Backtracking from a widely criticized assertion over the weekend, the secretary of homeland security, Janet Napolitano, said in a televised interview on Monday that the thwarted bombing of a Detroit-bound airliner on Christmas represented a failure of the nation's aviation security system, not a success. Ms. Napolitano said on the "Today" program on NBC that her remark on Sunday that the system worked had been taken out of context. "Our system did not work in this instance," she said on the program. "No one is happy or satisfied with that. An extensive review is under way." As criticism mounted that security lapses had led to a brush with disaster, President Obama on Sunday ordered a review of the two major planks of the aviation security system -- the creation of watch lists and the use of detection equipment at airport checkpoints. Some members of Congress urgently questioned why, eight years after the Sept. 11 attacks, security measures still cannot keep makeshift bombs off airliners.
Ms. Napolitano said on the "Today" program on NBC that her remark on Sunday that the system worked had been taken out of context. "Our system did not work in this instance," she said on the program. "No one is happy or satisfied with that. An extensive review is under way."
As criticism mounted that security lapses had led to a brush with disaster, President Obama on Sunday ordered a review of the two major planks of the aviation security system -- the creation of watch lists and the use of detection equipment at airport checkpoints. Some members of Congress urgently questioned why, eight years after the Sept. 11 attacks, security measures still cannot keep makeshift bombs off airliners.
Following this week's thwarted terror attack on a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit, officials across Europe are debating airport security standards. What, politicians and police are asking, can be done to stop the next Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab from boarding a trans-Atlantic flight? Over the Christmas holiday, Nigerian national Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to ignite an explosive device onboard a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit. Luckily, a combination of factors -- the explosive device did not light properly, Abdulmutallab was overpowered by passengers and cabin crew -- meant that the would-be terrorist failed. The plane, carrying around 300 passengers, landed safely and police detained the 23-year-old suspect, who will be prosecuted in the US. The aftermath of the incident has seen security services in all the countries the suspect entered asking themselves: How did he get through airport security? "That is clearly an extremely serious incident," European Commission spokesperson Mark English told the German news agency DPA. "As soon as the investigations are complete, we will draw our own conclusions and act accordingly."
Over the Christmas holiday, Nigerian national Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to ignite an explosive device onboard a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit. Luckily, a combination of factors -- the explosive device did not light properly, Abdulmutallab was overpowered by passengers and cabin crew -- meant that the would-be terrorist failed. The plane, carrying around 300 passengers, landed safely and police detained the 23-year-old suspect, who will be prosecuted in the US. The aftermath of the incident has seen security services in all the countries the suspect entered asking themselves: How did he get through airport security?
"That is clearly an extremely serious incident," European Commission spokesperson Mark English told the German news agency DPA. "As soon as the investigations are complete, we will draw our own conclusions and act accordingly."
Amsterdam airport is not using the 17 special security equiptment it has had since 2007. A millimetre wave scan would have detected the explosive powder Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab set off on board Northwest flight 253 to Detroit on Friday. The radio waves scan people's bodies and reveal anything they wear underneath their clothes. The millimetre wave technology security scans are still in the test phase, Schiphol spokesperson Mirjam Snoerwang told NRC Handelsblad. "European regulations tell us we can only put people through them on a voluntary basis. And objections have been raised with regards to privacy," she said. Citing anonymous FBI sources, American media said Abdulmutallab carried 80 grammes of pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN), possibly inside a condom, in his underwear. PETN was also used by Richard Reid, known as `the shoe bomber', in an unsuccessful attempt to blow up an American Airlines airplane from Paris to Miami in December 2001.
The millimetre wave technology security scans are still in the test phase, Schiphol spokesperson Mirjam Snoerwang told NRC Handelsblad. "European regulations tell us we can only put people through them on a voluntary basis. And objections have been raised with regards to privacy," she said.
Citing anonymous FBI sources, American media said Abdulmutallab carried 80 grammes of pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN), possibly inside a condom, in his underwear. PETN was also used by Richard Reid, known as `the shoe bomber', in an unsuccessful attempt to blow up an American Airlines airplane from Paris to Miami in December 2001.
Europeans flying to US airports in the wake of the failed Christmas Day aeroplane bomb attempt are facing minor disruptions due to extra security measures. Travellers have reported delays of between one and two hours following the introduction of full body searches for all passengers and more stringent checks on hand-luggage, especially liquids, such as baby milk. Some airlines have prevented passengers from carrying any more than one bag on board, including duty-free purchases.
Travellers have reported delays of between one and two hours following the introduction of full body searches for all passengers and more stringent checks on hand-luggage, especially liquids, such as baby milk.
Some airlines have prevented passengers from carrying any more than one bag on board, including duty-free purchases.
Terrorism is rare, far rarer than many people think. It's rare because very few people want to commit acts of terrorism, and executing a terrorist plot is much harder than television makes it appear. The best defenses against terrorism are largely invisible: investigation, intelligence, and emergency response. But even these are less effective at keeping us safe than our social and political policies, both at home and abroad. However, our elected leaders don't think this way: they are far more likely to implement security theater against movie-plot threats. A movie-plot threat is an overly specific attack scenario. Whether it's terrorists with crop dusters, terrorists contaminating the milk supply, or terrorists attacking the Olympics, specific stories affect our emotions more intensely than mere data does. Stories are what we fear. It's not just hypothetical stories: terrorists flying planes into buildings, terrorists with bombs in their shoes or in their water bottles, and terrorists with guns and bombs waging a co-ordinated attack against a city are even scarier movie-plot threats because they actually happened. Security theater refers to security measures that make people feel more secure without doing anything to actually improve their security. An example: the photo ID checks that have sprung up in office buildings. No-one has ever explained why verifying that someone has a photo ID provides any actual security, but it looks like security to have a uniformed guard-for-hire looking at ID cards. Airport-security examples include the National Guard troops stationed at US airports in the months after 9/11 -- their guns had no bullets. The US colour-coded system of threat levels, the pervasive harassment of photographers, and the metal detectors that are increasingly common in hotels and office buildings since the Mumbai terrorist attacks, are additional examples.
A movie-plot threat is an overly specific attack scenario. Whether it's terrorists with crop dusters, terrorists contaminating the milk supply, or terrorists attacking the Olympics, specific stories affect our emotions more intensely than mere data does. Stories are what we fear. It's not just hypothetical stories: terrorists flying planes into buildings, terrorists with bombs in their shoes or in their water bottles, and terrorists with guns and bombs waging a co-ordinated attack against a city are even scarier movie-plot threats because they actually happened.
Security theater refers to security measures that make people feel more secure without doing anything to actually improve their security. An example: the photo ID checks that have sprung up in office buildings. No-one has ever explained why verifying that someone has a photo ID provides any actual security, but it looks like security to have a uniformed guard-for-hire looking at ID cards. Airport-security examples include the National Guard troops stationed at US airports in the months after 9/11 -- their guns had no bullets. The US colour-coded system of threat levels, the pervasive harassment of photographers, and the metal detectors that are increasingly common in hotels and office buildings since the Mumbai terrorist attacks, are additional examples.
