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To turn the question, why was not the CEOs formal powers used to such an extent before the 80ies?

Was poor performance punished before the 80ies? Was there too powerful countervailing forces (and how did they decline)? Was there a fear of a workers revolution?

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by A swedish kind of death on Thu Jun 25th, 2009 at 02:19:53 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Much higher marginal tax rates meant that this kind of (cough) innovation made no difference to real income.

IT has also had the effect of making drive-by trading possible. It also meant that share prices could be monitored minute by minute, which has an obvious short-term influence.

Previously share dealing was a more leisurely affair, and there wasn't such an obsessive interest in talking up prices with bullshit - or reorienting towards a growth maximising corporate performance landscape, if you prefer.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Thu Jun 25th, 2009 at 03:05:40 PM EST
[ Parent ]
My guess is that tenure was more valuable, compared to lump-sum payments.

It's an equilibrium, of sorts: If the norm is that executives have long tenures, it becomes hard to get a slot, so a short-termist rape-and-run executive will hit a brick wall because he'll have a hard time getting new positions when he runs from the company he looted. Not because he'll have a problem being accepted into a new slot (he'll still be hired by his golfing buddies, after all) but because there are much fewer vacancies. This pressure to do a proper job while you are in the business will naturally tend to promote a long-term outlook that will in turn make it valuable to retain the executives over the long term.

On the other hand, you can get a new equilibrium in which the CEO can expect only a short tenure - in which case asset stripping becomes much more attractive as a strategy relative to real work, because the guy who benefits from his work will be the next CEO. At the same time, rape-and-run becomes more viable because there is a greater CEO turnover (so there will, at any given time, be more open slots when he has to run from the crashing company into a new top job). Obviously, this further reinforces the culture of short CEO tenures, which makes long term vision increasingly precarious.

It's entirely possible (but I won't claim to have evidence for it) that corporate culture can jump between these two states given the right (wrong?) external shocks. The Raygun Revolt may have been one such shock.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Fri Jun 26th, 2009 at 04:14:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]
So means (the formal right of the CEO to do almost anything), motive (marginal tax rates going down in the US in the 70ies) and opportunity (the Raygun Revolt).

And once it started it amassed power in the hands of a few who could finance people who promoted its spread.

A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!

by A swedish kind of death on Fri Jun 26th, 2009 at 01:34:41 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It's a possible explanation. I and others have advanced other possible explanations for a mechanism elsewhere in the diary.

What I'd like to do is read through the diary and comment thread in one sitting and synthesise the suggestions into a single reasonably coherent explanation (or, if that is impossible, at least make it clear which models are being proposed).

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Fri Jun 26th, 2009 at 04:31:45 PM EST
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