My understanding the airfields were built by Britain in the 1930s in reaction to Germany's rearmament.
I'm curious to read a source explaining how the airfields in the south of England were built to defend against French air attack. I've somehow missed that.
Worse yet was the RAF threat concept. In Europe in the early postwar years, only France had a large air force. The danger from democratic France was negligible, as both nations needed each other to preserve peace. But RAF Chief Trenchard needed a threat to justify a significant build-up of his service (similarly, the U.S. Navy's war plans conjectured a worst case scenario of an attack by an alliance of Japan and Britain, a combination no one seriously contemplated). Sadly, the RAF began to act as if the French threat was real. It built air bases facing France, and it specified limited-range bombers capable of hitting nearby Paris.
Here are some excerpts in support:
Excerpts from pages 5-6:
The political event in the early 1920s of most relevance to the subject of this book was the worsening of diplomatic relations with France in 1922. In the course of discussions on the 'Continental Air Menace', Lord Balfour commented: Day after day, night after night, the capital of the Empire would be subject to an unremitting bombardment of a kind which no city effectively acting as the military, naval and administrative centre of a country engaged in a life and death struggle, has ever had to endure." Concern over the size of the French Air Force led to the decision to strengthen the RAF, for it had been much reduced in size after the end of the 1914-1918 war. There followed two Home Defence Expansion Schemes. That of 1922 for 23 squadrons was soon superseded by the better known 1923 scheme for 52 squadrons... The Salisbury Committee's term of reference were to enquire into the cooperation and correlation between the Army, Navy and Air Force, and inter alia, into 'the standard to be aimed at for defining the strength of the Air Force for purposes of home and imperial defense'. The Committee issued an interim report in June 1923 which included the recommendation that British air must include Home Defence Air Force of sufficient strength adequately to protect us against air attack by the strongest air force within striking distance of this country. The Cabinet endorsed the Salisbury Committee's recommendations... the Air Staff later argued that it was based upon a assessment of the threat. They explained to the Committee of Imperial Defence that 'The object is to attain, and maintain, approximate numerical equality with the French Independent Striking Force'. The justification for this was that At the present time France is the only power which maintains a powerful air force within striking distance of Great Britain. The Estimated potentiality of the French air force, therefore, is used as a basis for calculating the air defense measures necessary for this country. We will see that this consideration shaped the Air Staff's views on operational requirements, and on airfield location, long after any thought that war with France was conceivable, because some basis for defence planning was required...
Day after day, night after night, the capital of the Empire would be subject to an unremitting bombardment of a kind which no city effectively acting as the military, naval and administrative centre of a country engaged in a life and death struggle, has ever had to endure."
Concern over the size of the French Air Force led to the decision to strengthen the RAF, for it had been much reduced in size after the end of the 1914-1918 war. There followed two Home Defence Expansion Schemes. That of 1922 for 23 squadrons was soon superseded by the better known 1923 scheme for 52 squadrons...
The Salisbury Committee's term of reference were to enquire into the cooperation and correlation between the Army, Navy and Air Force, and inter alia, into 'the standard to be aimed at for defining the strength of the Air Force for purposes of home and imperial defense'. The Committee issued an interim report in June 1923 which included the recommendation that
British air must include Home Defence Air Force of sufficient strength adequately to protect us against air attack by the strongest air force within striking distance of this country.
The Cabinet endorsed the Salisbury Committee's recommendations... the Air Staff later argued that it was based upon a assessment of the threat. They explained to the Committee of Imperial Defence that 'The object is to attain, and maintain, approximate numerical equality with the French Independent Striking Force'. The justification for this was that
At the present time France is the only power which maintains a powerful air force within striking distance of Great Britain. The Estimated potentiality of the French air force, therefore, is used as a basis for calculating the air defense measures necessary for this country.
The Estimated potentiality of the French air force, therefore, is used as a basis for calculating the air defense measures necessary for this country.
We will see that this consideration shaped the Air Staff's views on operational requirements, and on airfield location, long after any thought that war with France was conceivable, because some basis for defence planning was required...
Excerpt from page 8:
The emergence of Germany as a military threat in 1933-34 led to a major realignment of Air Staff planning in many respects. Before 1934 the RAF's operational squadrons had been disposed to counter an air attack from France, but in August 1934 the Air ministry was instructed to prepare plans from the air defence of Great Britain for war with Germany. These were to assume that France was an ally, and include the possibility that German aircraft would overfly Holland and Belgium, or occupy airfields in those countries. Germany as the potential enemy meant that attacks were now to be expected from the east rather from the south, with consequent reorientation of the RAF's fighter defence system. Needless to say, a direct effect of considering Germany rather than France as the potential enemy was greatly to increase the operation range required of bombers, and in consequence their size.
Excerpt from page 16:
Most bomber squadrons were to be stationed in Oxfordshire and Gloucestershire, where they would be protected by the Aircraft Fighting Zone... For many years the radius of action specified for most bomber types was no more than sufficient to reach Paris and the industrial regions of North-East France from those bases. When Germany replaced France as the potential enemy the best location for RAF bomber squadrons would be in East Anglia and Yorkshire.
So in the 1920s, Britain used France as its nemesis for war planning and it wasn't until 1934 did the planning focus switch to Germany. Now, I wonder if Britain had prepared for war with Germany in the 1920s would appeasement would have been a necessary delay tactic?
If you don't wish to spend that much money, there will be other sources (ouch it's no cheaper in the UK. I do hate academic publishers with a passion)
The Royal Air Force and the Problems of the Inter-War Years « Thoughts on Military History
The RAF also had to deal with the gradually changing geo-strategic situation in Europe. For example, in the mid-twenties, in a period of deteriorating relation with France, the RAF had to deal with the potential threat of what has been described as the French air menace.[36] This, coupled with the emergence of the threat of Germany in the 1930's led to the materialisation of a distinct home fighter force based around the concept of strategic air defence. [36] John Ferris `The Theory of a "French Air Menace", Anglo-French Relations and the British Home Defence Air Force Programmes of 1921 - 1925′ Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 10 (1987) pp. 62 - 83
[36] John Ferris `The Theory of a "French Air Menace", Anglo-French Relations and the British Home Defence Air Force Programmes of 1921 - 1925′ Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 10 (1987) pp. 62 - 83
Outline history from 1922-1923 makes for fascinating reading, but evidence of plans for global domination and total European war seems rather thin.
I had no idea that France was considered a likely enemy in the 20s, and I can't even begin to imagine why that might have been true.
France was a standing enemy in late 19th century brittish war plans due to the competition for colonies (Germany hardly featured there at all). With Germany defeated and France dominating the continent, they should have been an even more terrible foe. A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!
