now, the party is gathered in Dresden to begin the search for answers -- and for a fresh start. But a new poll indicates the road to recovery is, if anything, getting longer.
It was the kind of election result that can mark a party for years to come. In German general elections on Sept. 27, the Social Democrats -- a party with a proud history stretching all the way back to 1875 -- suffered a colossal defeat. After 11 years in government, the party received just 23 percent of the vote, its lowest result ever in post-war Germany.
..."We want to get together and take a critical look at ourselves," Andrea Nahles, tapped to be the party's next general secretary, told the German television station ARD this week. "There is going to be a generational shift. If the SPD wants to recover its traditional strength, then things can't remain as they are."
(Nahles has been attacked by seniors within the party for being too young to rise this high.)
For many in the party, the solution is obvious -- the party must shift to the left. Calls for the SPD to renounce the Hartz IV reforms and the retirement-age increase have been myriad. A desire for the SPD to work more closely with the far-left Left Party -- long shunned due to its having grown out of the East German communist party -- has likewise made itself manifest. Indeed, the selection of Andrea Nahles to take over from Hubertus Heil as SPD general secretary -- a move expected to be confirmed by a convention vote this weekend -- was seen as a step toward the left. Nahles has long been the leader of the SPD's left wing, and has not been shy about criticizing some of the reforms her party supported.
For many in the party, the solution is obvious -- the party must shift to the left. Calls for the SPD to renounce the Hartz IV reforms and the retirement-age increase have been myriad. A desire for the SPD to work more closely with the far-left Left Party -- long shunned due to its having grown out of the East German communist party -- has likewise made itself manifest.
Indeed, the selection of Andrea Nahles to take over from Hubertus Heil as SPD general secretary -- a move expected to be confirmed by a convention vote this weekend -- was seen as a step toward the left. Nahles has long been the leader of the SPD's left wing, and has not been shy about criticizing some of the reforms her party supported.
The relationships between Romania and the Republic of Moldova start to normalise after several years of tensions that culminated with visas being introduced for Romanian citizens. On Friday, the two states will sign several bi-lateral agreements that have been postponed for years by the ex-communist regime from Chisinau. The agreements address the light traffic at the border, the intergovernmental bi-lateral agreement regarding the cross-border points between the two countries and the protocol amending the intergovernmental agreement signed in 1992 in Bucharest addressing the protection of investments.
Presidential candidate and Social Democratic Party (PSD) leader Mircea Geoana said on Friday that his private visit to Moscow this spring, about which HotNews.ro first reported this week, was aimed mainly at "normalizing" the dialogue between Romania and the Russian Federation in a period of "frozen relationship" for which he blames incumbent president Traian Basescu, Romanian news agency NewsIn reports.
It happened that a father with his children in the car was driving through a village street, when a girl ran on the street. The car braked and the girl was barely hurt. However, a gathering of relatives and neighbours thought someone was ran over, pulled the man from the car, and beat him to death.
The perpetrators were Roma, thus all wings of the Hungarian far-right seized upon the crime, in particular the then still dwarf (but now double-digits in polls...) Jobbik, with its Hungarian Guard paramilitary.
The actual legal treatment of the case faced a problem: all the accused held to an omertà. All that became known about the background was that another small girl was ran over and killed there fifteeen years earlier (a circumstance that wasn't accepted by court as reason to consider acting on impulse as mitigating factor). Still, eight were sentenced to long prison terms on first instance.
Upon second instance, some of the accused broke and changed their testmonies, but did not say enough to reveal the precise course of events -- all that became clear was that the real ringleaders were the 6th and 7th order accused, who now got life imprisonment on second term. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
The sight of Silvio Berlusconi, the controversial Italian Prime Minister, changing the law to his own benefit has become so familiar there is a risk that Italians -- and the world at large -- will accept it as normal. What is at stake, however, is not normal. In effect, critics say, he is undermining the rule of law in a Western democracy instead of upholding it. Mr Berlusconi and his supporters have this week tabled in Parliament a Bill shortening the length of criminal trials. It is, they say, a long overdue attempt to reform Italy's notoriously slow, cumbersome and Kafkaesque judicial system, in which verdicts arrive after years -- or never. But this hastily formulated measure derives from Mr Berlusconi's instruction to Niccolo Ghedini, his personal lawyer -- who, this being Italy, is also a parliamentary deputy framing the law -- to find a way to save him from imminent corruption trials, after a ruling by the Constitutional Court last month overturning his self-awarded immunity from prosecution.
The sight of Silvio Berlusconi, the controversial Italian Prime Minister, changing the law to his own benefit has become so familiar there is a risk that Italians -- and the world at large -- will accept it as normal. What is at stake, however, is not normal.
In effect, critics say, he is undermining the rule of law in a Western democracy instead of upholding it.
Mr Berlusconi and his supporters have this week tabled in Parliament a Bill shortening the length of criminal trials. It is, they say, a long overdue attempt to reform Italy's notoriously slow, cumbersome and Kafkaesque judicial system, in which verdicts arrive after years -- or never.
But this hastily formulated measure derives from Mr Berlusconi's instruction to Niccolo Ghedini, his personal lawyer -- who, this being Italy, is also a parliamentary deputy framing the law -- to find a way to save him from imminent corruption trials, after a ruling by the Constitutional Court last month overturning his self-awarded immunity from prosecution.
I find the word "Kafkaesque" not appropriate to describe the judicial system. It is far more appropriate a qualification for Berlusconi's devastating laws which the judiciary are to apply. The judiciary is by no means without fault in many cases, but the increasing alienation of the body politic towards the judiciary is largely due to a ceaseless hate campaign by B and his government as well as legislation that is, to put it bluntly, gravely incoherent, largely written by B's close inner circle which holds the republic in contempt and often are of avowed fascist allegiance, such as his closest collaborators, Ghedini or Longo.
Some 18 ad personam laws (this will be the 19th) perpetrated by B's governments have undermined the efficacy of the judiciary in the past fifteen years. Further, his various ministers of Justice, Treasury and the Interior have systematically deprived the police and the judiciary of manpower, financial resources and such simple instruments or materials (paper, computer, electricity, gasoline)necessary to investigate and pursue crime. Judiciary halls often close at 2 PM for lack of personnel. Investigative judges rely on their own meagre resources at times to supplement their work at home or resort to town cops or postmen to carry on investigations.
Coupling propaganda and siege tactics with a law obliging judges to hand down decisions within two years is outrageous. Senator Anna Finocchiara's gesture the other day of hurling the bill against the Senate wall sums up the exasperation with B's contemptuous disregard for the republic and its institutions.
As far as a solution for Italy's judiciary problems goes, very simple measures may be taken: One, the statute of limitations ceases to tick away once a trial starts; Two: If a person is found guilty he immediately begins to serve his sentence, regardless if there is an appeal. What is plain sense in most mature democracies would have revolutionary consequences in Italy.
In conclusion, the core nature of Justice is to produce publically shared truths through motivated decisions and sentences. In order to avoid appearing in court or even being tried, Berlusconi has used his power throughout his careers both as a corrupt businessman and a politician to denigrate and delegitimize the judiciary branch. He has managed in his career to control the executive and the legislative branches of the state and the media. The only power that has still remained formally independent is the judiciary branch. Once that has succumbed, Europe will once again foster a totalitarian paranoid Truth in its womb.
The European Union refuses to give Ukraine a shot at EU accession, thereby leaving the country without any bright prospects and slowing its stabilisation. This will go down in history as a huge mistake, foresees the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. It is widely mooted that political chaos reigns in Ukraine. What goes unmentioned in these appraisals, however, is that the Ukraine's principal Western partner, the European Union, is partly to blame for keeping the country unmoored and adrift with no political destination in sight. Hardly anyone would deny that the prospect of EU accession went a long way toward expediting the stabilisation and democratisation of Central Europe after the Soviet bloc fell apart. Precious few European politicians, however, are prepared to publicly pronounce the obvious corollary for the Ukraine. If participation in the European integration process, the prospect of and negotiations toward EU accession, had positive repercussions from Tallinn to Dublin, then the Ukraine, if denied even a shot at future EU membership, remains at sea and sorely deprived of the beneficial beacons that lit the way for its western neighbours.
The European Union refuses to give Ukraine a shot at EU accession, thereby leaving the country without any bright prospects and slowing its stabilisation. This will go down in history as a huge mistake, foresees the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
It is widely mooted that political chaos reigns in Ukraine. What goes unmentioned in these appraisals, however, is that the Ukraine's principal Western partner, the European Union, is partly to blame for keeping the country unmoored and adrift with no political destination in sight.
Hardly anyone would deny that the prospect of EU accession went a long way toward expediting the stabilisation and democratisation of Central Europe after the Soviet bloc fell apart. Precious few European politicians, however, are prepared to publicly pronounce the obvious corollary for the Ukraine. If participation in the European integration process, the prospect of and negotiations toward EU accession, had positive repercussions from Tallinn to Dublin, then the Ukraine, if denied even a shot at future EU membership, remains at sea and sorely deprived of the beneficial beacons that lit the way for its western neighbours.
[Europe.Is.Doomed™ Alert]
Seriously, how stupid are they? It doesn't take rocket science to see that the contry is hopelessly corrupt, and totally blocked by the conflict between the 3 factions that fight it out in Kiev without one (or even two) ever taking over.
You can't offer EU membership to a country which is absolutely not ready for it - and of which large parts don't want it. And you can't offer it to a country which has 2,000km of completely open borders with Russia and Belarus, and an economy largely integrated with, or dominated by, Russian oligarchs... In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
Russia IS a European country, much more so than Turkey. Total lack of imagination regarding a way of incorporating Russia into the European system is breathtaking. Neither current Russian elite nor Brussels self-styled keepers of "Europeanness" are serving our respective people well. Brussels is more guilty - the invitation comes from them, after all.
Welcome to a word of tails wagging the dog.
Oh boy, but do they have plenty of other choices for Other... maybe with the exception of the Baltics. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
For Poland, this is Partitions, and two out of three empires participating are now inside the EU together with them. And they actually escaped East to the West... so using Germans as the Other would be very problematic.
Many Czechs actually believe that the best things they got as a nation were brought in by Germans. Again, hard to use them as the Other. And on and on I could go...
If you want to, try reading Uses of the Other by Iver Neumann (it's extremely theoretical, be careful).
Yet, it was used regularly by the parties in the previous Polish government and the media associated with them [including, what a cynical hypocrisy, a tabloid owned by Axel Springer Verlag]. Polish Euroscepticism is in no small part Germanophobia. On this insane Right, there is substantial anti-semitism, too.
Many Czechs actually believe that the best things they got as a nation were brought in by Germans.
But, there is also the issue of the Sudeten Germans (throwing them out was a very concrete act of nation building, but so was the mythology of resistant Czechs and colaborating Sudeten-Germans built to support it 'morally'), the issue of on-going conflict with refugee organisations and Bavaria and Austria ('foreign meddling'), the Temelín conflict with Austria (which, the way I read it, was seen in the Czech Republic as one about Austria trying to lord over Czechs, too), and German multinationals buying up national symbol companies. In addition, for The Other, there are Gypsies... *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
And of course, using gypsies as the official Other is non-PC. It still happens, but gets rarer and rarer.
Why would that count? In the older generations, there are people with different views too (even if most of them erx-communists). For the younger generations, views of Russia might be even more extreme because they know only the nationalist-coloured school history book/anniversary rememberence/domestic movie/party propaganda version of the previous era. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
For some reason Russia is not part of the "Neighbourhood Policy" but EU-Russia relations are on a par with EU-US or EU-China relations.
Russia is already part of the "European System" - it is, most importantly (in particular, as regards "European values"), part of the Council of Europe (unlike Belarus). This is because it is a European Country. Given that, I see no point in the EU lecturing Russia on "European Values" either especially since nothing in being done about (say) Berlusconi.
Russia is not part of the European Economic Area. Could it be, and under what terms? One feature of the EEA is that the EU dictates terms to the non-EU members (they have to adopt the EU acquis to a large extent) and collects a market access levy from them. Adopting the EU acquis is also a requirement for EU accession. Again, I don't see the EU dictating legislation to Russia.
The EU doesn't invite countries to apply for membership. They do on their own, and then the EU agrees (or not) to open membership negotiations. It would be interesting to see what the EU would do if Russia decided to apply for EU membership. Again, I don't see Russia applying.
But, by the same reasoning, I don't know why Ukraine couldn't apply for EU membership and start negotiating. After all, the EU has opened negotiations with Turkey and is dictating legal reforms to it without (IMHO) any real prospects of actual accession in the next 10 to 15 years, and lots of noises from the Christian Democrats about keeping Turkey out by fiat.
If and when Ukraine decides through its own internal political process to apply for EU membership there's nothing the EU can do to prevent them from doing so. Same goes with Russia. En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
EEA is problematic, given the dictat. Russia is resisting it in some areas (holding out on the Energy Treaty and Transit Protocol but giving up on other things - Kyoto Treaty signing comes into mind immediately, even though it wasn't part of <it>acquis</it>. Or Gazprom's giving up no-resale clause in its contracts with Western Union customers (after all, it's 51% state owned). So, there is a room for negotiations, but Russia expects for flexibility than the EU is ready to present, perhaps.
EU does invite the countries for membership, if informally. I was not talking in strictly legalistic terms, but we all understand no application would be forthcoming if non-zero probability of acceptance were not perceived. In the Russian case the probability is perceived as zero at this point, thus no application. Perhaps, that is as well - can you imagine the number of heart attacks among recent entrants' politicians if this happened?
I have read recently that Ukraine wanted to submit an application in early 2010. Perhaps this article is one of the shots in the game around the signal to be sent to Ukraine before this actually happens? After all, rejecting an application and even dragging the feet (as with Turkey) is politically inconvenient, given all the lofty talk on EU being open. Better not to have an application in the first place, at least for some leaders. At the same time, normal politicians would not like to look like losers submitting a dead on the arrival application, which makes the process an extremely interesting game to watch. Definitely neither Medvedev nor Putin would make such an error.
The EU offers our neighbours a privileged relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development). The ENP goes beyond existing relationships to offer a deeper political relationship and economic integration. The level of ambition of the relationship will depend on the extent to which these values are shared. The ENP remains distinct from the process of enlargement although it does not prejudge, for European neighbours, how their relationship with the EU may develop in future, in accordance with Treaty provisions. The European Neighbourhood Policy applies to the EU's immediate neighbours by land or sea - Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. Although Russia is also a neighbour of the EU, our relations are instead developed through a Strategic Partnership covering four "common spaces".
The European Neighbourhood Policy applies to the EU's immediate neighbours by land or sea - Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. Although Russia is also a neighbour of the EU, our relations are instead developed through a Strategic Partnership covering four "common spaces".
Personally, I would love to see the four freedoms (but crucially the freedom of movement for individuals) in a space encompassing both the EU and Russia. I'm just a little unclear as to what form this would take given that EEA (let alone EU) membership for Russia is probably not realistic. En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
Maybe the EU doesn't encourage an application from Ukraine because Russia wouldn't like it? Would the Eastern, Russophone half of Ukraine like an appication for EU membership any more than an aplication for NATO membership?
In the Russian case the probability is perceived as zero at this point, thus no application. Perhaps, that is as well - can you imagine the number of heart attacks among recent entrants' politicians if this happened?
Even in Croatia, due to perceived domineering behaviour by the EU or its member states, a large fraction of the population is sceptical of EU entry, and this despite a broad consensus at the political level. This makes EU membership an 'elite' project for Croatia, and this is for a country of 4M people which is deeply in the EU's sphere of influence. I cannot imagine the Russian people or the Russian establishment entertaining the notion of EU accession.
This is entirely different from the question of whether Russia is "European", which nobody in their sane mind doubts (being facetious I'd point out that Russia is in UEFA and Eurovision - I mentioned the Council of Europe earlier) and which is realised daily in contacts among private citizens. En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
Maybe the EU doesn't encourage an application from Ukraine because Russia wouldn't like it?
In many discussions, Russian big businesses and their consultants quietly hope for some form of a Ukrainian EU entry, because that would mean backdoor entry for the Russian capital which owns a sizable chunk of Ukrainian one (actually, this is really cross-ownership, links go both ways).
Would the Eastern, Russophone half of Ukraine like an appication for EU membership any more than an aplication for NATO membership?
Overall, Ukraine likes EU much better than NATO: see this graph for EU entry and this one for NATO entry. Regional split on EU entry question is available only in Ukrainian, here. In the last figure, the question is "Should Ukraine enter the EU?", yellow bar is Yes and grey No, lines from top to bottom are for East, South, Center, and West.
Yes, of course the West is more enthusiastic and East less so, but the EU entry is often sold as a package with NATO. It also might mean in respondent's mind that a union with Russia and Belarus is excluded by the EU entry. This book (regretfully, only short excepts and only in Russian are available here) states that 50% of population is for "Eastern" foreign vector, 18% for "Western" and 19% for developing on its own, with "Eastern" dynamics rather stable over time. However, these orientations are not exclusive, as 31% of those wishing to see Ukraine in a union with Russia and Belarus won't mind EU entry, and full 43% of those for EU entry would like to see the union.
So, the conclusion there seems to be: if EU entry would be posed as something that does not exclude close cooperation with Russia, it would be rather easy to generate support of population on 50%+ level.
I mean, seriously, what fraction of the population would be in favour of EU membership, and what fraction of the Duma?
This was part of the thinking behind proposals to have the Kaliningrad District inside the EU (or at least Schengen) before the accession of Poland and the Baltics, too. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
The very first bar plot is [Russians'] yes answers over time, which started from 59% in Mar 01, peaked at 73% in June 03, and fell down to 30% in Sep 08. The number opposed didn't move so dramatically, from 19 to 10 to 27% today.
As long as De Gaulle was President of France, the EU rejected UK applications for membership. En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
And bringing in Ukraine into the EU makes no sense, right now. In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
The problem is that the signal was supposed to come in much earlier, when totally ignoring Russian issue was possible. Now it might be too late for that beneficial effect.
I'm waiting anxiously for them to explain how Ukraine won't become a Bulgaria problem on crack. Not. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
Web search giant Google faces a court case in Switzerland because of privacy concerns over its Street View service.The application allows a 360-degree view of any street-level location. "Numerous faces and vehicle number plates are not made sufficiently unrecognisable," said data protection commissioner Hanspeter Thuer. Google said it was disappointed by the move. The firm says it is sure that Street View is legal in Switzerland and will "vigorously contest" the case.
Web search giant Google faces a court case in Switzerland because of privacy concerns over its Street View service.
The application allows a 360-degree view of any street-level location.
"Numerous faces and vehicle number plates are not made sufficiently unrecognisable," said data protection commissioner Hanspeter Thuer.
Google said it was disappointed by the move. The firm says it is sure that Street View is legal in Switzerland and will "vigorously contest" the case.
... What makes Germany's unwillingness to aim for the top jobs in these two organizations so surprising is that it could have them for the asking. "Germany could get any position it wanted here in NATO," the NATO diplomat said. A veteran E.U. diplomat agreed: "If Merkel was serious about naming someone, that person would get the top job. No question about it." No German has led the top European institution for 42 years, and the last time a German headed NATO was 15 years ago. Apart from heading the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, Germany is also noticeably absent from the leadership of other major international organizations, including the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the International Energy Agency and the United Nations (where at least a German heads the Environment Program). <...> Perhaps Germany does not want these leadership roles, said Daniela Schwarzer, Europe expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. "Maybe the Germans see themselves as moderators, not as leaders." With 27 countries now in the E.U., it is becoming increasingly difficult even for the best moderators to reach decisions that have substance. In that case, the new E.U. posts might not be so attractive. "Whether the new posts will be influential depends on the governments' willingness to make them so," Ms. Schwarzer added. Other analysts are more critical of the German approach. "Germany has become very inward looking," said the E.U. diplomat, who attends all the bloc's major meetings and summit talks and sees the role Germans play. "If Merkel really cared about Europe, she would send better people and support stronger candidates," added the diplomat. ...
... What makes Germany's unwillingness to aim for the top jobs in these two organizations so surprising is that it could have them for the asking. "Germany could get any position it wanted here in NATO," the NATO diplomat said.
A veteran E.U. diplomat agreed: "If Merkel was serious about naming someone, that person would get the top job. No question about it." No German has led the top European institution for 42 years, and the last time a German headed NATO was 15 years ago.
Apart from heading the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, Germany is also noticeably absent from the leadership of other major international organizations, including the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the International Energy Agency and the United Nations (where at least a German heads the Environment Program).
Perhaps Germany does not want these leadership roles, said Daniela Schwarzer, Europe expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. "Maybe the Germans see themselves as moderators, not as leaders." With 27 countries now in the E.U., it is becoming increasingly difficult even for the best moderators to reach decisions that have substance. In that case, the new E.U. posts might not be so attractive. "Whether the new posts will be influential depends on the governments' willingness to make them so," Ms. Schwarzer added.
Other analysts are more critical of the German approach. "Germany has become very inward looking," said the E.U. diplomat, who attends all the bloc's major meetings and summit talks and sees the role Germans play. "If Merkel really cared about Europe, she would send better people and support stronger candidates," added the diplomat. ...
... Under the Lisbon Treaty, which was completely ratified Nov. 3, each of the member states will continue to have a seat at the European Commission. But because the new foreign policy chief will also be a vice president of the European Commission, he will also be his nation's sole appointee there. France has so far not put forward potential contenders from the center-left for the foreign policy job. Germany has already nominated as its European commissioner Günther Oettinger, who is from the center-right and has no substantial foreign policy experience. One possible compromise would have involved the British foreign secretary, David Miliband, being selected as the foreign policy chief, complementing the choice of Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy of Belgium, a member of a center-right party, as president. But Mr. Miliband appeared to rule himself out and, according to diplomats, one reason that Britain was reluctant to propose him for the post was a concern that his selection would then clear the way for France and Germany to get key economic positions in the European Commission. Of particular concern to the British is the prospect of France winning the internal market portfolio, according to a European Union diplomat. This is viewed as a vital job, because it oversees efforts to maintain a level playing field in the bloc's internal market and because it also includes financial regulation, an area certain to be more important in the aftermath of the financial crisis. However, some diplomats believe that, if Britain wins some safeguards on economic policy, it might be prepared to put forward as foreign policy chief its former European commissioner, Peter Mandelson, or even prevail on Mr. Miliband to change his mind.
... Under the Lisbon Treaty, which was completely ratified Nov. 3, each of the member states will continue to have a seat at the European Commission. But because the new foreign policy chief will also be a vice president of the European Commission, he will also be his nation's sole appointee there. France has so far not put forward potential contenders from the center-left for the foreign policy job. Germany has already nominated as its European commissioner Günther Oettinger, who is from the center-right and has no substantial foreign policy experience.
One possible compromise would have involved the British foreign secretary, David Miliband, being selected as the foreign policy chief, complementing the choice of Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy of Belgium, a member of a center-right party, as president. But Mr. Miliband appeared to rule himself out and, according to diplomats, one reason that Britain was reluctant to propose him for the post was a concern that his selection would then clear the way for France and Germany to get key economic positions in the European Commission.
Of particular concern to the British is the prospect of France winning the internal market portfolio, according to a European Union diplomat.
This is viewed as a vital job, because it oversees efforts to maintain a level playing field in the bloc's internal market and because it also includes financial regulation, an area certain to be more important in the aftermath of the financial crisis. However, some diplomats believe that, if Britain wins some safeguards on economic policy, it might be prepared to put forward as foreign policy chief its former European commissioner, Peter Mandelson, or even prevail on Mr. Miliband to change his mind.
