we do have bottom-up organizing, ATTAC and LCR, and I think our side will have a better position in the outcome of the crisis, if we play our cards right.
In France we rejected because the Giscard constitution was a step backward for us. Too much emphasis on neo-liberal, free market reforms
It would be interesting to compare the sums used by the US "cohesion" programs you're referring to and the European structural funds (Cohesion fund, ESF...) available for the new member states starting in 2004 (remembering that they had access to funds during the accession period). I know the amount for the 2000-2006 period was around 24 billion € (in fact they were not able to use the totality...). I know the 2007-2013 program plans for bigger sums, but I haven't been able to find the actual amounts so far. Even if we think it's not enough, there is an important effort to close the gap between the poorest and the richest states within the EU.
So, in fine, if I understand well, you want to build Europe in one country "Dieu se rit des hommes qui se plaignent des conséquences alors qu'ils en chérissent les causes" Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet
As for acquis sociaux, that's easy and was well known at the time. Article one sets out that there should be no rules or any other impediment to undistorted markets within the Union, and of course at the time, we had Bolkestein concretely remind everyone what this meant in practise. If you do not think this would ultimately undermine not just solidarity mechanisms we have in place, but also wages themselves, you certainly were a distinct minority upon partisans on the left, of whom virtually all LCR and PCF voted against, and some exit polls had even the PS-electorate voting up to 60% against. The PS leadership was ok with it (hell, I think Hollande and Sarkozy become drinking buddies over the whole thing), not the rank and file.
On top of this, there were the military aspects of the treaty telling member states to spend more, and specific language about relationship with Nato, objectionable to many.
Other objectionable things...it specifically weakened labor by putting the right of firms to lock out employees into the constitution. It also had specific language prohibiting capital controls, and some vague language on prohibiting anything which impedes free enterprise, and I'll let you guess where that one goes.
Finally on the rights charter, it frankly is a watering down of the rights to a job or minimum revenue, to housing, et c., none of which are specifically named as positive rights, and this is important especially when you consider all the neo-liberal wet dream language.
So, it was a bad constitution, the left voted overwhelmingly against, I did too, and the Irish are reminding us now exactly why it was important to reject it: once adopted, it is damn near impossible to modify. A sliver of a minority of one tiny country can impact the labor rights of 300 million active workforce. No thanks. Yes to Europe, but no to that one.
But I'll give you this...your red-baiting is charming.
Fai de bèn a Bertrand, te lou rendra en cagant
French European Constitution referendum, 2005 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
On 1 December 2004, the opposition Socialist Party held a vote among its members to determine the stance it would take. The issue of the Constitution had caused considerable divisions within the party, with many members--although broadly in favour of European integration--opposing the Constitution for reasons including a perceived lack of democratic accountability, and the threat they considered it posed to the European social model. The "Yes" side was led by party leader François Hollande while the "No" side was led by deputy leader Laurent Fabius. Out of 127,027 members eligible to vote, 59% voted "Yes", with a turnout of 79%. Out of 102 Socialist Party regional federations, 26 voted "No".
The Bolkestein (services) directive was not hard-wired into either the treaties or the Constitution. The directive was pushed because of the dominant neoliberal sentiment at the time among national governments and within the Commission (and sadly we haven't made much progress since then on those fronts...). Its neoliberal elements were ultimately defeated by a pan-European protest led by the labour movements and an effective PES rapporteur in the European Parliament.
And you can say all you want that I am simply repeating the bullet points of the non campaign, because you claim I cannot say anything specific about what it's adoption would have done. In this, you present a red herring, because of course the purpose of a constitution is not to be overly specific, to provide broad guidelines, and, well, those broad guidelines, as drafted, were neo-liberal in intent and the bias it would have had on further interpretation of national statute equally would have been neo-liberal. No one argued that the constitution would expressly do away with the 35 hour week, RTT, 5 weeks vacation, right to housing, income supports, access to health care, farm subsidies or whatever via specific language in the constitution. What was argued was that this would be the logical eventual conclusion, a conclusion whose ineluctability was demonstrated by the attempt to ram the Bolkestein directive down everyone's throat at the same time.
And, you are free to dispute that interpretation but at least be frank enough to admit that, on the left, your viewpoint was quite a minoritarian one, mine very much the majority, and not just of those of us "unserious" ones. Fai de bèn a Bertrand, te lou rendra en cagant
European Tribune - Eurozone Economic Governance
There is, however, a redistributive policy in the EU through its structural funds and general budget. It is unclear to me to what extent it can stabilise asymmetric shocks (seems like it can't do it for all countries because it only favours the poor areas which are largely concentrated in the poorer countries). But it fulfils the separate but equally valid aim of reducing long term inequalities. In a study made in 2000, it was found that the EU budget has a 'remarkably redistributive effect' (pdf file here). I'll give you a quote: Finally, when we consider the net financial balance, we find that the EU budget has a remarkably redistributive effect on the income of its members. This result is a necessary condition to speed up the convergence process among European countries. Our results show that the EU budget redistributes the 5 percent of any difference between richer and poorer countries. Although this number is well below the estimates for the United States (federal taxes and transfers redistribute approximately a 20 percent), it is important to notice that this redistributive effect is achieved with budget resources that represent less than 1.27 percent of the European GNP. (DOMÉNECH, R., MAUDES, A. AND J. VARELA (2000): Fiscal Flows in Europe: The Redistributive Effects of the EU Budget.) This is impressive, but again we can note that the actual redistribution (which is all that counts) in the US is 4 times greater, its trade flows are 2-3 times greater and it does have substantial stabilising mechanisms which don't exist in Europe. Also note that this data is historic and that with the expansion, the redistributive effect of the budget has probably decreased.
There is, however, a redistributive policy in the EU through its structural funds and general budget. It is unclear to me to what extent it can stabilise asymmetric shocks (seems like it can't do it for all countries because it only favours the poor areas which are largely concentrated in the poorer countries). But it fulfils the separate but equally valid aim of reducing long term inequalities. In a study made in 2000, it was found that the EU budget has a 'remarkably redistributive effect' (pdf file here). I'll give you a quote:
Finally, when we consider the net financial balance, we find that the EU budget has a remarkably redistributive effect on the income of its members. This result is a necessary condition to speed up the convergence process among European countries. Our results show that the EU budget redistributes the 5 percent of any difference between richer and poorer countries. Although this number is well below the estimates for the United States (federal taxes and transfers redistribute approximately a 20 percent), it is important to notice that this redistributive effect is achieved with budget resources that represent less than 1.27 percent of the European GNP. (DOMÉNECH, R., MAUDES, A. AND J. VARELA (2000): Fiscal Flows in Europe: The Redistributive Effects of the EU Budget.)
