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  1. German banks were obstacles to the spread of the Anglo disease, so their destruction was part of the game plan;

  2. I still don't think the problem is bigger in Europe. European banks (especially German ones) have indeed bought bad assets and will suffer losses on these, but their core business (retail and local business) is still basically sound, as they do not have to deal with any local debt bubble (the jury is still out on Spanish banks there, but they seem to have been quite tightly regulated, and to have tried t odiversify away from the Spanish bubble early enough). So they should survive the second wave of the crisis better;

  3. The European right, like the Democrats (who have pretty close ideas to the Euroepan right on economics) has moved leftwards to some extent, even if in ways we don't really like;

  4. The fundamental problem has been too much debt. Focusing on reducing debt is the right solution in the medium and long term, even if it means short term pain. What matters in the meantime is how what is available is redistributed, but it is pretty much inevitable that the pie will shrink

  5. We need to have that discussion of the "Japanese lost decade", but it seems to have been lost for financial investors rather than for the population. Is that really a bad thing?

  6. Not sure what "behind" means anymore...


In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes
by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Wed Jul 1st, 2009 at 08:32:42 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Jerome a Paris:
German banks were obstacles to the spread of the Anglo disease, so their destruction was part of the game plan;

Sounds a bit conspiracy theoryish.  Surely they adopted the anglo disease when  they started investing in dodgy US derivatives?

See also:
How the ECB's fig leaf has completely withered away | Anatole Kaletsky: Economic view - Times Online

However, if we look at the facts, the transatlantic difference is less clear. In fact, the ECB is printing money even faster than the Fed is.  It is also supporting fiscal policy more explicitly through debt monetisation and taking much bigger risks with its credibility and solvency. The first point is illustrated in the chart. Since mid-2007, central banks have expanded their total liabilities (the broadest definition of what it means to print money in the modern world) by $1.2 trillion in the US and by $1.5 trilllion in euroland. Given that GDP is 12 per cent bigger in the US than in the eurozone, this means that the ECB's printing presses have actually been running 50 per cent faster than the Fed's.



notes from no w here
by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot dotty communists) on Wed Jul 1st, 2009 at 10:16:52 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Surely they adopted the anglo disease when  they started investing in dodgy US derivatives?

I agree to that; then again, they could do so after some loosening of rules. (Where the looseners of rules might have been dupes seduced by the Anglo finance propagandists themselves.)

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Wed Jul 1st, 2009 at 10:30:28 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Adding for further clarity: let's not forget the global asymmetry. The system 'worked' due to a constant net flow of capital from the rest of the world to the USA (and the City of London). The stupid investments of the Landesbanken was beneficial for the imperial centre.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Wed Jul 1st, 2009 at 10:33:52 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The Landesbanken had access to cheap funding thanks to their public status, and could lend to German companies at low rates.

Investment banks could not compete with such rates and could not sell bonds and other products to German companies. So they got the Landesbank public status to be labelled as unfair competition, and to be dismantled.

Thus the Landesbanken could no longer loan cheaply, as their own funding cost increased, and they then lost markets to investment banks. Forced to go look for other sources of income, they went to invest their (more expensive) money into riskier stuff.

Thus, to open German markets to investment banks (mostly US and mostly based in London), a cheap and reliable source of funding for the German economy was eliminated.

In the long run, we're all dead. John Maynard Keynes

by Jerome a Paris (etg@eurotrib.com) on Wed Jul 1st, 2009 at 12:37:56 PM EST
[ Parent ]
So the irony is - the Landesbanks lost their public status - where the state was the ultimate guarantor and risk bearer - and had to compete on an "open" market.  Whereupon they aped the investment banks and engaged in riskier behaviour - only with less skill - and got caught holding the junk when the music stopped.  Then the state had to step in anyway to bail them out because a functioning banking sector is essential to the economy.  So the state ended up taking on greater (US) liabilities than if it had simply continued to underwrite German market risk. It seems that Globalisation is something of a one way street where the imperial power is never the loser...

notes from no w here
by Frank Schnittger (mail Frankschnittger at hot dotty communists) on Wed Jul 1st, 2009 at 03:10:11 PM EST
[ Parent ]
It seems that Globalisation is something of a one way street where the imperial power is never the loser...

Bingo.  But what exactly is the imperial power?  I would submit that in the US it is not in DC.

As for Jerome's conspiracy, don't dismiss it too quickly.  Consider, the Landesbank deregulation came well after the first rounds of UK deregulation under Dame Maggie had failed to produce the advertised results and Garn-St. Germain had utterly destroyed the US thrift industry, and it was contemporaneous with the greatest cave-in to libertarian speculative finance theory ever, namely Gramm-Leach-Bliley (There were a few of us at the time who warned what would happen, but most of us were hicks from the US Midwest, so what did we know?).  Now that all of those theories have generated nothing but epic fail and the destruction of local sources of capital for the benefit of major banking houses, we know that the Austro-Chicago "brain trust" that sold this snake oil was in fact shilling for the Ueberklass.  I doubt there was a unified conspiracy of Dan Brownian proportions, but there were a lot of people who all belonged to the same country clubs and who were all working toward the same goal, namely controlling as much of the money supply as possible to the detriment of those of us who didn't belong to those country clubs.

As for the condition of the European banks, I honestly don't see how they can be worse off than the US banks, given the latter remain wholly addicted to the various forms of fraudulent financing they've ginned up over the last quarter-century.

by rifek on Sat Jul 4th, 2009 at 10:56:36 PM EST
[ Parent ]
But there is a world of difference between printing money to buy sovereign debt at face value and printing money to buy ShitpileTM at face value.

The former is supporting sovereign fiscal deficits, which may or may not be a good idea depending on circumstances. The latter is bailing out the people who used to hold the ShitpileTM at the expense of the full faith and credit of your currency. I am not sure I can see any possible scenario in which that is a good idea.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed Jul 1st, 2009 at 12:44:39 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Quite. As the evidence says, the increase in central bank liabilities is a small fraction of one year's GDP, and is certainly in line with the credit-money that's been destroyed in the process of deleveraging ...

... the risk is on the asset side.

If the assets are sovereign debt, they can certainly be used to drain reserves out of the system again should the finance sector (unexpectedly) get back on its feet. It is a straightforward technical operation that central banks worked out long ago.

If the "assets" are notional valuations of chickenshit that could only be sold at a fraction of their book value, and which, indeed, the Central Bank dare not sale in order to avoid pressure to value them closer to market value ... then there is the possibility that normal monetary policy will run down their genuine income generating assets and facing a trade-off between pursuit of monetary policy and sacrifice of policy independence, if they have to go cap in hand to the fiscal authority for funding of the central banking system itself.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Sun Jul 12th, 2009 at 01:58:48 PM EST
[ Parent ]
If the "assets" are notional valuations of chickenshit that could only be sold at a fraction of their book value, and which, indeed, the Central Bank dare not sale in order to avoid pressure to value them closer to market value ... then there is the possibility that normal monetary policy will run down their genuine income generating assets and facing a trade-off between pursuit of monetary policy and sacrifice of policy independence, if they have to go cap in hand to the fiscal authority for funding of the central banking system itself.

Interestingly, this is the exact situation Bernanke's Fed finds itself in.  This is why Ron Paul has 250 co-sponsors for a House bill to audit the Fed.  But the big US banks, whose creature the Fed is and for whom the Fed is the chief shill, probably have enough Senators on retainer to prevent legislation from reaching Obama, who would almost certainly veto it, (else he would long ago have fired Giethner.)

As the Dutch said while fighting the Spanish: "It is not necessary to have hope in order to persevere."
by ARGeezer (ARGeezer a in a circle eurotrib daught com) on Mon Jul 13th, 2009 at 12:03:30 AM EST
[ Parent ]
... is after the recession is over and it is time to drain reserves from the system.

Just as the damage to the financial sector done by the bubble is realized when the bubble pops, the damage presently being done to the Fed balance sheets during the recession will be realized when the recession passes.

Which could of course be one to four years from now.


I've been accused of being a Marxist, yet while Harpo's my favourite, it's Groucho I'm always quoting. Odd, that.

by BruceMcF (agila61 at netscape dot net) on Mon Jul 13th, 2009 at 10:42:43 PM EST
[ Parent ]

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