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I'm aware of that difference between computerisation in the early '90s and before and the late '90s and after.

But that is precisely my point: The outrageous CEO power grabs began a full decade before the electronic automation you mention. Almost all the faults in corporate culture that we bemoan today were already present during the Savings and Loan crisis. So they are clearly antecedent to the technical revolution at the heart of your experience.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Thu Jun 25th, 2009 at 09:46:55 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I can only speak from my experience in my own firm.  Perhaps the technological revolution occurred sooner in the US financial services sector - I think it did as the process in a financial services company are arguably less complex.  But there was also a very different corporate culture in the US and Europe at the time - with the US model now dominant everywhere.

notes from no w here
by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot dotty communists) on Thu Jun 25th, 2009 at 10:26:52 AM EST
[ Parent ]
transfer of productivity ("profit") to investors, as foretold and sold by just one IT analyst, c. 2002



Interests in preserving structural relationships between (actual) people prevents deep IT penetration of FIN and COMMOD sectors. Asymetrical market knowledge (and adverse selection) is a feature not a bug.


Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.

by Cat on Thu Jun 25th, 2009 at 12:29:59 PM EST
[ Parent ]
i remember the charles clore scandal (70's?), and thinking 'this is a new echelon of criminal', then we had the appropriately named michael milken, but it was still rare, now it's the deluge, after the savings and loan scandal one might have thought the phenomenon would slow down, but no, it's amped up exponentially.

enron was the smoke coming out of the financial engine, now bits are falling off by the mile and the day...

~"When an inner situation is not made conscious, it appears outside as fate." Karl Jung~

by melo (melometa4(at)gmail.com) on Thu Jun 25th, 2009 at 01:21:58 PM EST
[ Parent ]
the real, massive increases in CEO pay mainly happened in two phases: in the dotcom bullrun of the late 90s, and in the more recent Bush years.

I'll also note that this has coincided with the European institutions turning from French-speaking and French-inspired to English-speaking and English-inspired, because of the arrival of the Scandinavian countries, the replacement of fundamentally pro-European Mitterrand by euro-skeptic Chirac, in addition to overall trends.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Thu Jun 25th, 2009 at 10:40:30 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Jerome a Paris:
the real, massive increases in CEO pay mainly happened in two phases: in the dotcom bullrun of the late 90s, and in the more recent Bush years.
Does anyone have historical data on the level of executive compensation?

A man of words and not of deeds is like a garden full of weeds; a man of deeds and not of words is like a garden full of turds — Anonymous
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu Jun 25th, 2009 at 10:49:12 AM EST
[ Parent ]
There's this:

and this to show that most of the increase in incomes have come in the form of higher wages rather than in the form of capital gains:

Wage increases are associated with the managerial class, ofcourse.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Thu Jun 25th, 2009 at 11:03:26 AM EST
[ Parent ]
In your last chart you can see that executive compensation increased starting around 1980 and stalled with the S&L crisis and the recession of the early 1990's.

So it's not just about the dot-com starting in the 1990's as you claim.

A man of words and not of deeds is like a garden full of weeds; a man of deeds and not of words is like a garden full of turds — Anonymous

by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Thu Jun 25th, 2009 at 11:11:14 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Galbraith's industrial corporation needs to be independent from outside interference. Now suppose an unforeseen crisis leads to indebtedness beyond the level that can be sustained by the old business model. Suddenly many corporations have to convince their creditors that they can grow like a malign cancer or face insolvency. The CEO would then be the guy with the cancer plan who tries to ensure that the creditors get their pound of meat.

Wait this is important. Someone is wrong on the Internet.
by generic on Thu Jun 25th, 2009 at 02:00:56 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I seem to recall being shocked when I heard that a Mr. Nobody-anyone-ever-heard-of bank president (I think that was his title?) at a No-big-deal bank in the late 1980s made over a million dollars in a year, and in that year, he was one of the top earning bank presidents.  I'll see if I can dig up that information.  It was so shocking, but it was the beginning of a trend as I remember it.

After that, the smash-and-grab was on, and the CEO class never looked back.

by jjellin on Thu Jun 25th, 2009 at 09:25:42 PM EST
[ Parent ]
His name was Baldini, and he was the president of Comfed mortgage who was paid over $2 million in 1987.  Here is a link to an archived article which makes the point that his earnings were really something at that time:

http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-8010445.html

and here is a link to some document related to the FDIC investigation a decade later which mentions his base pay and bonuses in 1987 adding up to over $2million.  I can't remember what eventually happened to Baldini, but he got into some trouble after the bank/mortgage company failed.  It was an 80s thing.

http://www.qui-tam.net/USga1121.htm

by jjellin on Fri Jun 26th, 2009 at 08:45:54 PM EST
[ Parent ]
My comment below (with sources linked) may be relevant:
http://www.eurotrib.com/comments/2009/6/24/17130/0955/77#77

In 1987, Jim Baldini, the president of Comfed mortgage made over 2 million dollars.   Less than $400,000 was salary; the rest was "bonus."  As I recall at the time, it was shocking to think that anyone could possibly "earn" that much money in one year.

by jjellin on Fri Jun 26th, 2009 at 08:59:09 PM EST
[ Parent ]
To turn the question, why was not the CEOs formal powers used to such an extent before the 80ies?

Was poor performance punished before the 80ies? Was there too powerful countervailing forces (and how did they decline)? Was there a fear of a workers revolution?

A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!

by A swedish kind of death on Thu Jun 25th, 2009 at 02:19:53 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Much higher marginal tax rates meant that this kind of (cough) innovation made no difference to real income.

IT has also had the effect of making drive-by trading possible. It also meant that share prices could be monitored minute by minute, which has an obvious short-term influence.

Previously share dealing was a more leisurely affair, and there wasn't such an obsessive interest in talking up prices with bullshit - or reorienting towards a growth maximising corporate performance landscape, if you prefer.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Thu Jun 25th, 2009 at 03:05:40 PM EST
[ Parent ]
My guess is that tenure was more valuable, compared to lump-sum payments.

It's an equilibrium, of sorts: If the norm is that executives have long tenures, it becomes hard to get a slot, so a short-termist rape-and-run executive will hit a brick wall because he'll have a hard time getting new positions when he runs from the company he looted. Not because he'll have a problem being accepted into a new slot (he'll still be hired by his golfing buddies, after all) but because there are much fewer vacancies. This pressure to do a proper job while you are in the business will naturally tend to promote a long-term outlook that will in turn make it valuable to retain the executives over the long term.

On the other hand, you can get a new equilibrium in which the CEO can expect only a short tenure - in which case asset stripping becomes much more attractive as a strategy relative to real work, because the guy who benefits from his work will be the next CEO. At the same time, rape-and-run becomes more viable because there is a greater CEO turnover (so there will, at any given time, be more open slots when he has to run from the crashing company into a new top job). Obviously, this further reinforces the culture of short CEO tenures, which makes long term vision increasingly precarious.

It's entirely possible (but I won't claim to have evidence for it) that corporate culture can jump between these two states given the right (wrong?) external shocks. The Raygun Revolt may have been one such shock.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Fri Jun 26th, 2009 at 04:14:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]
So means (the formal right of the CEO to do almost anything), motive (marginal tax rates going down in the US in the 70ies) and opportunity (the Raygun Revolt).

And once it started it amassed power in the hands of a few who could finance people who promoted its spread.

A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!

by A swedish kind of death on Fri Jun 26th, 2009 at 01:34:41 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It's a possible explanation. I and others have advanced other possible explanations for a mechanism elsewhere in the diary.

What I'd like to do is read through the diary and comment thread in one sitting and synthesise the suggestions into a single reasonably coherent explanation (or, if that is impossible, at least make it clear which models are being proposed).

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Fri Jun 26th, 2009 at 04:31:45 PM EST
[ Parent ]

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