Now, you may not be a racist, but your personalisation of countries is a strong form of nationalism. It is also a category error.
It's much better to look at a country's interests. You'll see that the Netherlands and Denmark are both trading countries and thus they are prone to be a bit more atlanticist and concerned about protectionism. You may want to get rid of that influence, but, well, Europe has had its attempts at autarky. I don't think it will work out.
To get one back, I'll also note that historically speaking the French government has obstructed the process of European unification far more often and with much greater impact than the Dutch...
Now France doesn't "own" the EU any longer and wants it's toys back. Why is the Irish rejection of Lisbon so much more a crisis for Europe than the French rejection? The answer is some in France still thinks France IS Europe, and can do with it as it wants, whereas smaller countries like Ireland (and the 12 Eastern entrants) are expected to know their place and do what they are told. (Ref. Chric's comments to that effect).
But the EU now - for all its inadequacies - and I agree with many of the criticisms here - is nevertheless a much bigger project than France or any one major member. The EU will go its own way at its own pace, and seeking to divide it up in some way would simply kill the whole project off.
I agree enlargement should never have happened before the Constitution was agreed, but it's too late to change that now. Comparing the EU to the US is an interesting academic exercise, but not even the original 6 members agreed to a Federal Europe. Greater cohesion and integration of industrial, social, healthcare and financial systems will happen by a slow and painful political process of negotiation in response to a realisation that a Globalising economy requires a globalising polity to regulate and manage it. The peoples of Europe will gradually demand it and elect more socialist deputies to the EU Parliament if they really want it.
But any attempt to return to a "France knows best" imperialism will simply fan the flames of nationalism it other EU Member states as well, and we will be doing well to hold on the the EU we now have rather than being in a position to dream of a much better one. It may be frustrating (to the French) that France no longer calls most of the shots, but that is nothing to the political meltdown the EU would experience if a single member ever succeeded in dominating the EU again.
It is actually a tribute to the importance the EU has achieved that the ratification of Lisbon has been so hotly contested. If the EU didn't matter much, nobody would have cared much either way. The problem is not that the debate has been divisive in some states - that's what happens when important issues are debated in a polity - the problem is that in many states there was little debate at all, and thus little public engagement or understanding of the issues.
The EU has probably gone as far as it can as an elite project - the tide of the consequences of WW2 and the vision of the EU's founding fathers has now ebbed away from the younger public's political consciousness. The engine of future development has got to come from the democratic process itself, from a much greater engagement of the populace, and from controversies like the Lisbon Treaty ratification. If the initial Irish no vote leads to a greater determination to pursue future EU development through more democratic means, then the initial Irish No may indeed have been of some great service - and a much greater service to the EU that the French conspiracy to prevent popular ratification of the Treaty the second time around. notes from no w here
In France we rejected because the Giscard constitution was a step backward for us. Too much emphasis on neo-liberal, free market reforms in the countries where Capital wanted those reforms to make more money for shareholders and squeeze the rest of our wages, and almost zero emphasis on social reforms in countries that chronically engage in social dumping and thereby undermine solidarity mechanisms in those countries which actually take them seriously. This is why on the left, we voted overwhelmingly against, while on the "respectable" right (UMP, not FN) they voted overwhelmingly for it.
In the Netherlands, of course, voters rejected it because the rest of us stepping backwards is in their immediate national advantage, as Nanne observes here re: their attitudes on trade. (In Ireland, I'm not sure ultimately what the problem is, but I'd prefer not to get into that here.)
Totally different rejections, in terms of political content of the rejection.
Now, and again this is a political statement of preference of mine, but it is precisely because of the content of the rejection in France which makes it credible. Not that it was France that rejected it, but why France rejected it.
Fai de bèn a Bertrand, te lou rendra en cagant
The usual reponses to the no in NL were that it reduced NL power in the union, followed by expression of dissatisfaction in the government coalition of the time. And, the "respectable" left parties there were for it, though shortly thereafter, one of the properly left parties, which had been against on grounds similar to those of us in France, had some serious electoral successes, so maybe there's hope after all.
In France, the fact it reduced actually exisiting rights and protections, played a predominant role in the referendum defeat. The PS was split in two on the wubject, most of the PS votes voted against, and all other parties on the left were against. Fai de bèn a Bertrand, te lou rendra en cagant
As for attitudes, in my memory the right-wing side of the Dutch 'no' was due to a backlash against the euro, which was blamed for inflation and there were fears about the membership of the southern states, and there was a backlash against the opening of negotiations with Turkey.
Neoliberalism had little to do with it.
But I think it is outstanding that there is again a viable left party in NL. This is good news for all of us. Fai de bèn a Bertrand, te lou rendra en cagant
The SP indeed became a larger party only after the referendum. But its base had already expanded at that time.
To cherry pick on my side a bit, here's a short quote from this evaluation (pdf) of the Dutch referendum:
Looking at results per municipality, it shows that a majority voted no in 9 out of 10 municipalities. The municipalities which voted yes in majority are the richest municipalities of the country: Rozendaal (Gld.), Laren, Bloemendaal, Heemstede, Wassenaar, and the rich communities in Eindhoven. Municipalities which had a high percentage of no-voters were the fiercely Protestant localities, the leftwing Socialist localities and those that also voted in high numbers for Pim Fortuyn (`protest localities').
A masterpiece of Jesuitical sophistry! The reasons for any no vote are always arguable and will change depending on who you talk to. The hard left in Ireland also voted against Lisbon because it appeared to them to endorse the neo-liberal policies of global capitalism. The hard right in both France and Ireland voted against Lisbon because of their social conservatism and Nationalist proclivities.
Probably the biggest block of NO voters in Ireland voted NO because the Treaty had been rendered deliberately unintelligible by elite conspiracy to make it appear different from the Constitution. This was a contemptuous way to treat any electorate and I have a lot of sympathy for that particular argument. It was a "solution" created to solve a French problem (NO to Constitution) and ended up causing an even bigger problem for a more democratically inclined Irish polity. Hopefully no European electorate will be treated with similar contempt again.
But at the end of the day what matters is not the multitude of reasons why people voted NO: Whether a left-winger approves of a left wing rejection of neo-liberalism, or a right-winger approves of a right-wing rejection of a further erosion of national Sovereignty is neither here nor there - neither type of vote is more "credible" or more "creditable" than the other. Their effect is precisely the same - to prevent the further development of a more European polity - whatever way you try to dress it up. notes from no w here
I agree on that, and had I been able to vote in Spain (I was moving and changing voter registration so I missed it) I would probably have voted no on those grounds alone. Not that it would have made a difference in the result (a "safe" no vote) but at least it would have brought the participation rate closer to 50% :-) Most economists teach a theoretical framework that has been shown to be fundamentally useless. -- James K. Galbraith
On the Irish voters being obligated here to vote on a crappy (and here I don't disagree on the substance, it's the form I find objectionable) treaty revision, I don't think anyone in the EU forces Ireland to hold referenda. My understanding is, unlike every other EU member state, Ireland is constitutionally obligated to hold such referenda for modifications to the constitution large and small.
Here in France, I think Chirac was obligated by popular demand to put it to a refendendum, like Mitterand did with Maastricht. But he was not constitutionally obligated to do so. It was a political decision. I think the same goes for Netherlands too.
But Ireland is a special case. Fai de bèn a Bertrand, te lou rendra en cagant
I think the problem is that the EU used to be just an extension of French foreign policy, with a docile Germany and an occasionally recalcitrant Britain which nevertheless actually implemented the EU regulations it agreed to whereas in France, actual implementation was, shall we say, more selective.
Foreign policy has remained outside the remit of the EU and the EU has mainly let France do what it wants in Africa. With regard to most other areas NATO has dominated the agenda and France had put itself a bit out of play by exiting the command structure under De Gaulle (it will re-enter in April).
As for implementation, French implementation is mainly slower than British implementation. Where French compliance has been a problem this has mainly been due to corruption rather than calculation by the political leadership.
That's an unnuanced view.
I am being polemical because I find it ironic that an appartent CP supporter should appear to endorse imperialistic notions of French Grandeur and Noblesse Oblige in France's relations with its smaller neighbours. This harks back to an earlier conversation where quite racist, supremacist, and imperialist attitudes were expressed towards Ireland and all things Irish. (The type of attitudes, which if promulgated more prominently as representative wider "European" attitudes, would guarantee a much higher No vote the next time around).
I would have hoped that the French Left would be more internationalist, multi-lateral and respectful in its tone to fellow members - building alliances rather than whipping up nationalist antagonisms. France does not have a monopoly on progressive tendencies in Europe and portraying other polities as overwhelmingly composed of dimwitted peasant dupes of Global capital is not generally a good strategy for building a united progressive movement throughout Europe. notes from no w here
But EU has clearly escaped french control since at least 20 yrs. During the 90's, the EU was entirely perverted at the service of the german reunification and the monetary consequences of Kohl's populist move of 1 east mark = 1 west mark. It caused a deeper, longer recesssion everywhere in Europe, clearly in France, and caused the UK to drop out of the SME.
Nowadays, monetary power in the EMU is entirely undercontrol of the germans, and regulatory power in the EU is entirely under control of the (internationalist) neo-lib mafia. Pierre
See Wikipedia: Empty Chair Crisis
President Charles de Gaulle of France favoured a protected market for France's agricultural products. In 1965 the European Commission's president, Walter Hallstein, suggested an extension of the Commission's powers and a general increase in the supranational nature of the Community. He also proposed an increase in the use of qualified majority voting in commercial matters dealt with by the Commission. De Gaulle opposed Hallstein's proposals. De Gaulle also strongly sought a financing agreement for the Common Agricultural Policy ("CAP"). The deadline for this was approaching in 1965. Hallstein made the political judgment that De Gaulle would not risk losing the CAP agreement and upsetting French farmers before a December 1965 presidential election. Hallstein calculated that to secure the CAP De Gaulle would compromise on the institutional questions. The other five countries refused to compromise the agenda of the meeting and wanted de Gaulle to accept the whole package. After a tense meeting on June 28-30, 1965, De Gaulle's response was to withdraw France's representative in Brussels and to boycott discussions of institutional change. This strategy led to what was called the "empty chair crisis". ... The incident leading to the Luxembourg compromise had deep repercussions for the EC, leading to a slowing down of integration, and move toward the "confederalist" approach favoured by de Gaulle, rather than a more federalist approach favoured by Hallstein.
De Gaulle opposed Hallstein's proposals. De Gaulle also strongly sought a financing agreement for the Common Agricultural Policy ("CAP"). The deadline for this was approaching in 1965.
Hallstein made the political judgment that De Gaulle would not risk losing the CAP agreement and upsetting French farmers before a December 1965 presidential election. Hallstein calculated that to secure the CAP De Gaulle would compromise on the institutional questions. The other five countries refused to compromise the agenda of the meeting and wanted de Gaulle to accept the whole package. After a tense meeting on June 28-30, 1965, De Gaulle's response was to withdraw France's representative in Brussels and to boycott discussions of institutional change. This strategy led to what was called the "empty chair crisis".
...
The incident leading to the Luxembourg compromise had deep repercussions for the EC, leading to a slowing down of integration, and move toward the "confederalist" approach favoured by de Gaulle, rather than a more federalist approach favoured by Hallstein.
