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The function of the PPIF is to sell the state-owned toxic assets to the private sector at the private sector's price, and make up the shortfall with public money?

Why the need for this separate fund, once the banks are nationalised?

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Wed Feb 11th, 2009 at 06:39:33 AM EST
[ Parent ]
My question would be, why the need for the banks to sell the toxic assets after their balance sheets have been "buffered" with the public injection after the audit? The fact sheet says:
Public-Private Investment Fund: One aspect of a full arsenal approach is the need to provide greater means for financial institutions to cleanse their balance sheets of what are often referred to as "legacy" assets. Many proposals designed to achieve this are complicated both by their sole reliance on public purchasing and the difficulties in pricing assets. Working together in partnership with the FDIC and the Federal Reserve, the Treasury Department will initiate a Public-Private Investment Fund that takes a new approach.
The "stress test" is supposed to have determined
whether major financial institutions have the capital necessary to continue lending and to absorb the potential losses that could result from a more severe decline in the economy than projected
and, if they don't have that capital, to
While banks will be encouraged to access private markets to raise any additional capital needed to establish this buffer, a financial institution that has undergone a comprehensive "stress test" will have access to a Treasury provided "capital buffer" to help absorb losses and serve as a bridge to receiving increased private capital.
Once this buffer is in place to "help absorb losses", why is it needed to get rid of those assets?

I think the (scary) answer is that the US Treasury believes securitisation is a great idea and should continue

While the intricacies of secondary markets and securitization - the bundling together and selling of loans - may be complex, they account for almost half of the credit going to Main Street as well as Wall Street. When banks making loans for small businesses, commercial real estate or autos are able to bundle and sell those loans into a vibrant and liquid secondary market, it instantly recycles money back to financial institutions to make additional loans to other worthy borrowers. When those markets freeze up, the impact on lending for consumers and businesses - small and large - can be devastating. Unable to sell loans into secondary markets, lenders freeze up, leading those seeking credit like car loans to face exorbitant rates.
I am not so sure that banks should be allowed to bundle loans and sell them off. Banks create money when they make a loan. That's a privilege and that's why they are regulated. IMHO you shouldn't be able to sell a loan to an unregulated entity (i.e., to a non-bank).

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Feb 11th, 2009 at 07:05:25 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Banks create money when they make a loan. That's a privilege and that's why they are regulated.
Moreover, they are regulated because otherwise the monetary authorities lose control of money creation.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Feb 11th, 2009 at 07:13:56 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Your question is another expression of the concern that led to mine: if the aim Geithner is pursuing is backdoor nationalisation (and I have no problem understanding that he isn't going to go yelling swearwords like nationalisation all over the place), then the audit is a handy means to that end.

But it's hard to see the compatibility of that with the <$1tn PPIF. Once the insolvent banks are taken under public control (involving capital injection, or following capital injection aka "buffer", I don't quite get), the government can choose what it wants to do with compromised assets, including keep them on the books.

In other words, what's the use of the PPIF, if backdoor nationalisation is indeed the aim?

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Wed Feb 11th, 2009 at 07:47:03 AM EST
[ Parent ]
is who pays for all the losses from the toxic assets. It's one thing to identify how much the losses are (ie finding willing outside investors to buy them), and another to allocate the losses - remeber that these are potnetial losses, not realsied ones, and they may end up being higher or lower:

  • one part of the allocation is the price at which assets are sold: if high enough, it means the buyers are taking some of the risk; if low, it means it is fully borne by the sellers

  • then the main allocation is the loss between the banks and the State entity which backs the scheme up, and inside the banks, between shareholders (already largely wiped out), preferred lenders (including the government, form previous capital injections), bondholders/senior creditors;

  • note that there can be a separate allocation of any potential upside as well, which will have significant depending on the price agreed to above.


In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Wed Feb 11th, 2009 at 08:20:29 AM EST
[ Parent ]
You only need to realise the losses by selling the assets if you want to open up room in the balance sheets for more lending (sell off the bad loans so you can give out more loans).

So stabilizing the banks won't solve the credit squeeze. It will just stabilize the financial system. Which is no mean feat, but still only a partial solution to part of the problem.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Feb 11th, 2009 at 10:08:38 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Stabilisation is needed in the interbank market for normal lending to re-start. Right now, banks do not trust one another, and thus do not fund one another.

Cleaning up banks will unclog several basic functions of the banking world which are very necessary and are still seriously constrained right now.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Wed Feb 11th, 2009 at 10:27:30 AM EST
[ Parent ]
But is this really the best of all possible ways to clean up the banks?

Or at least, to clean up the banking functions which they're supposed to perform - which may not be the same thing.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Wed Feb 11th, 2009 at 06:18:40 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Yes. But if nationalisation is Geithner's aim (as you too seem to be claiming), then where is the need for this "State entity" (aka PPIF)?

It is going to take a lot of time for this entity to get set up and find willing private partners and, together with them (or thanks to their superior market know-how), analyse the often very complex vehicles involved.

Meanwhile, an audit is going to estimate the banks' exposure to bad stuff. (How that is to be done convincingly without evaluating assets I don't see). There will then be an injection of a capital "buffer", and/or nationalisation (according to the Trojan Horse theory). This may well occur well before the PPIF has got far in its price-setting and allocation tasks. What use will it then be, what will be its role?

I think that if major American banks are nationalised, that will be because it becomes inevitable, not because this unclear, confused communication from Geithner masks a cunning plan to reach that goal without Wall Street seeing it coming.

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Wed Feb 11th, 2009 at 10:13:57 AM EST
[ Parent ]
it is not necessarily by Geithner. A theory I was told is apparently making the rounds in Brussels is that he is being set up as a goat, ie his plan will fail, and will make it politically possible to go for a more radical plan. Some people in Brussels seem to think he won't be around in a few months' time.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Wed Feb 11th, 2009 at 10:29:19 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I wouldn't be at all surprised that he should disappear within a few months.

But I'm not impressed by the very-cunning behind-the-scenes plan explanation. Once Obama's main project for dealing with an urgent financial crisis has failed, I don't quite see what extra leeway to introduce more radical policy he'll have gained.

We shall see.

by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Wed Feb 11th, 2009 at 11:29:08 AM EST
[ Parent ]
It's a nice theory - but why set up someone to fail? There would have to be a political advantage of the 'We tried it your way - now let's try my way' kind.

What evidence is there that Obama works like that, or has ever worked like that?

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Wed Feb 11th, 2009 at 06:21:40 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Having Watched the Iraq war, I'm sure that would result in, "you havent tried it our way for long enough" as a response till the next presidential  election where he would loose as the recovery would be perpetually round the next corner.

Any idiot can face a crisis - it's day to day living that wears you out.
by ceebs (ceebs (at) eurotrib (dot) com) on Wed Feb 11th, 2009 at 08:44:15 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Concerning the losses on the assets.

Let the Chinese exchange (essentially) worthless pieces of paper (US IOUs) for the properties.  The US declares that we put one over on them (Those stupid Chinese!) and the Chinese have a peaceful invasion of the US.

EVERYBODY WINS!!! (Throw confetti here)

In the end, might makes right. Nothing has changed since the caveman.

by THE Twank (yatta blah blah @ blah.com) on Wed Feb 11th, 2009 at 10:34:47 AM EST
[ Parent ]
But it's hard to see the compatibility of that with the <$1tn PPIF. Once the insolvent banks are taken under public control (involving capital injection, or following capital injection aka "buffer", I don't quite get), the government can choose what it wants to do with compromised assets, including keep them on the books.
I think the point is that the "capital injection" will not be nationalisation yet because it will be debt (admittedly, convertible to equity), not equity. As such, there will be no public control.

So the banks will be stabilised with a convertible loan. Then the plan is that they'll try to sell off the toxic (um, "legacy" seems to be the new term) assets so the banks can lend again. They'll also try to get the asset-backed-security market going again to kick-start securitisation. What will happen if an when these attempts fail is anyone's guess.

I think it is necessary to stabilize the existing "bad" banks so that their spasms stop causing seizures in the broader economy.

Restarting the flow of credit is a different thing. Apart from the contradiction inherent in saying everyone is indebted beyond their means and immediately laying out a plan to start lending again, there is the fundamental problem that the securitisation mechanism involves selling loans to non-bank entities which are not required to have regulatory capital to cover the risk of default and so should possibly not be allowed to actually buy a loan. Hopefully Geithner doesn't intend for the stabilised banks to start creating SIV's and off-balance-sheet "conduits" again.

So, once the banks are stabilised I think there will still be a credit crisis in the "real economy". I am not quite sure how to deal with that. Also, after a debt binge there must be a monetary contraction unless the debt is inflated away. So it seems to me that a few months from now an expansion of unemployment benefits and of employment through public investment will still be necessary.

Somebody sitting on a large pile of cash could decide to set up a new private bank and start lending from it. There's not going to be much competition from the old banks, and apparently also not from direct government lending.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Feb 11th, 2009 at 09:51:16 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Excellent comment. But the notion that Geithner is cunningly aiming at nationalisation is (it seems to me) going further and further adrift the more we discuss this.
by afew (afew(a in a circle)eurotrib_dot_com) on Wed Feb 11th, 2009 at 10:21:31 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Yes, you're right.

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Feb 11th, 2009 at 10:22:11 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Banks are not lending right now for two reasons:
  • they have liquidity problems, because the market is closed, because banks do'nt trust one another (for good reason);
  • they are risk adverse, and see the recession as a reason to restrict lending anyway;

Solving the banking crisis will reduce the acuteness of the first one, but will do little for the second, which is set to worsen.

So we may switch one credit crunch for another...

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Wed Feb 11th, 2009 at 10:31:47 AM EST
[ Parent ]
But the second credit crunch is amenable to standard Keynesian shock therapy...

Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Feb 11th, 2009 at 11:03:23 AM EST
[ Parent ]

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