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One, it is still a nation-state based system, recognizing the sovereignty of individual member-polities.

After the Peace of Westphalia it did consist of sovereign states, as this peace created the concept. Before that it was a feudal state with a decentralised power structure. Not unlike France before and during the hudred year's war. The thirty year's war finished of a series of attempts at creating a more centralised state in HRE, like the failed introduction of common taxation around 1500.

But the concept of nation-state is hardly appliable at all when looking at the constituent parts of HRE, if the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation had a nation, it was simply German. I would however rather argue that the modern concept of nation was not born until the late 18th century, and did not find traction in Germany until France abolished the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation.

So yes, the EU and the HRE are both confederacies but but not very similar at all.

Another similarity is that the conveners of the legislative bodies -- those who carry important agenda-setting powers -- are elected institutionally, not popularly. Their authority derives from their relationships with other institutional authorities of governance. This is not necessarily "power with" instead of "power over," as some have argued here.  This is power exercised by a governing class of elites, and the presidencies answer to those elites, not any popular constituency.  Correct me if I'm wrong.

This basically seperates states into two cathegories, those were the executives are popularly elected and those where are they are not.

And yes, the HRE and the EU share that they are confederate systems where the executive is not directly elected, but so was the Delian League or Swiss confederation.

How was the EU more similar to the HRE (and in what century of HREs development) then say to the abortive Federal German state of 1848-49?

A vote for PES is a vote for EPP! A vote for EPP is a vote for PES! Support the coalition, vote EPP-PES in 2009!

by A swedish kind of death on Tue Jul 21st, 2009 at 05:21:08 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The nation-state is just a form of a more or less sovereign polity, the more general term for a nation, country, state, or whatever.  HRE was a system of governance among such polities, which provided for a degree of centralization of governance both before and after the existence of so-called nation-states as distinct categories. Other European examples of such efforts also exist, such as the German federal state.  That the EU should be seen as an historical outcome of those efforts and not something brand, spanking new was my point, not that the HRE is more like the EU than other European experiments. As such, it is possible, after correcting for the contextual differences, to identify those qualities of personal leadership which lead to more desirable outcomes -- perhaps strength and unity of purpose in multinational political entities.  And because, like the HRE and other examples, there is one or more layers of separation between popular sovereignty and the institutional offices of President, it might behoove us to look at different qualities of leadership than we would expect from popularly elected leaders.  For example, ideological transparency and non-interventionist foreign relations philosophy might enjoy strong popular sentiments, but they might be the opposite of what is needed for negotiating effective policy outcomes among the institutional authorities that will really be calling more of the shots in the EU, post-Lisbon.  

Unless I'm mistaken, the authority will be more centralized in Brussels relative to what it is now, which means that the ability to unite disparate institutional interests in Brussels might be more important than placating popular interests in Paris, London, Madrid, or anywhere else.  I don't know that TB is the right person at all for that, but I do suggest that being a leader in an unpopular war and being able to imply one thing to a popular constituency while doing another behind the scenes do not appear, from the historical evidence in Europe, to be negative qualities for forging institutional alliances that can unify and advance the EU project rather than stall it.

by santiago on Tue Jul 21st, 2009 at 06:09:05 PM EST
[ Parent ]
The nation-state is just a form of a more or less sovereign polity, the more general term for a nation, country, state, or whatever.

Nope. The nation state is the concept of disjunct territories ruled centrally on the basis of a community of citizens. The feudal state was a concept based on feudums -- land owned by noblemen. The feudal concept had no distinct countries, only a hierarchy of territories and corresponding titles. One nobleman could own multiple feudums, without an overarching title -- for example, the Habsburg Empire was not officially consolidated until it became Austria-Hungary; the empire was officially an assemblage of kingdoms and principalities whose titles were all held by the emperor. Furthermore, there were non-overlapping titles: some parts of the Habsburg Empire were outside the Holy Roman Empire; the French king was de jure the liege of the English king for some areas held prior to the end of the 100 years war; during that war, at times Burgundy had more de-facto sovereignity than France, which it was supposed to be part of; and so on.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Tue Jul 21st, 2009 at 06:26:14 PM EST
[ Parent ]
feudums -- land owned by noblemen

...and given by higher-ranked noblemen one was supposed to be loyal to.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Tue Jul 21st, 2009 at 06:53:26 PM EST
[ Parent ]
"supposed" to be loyal.  The fact that loyalty could not be counted on is what led to the development of political theory -- to understand why and under what conditions political power can actually be wielded.
by santiago on Wed Jul 22nd, 2009 at 03:34:12 PM EST
[ Parent ]
That was then. Feudalism has much in common with fascism. The weak are oppressed by their alleged defenders, and the strong vie with each other for total political domination through endless war.

Feudalism doesn't have the jack boots and comical posturing of Italian fascism. Or the jack boots, racism, and even more comical (but tragic) posturing of Nazism.

But the world view is essentially Hobbesian, with no quarter for weakness, and perpetual competition among those strong enough to compete. The strong leader survives as long as he (sic) stays strong and invincible. When strong leaders fail, they are killed and replaced.

The European Right would doubtless approve of that morality, although it might be circumspect about saying so in public.

But what makes Europe different is a strong socialist tradition which has a rather different and more measured and successful world view. There was class consciousness of a sort in feudalism. But it was random, sporadic, and never organised or properly socialised.

by ThatBritGuy (thatbritguy (at) googlemail.com) on Fri Jul 24th, 2009 at 01:03:38 PM EST
[ Parent ]
You must mean Machiavelli -- though methinks political theory arose under similar circumstances much earlier (Greece, China). However, (real or feigned) loyalty is a fundamental of feudalism, while it is not a factor in modern intra-federation and -confederation politics.

The HRE Emperor got weaker because the kings and princes and cities were ever more into paying lip service. Absolutism was the king finding ways to enforce loyalty beyond the feudal standard by binding the noblemen around his court. Meanwhile, no one in the European Council will even feign loyalty to its President.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Sat Jul 25th, 2009 at 06:27:35 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm not talking about the difference between nation-states and other forms of polities, so it doesn't matter what you call them.  I'm talking about the essential similarity between historical attempts to unify groups of independent polities -- whether they are nations, empires, principalities, counties, cantons, whatever -- and the present attempt to do so in the EU.  The essential similarity is this I think: the centralized political authority answered not to popular consent except in indirect ways, but instead it answered to institutional elites who were insulated from popular opinion. What were the attributes, then, that provided for success or failure among those personalities selected for leadership of those historical predecessors to the EU?  Or are the differences between them and the present EU in fact so great as to make them useless as case studies?
by santiago on Wed Jul 22nd, 2009 at 01:02:02 AM EST
[ Parent ]
You keep forgetting that unification is a policy, not an objective.

If unification produces objectionable results, it is not to be supported. Only if it stands to produce, on balance, more favourable than objectionable results is there any sense to supporting it.

So I can live with slower unification if it means that we escape presidentialisation and escape having to live with a neoconservative traitor and war criminal in a high office.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed Jul 22nd, 2009 at 02:08:19 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Everything is a policy, even unification. Some policies are purposeful means toward other political ends and other policies have unintended consequences on other ends as well.  I am concerned that unification is a primary outcome sought by a number of institutional elites in Brussels and elsewhere because of the purposeful outcomes they seek (increased power for some institutional elites at the possible expense of decreased welfare for many people) that I think many progressives would find objectionable.  

I think there are many progressives, however, who see the EU project as primarily a means to contest American power in international relations, and an over-presidentialization might be a cost they're willing to accept toward that end.  I hope that sentiment is not large and doesn't carry the day.

 

by santiago on Wed Jul 22nd, 2009 at 03:43:26 PM EST
[ Parent ]
Of course, Tory Bliar would not contest American power...

And overall, I'm hopeful that the last eight years of "a strong president" on the other side of the Pond (along with Corruptioni et al on our side) have convinced most progressives that an overly strong executive centred around a single person is A Bad Idea.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed Jul 22nd, 2009 at 04:31:45 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I hope so too.
by santiago on Wed Jul 22nd, 2009 at 05:17:40 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I'm not talking about the difference between nation-states and other forms of polities

Come on, don't backpedal, you did.

I'm talking about the essential similarity between historical attempts to unify groups of independent polities

Which cannot be essential, given the essential differences between the polities you consider -- for one, the feudal polities weren't independent. For the other, the example you named (or mis-named -- you first gave the Habsburg Empire, which emerged from personal union rather than a meta position, while you meant something else), the Holy Roman Empire, was not an attempt to unify groups, but to keep together parts of a pre-existing falling-apart empire (the Carolingian one).

The essential similarity is this I think: the centralized political authority answered not to popular consent except in indirect ways, but instead it answered to institutional elites who were insulated from popular opinion.

With that, we get back to another basic problem of your analogy I pointed out in the very first reply: none of the polities in the feudal HRC were democracies. No indirect answering to popular consent. That top-level feudal overlords are undemocratic in an undemocratic feudal world, let's say, doesn't come as a surprise... As for the EU,  by all democratic deficits, you should not forget about the EP, and about referendums.

Or are the differences between them and the present EU in fact so great as to make them useless as case studies?

Since I don't see them as historical predecessors, not direct at least (the EU's structure is in no small part modelled on the federal structure of West Germany, so there the long lineage back to the HRE behind that; but just the strength of the intergovernmental side is a deviation), I would obviously say yes. To be more specific, I can't compare feudal lords with their own kingdoms elected for life to people without other positions elected for fixed terms.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Wed Jul 22nd, 2009 at 05:39:54 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The electors of the HRE had at least as much independence as the member states of the EU. Feudal loyalty was a contested space, in reality, as Machivelli showed.  Breaking oaths of fealty was as common as keeping them during the period, which allows for using much of that history as case studies for political theory and the present EU situation, I argue.

I used the Habsburg name because of its long association with the HRE and also because of its success in holding the most power within the system for the longest time. Obviously Blair would have trouble using their marriage strategy to achieve inter generational success among electors, but I think a sound application of political theory (which has come a long way since Machiavelli) to both European history and the EU would yield some very helpful information about what are desirable and undesirable leadership traits for a council president at this time, and for whom they would be desirable or undesirable.  I think they will also provide more sound arguments about why Blair might be the wrong man for the job, as well.

by santiago on Wed Jul 22nd, 2009 at 03:54:51 PM EST
[ Parent ]
I should also add that I don't see any proper historical analogies to EU unification in general. Most prior unifications happened through contest by one dominant party (see Carolingian Empire, Qin China, Stephen I's Hungary, Mindaugas's Lithuania, etc. etc., and also the Prussia-created German Second Reich). Alliances that did not achieve unification or achieved it without conquest also tended to have one over-dominant member or faction (see Delian League, India). The one exception is the USA, if we treat the Colonies as independent units -- however, those still had a head start as the colonies of the same colonial empire, pushed into union by opposition to the same.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Wed Jul 22nd, 2009 at 05:51:11 AM EST
[ Parent ]
But the EU also has a dominant power - well, two dominant powers, but I'm not sure that changes the dynamics very much.

- Jake

If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.

by JakeS (JangoSierra 'at' gmail 'dot' com) on Wed Jul 22nd, 2009 at 06:06:24 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Dominant, but not over-dominant. Germany is not even a fifth of the EU, and Turkey wouldn't be either by current population projections. As for Franco-German dominance, whether it is over-dominance or not, that would be a joint dual dominance, now name a historical parallel for that :-)

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Wed Jul 22nd, 2009 at 06:23:26 AM EST
[ Parent ]
How about the Inca Empire's growth by assimilation?

The peak-to-trough part of the business cycle is an outlier. Carnot would have died laughing.
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Jul 22nd, 2009 at 06:11:42 AM EST
[ Parent ]
!? Wasn't that simple imperial conquest?

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.
by DoDo on Wed Jul 22nd, 2009 at 06:27:44 AM EST
[ Parent ]
Inca civilization - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Pachacuti would send spies to regions he had wanted in his empire. They would then report back on the political organization, military might, and wealth. The Sapa Inca would then send messages to the leaders of these lands, extolling the benefits of joining his empire. He offered gifts of luxury goods like high quality textiles, and promised that all living in those territories would be materially richer as subject rulers of the Inca. Most accepted the rule of the Inca as a fait accompli and acquiesced peacefully. The neighboring rulers' children would be brought to Cuzco to be taught about Inca administration systems, and then would return to rule their native lands. This allowed the Inca to indoctrinate the former rulers' children into the Inca nobility, and, with luck, marry their daughters into families at various corners of the empire.

It was traditional for the Inca's son to lead the army; Pachacuti's son Túpac Inca began conquests to the north in 1463, continuing them as Inca after Pachucuti's death in 1471. His most important conquest was the Kingdom of Chimor, the Inca's only serious rival for the coast of Peru. Túpac Inca's empire stretched north into modern day Ecuador and Colombia, and his son Huayna Cápac added significant territory to the south. At its height, Tawantinsuyu included Peru and Bolivia, most of what is now Ecuador, a large portion of modern-day Chile, and extended into corners of Argentina and Colombia.

Tawantinsuyu was a patchwork of languages, cultures and peoples. The components of the empire were not all uniformly loyal, nor were the local cultures all fully integrated. For example, the Chimú used money in their commerce, while the Inca empire as a whole had an economy based on exchange and taxation of luxury goods and labor. (It is said that Inca tax collectors would take the head lice of the lame and old as a symbolic tribute.) The portions of the Chachapoya that had been conquered were almost openly hostile to the Inca, and the Inca nobles rejected an offer of refuge in their kingdom after their troubles with the Spanish. They ended up being conquered by Francisco Pizarro.



The peak-to-trough part of the business cycle is an outlier. Carnot would have died laughing.
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Wed Jul 22nd, 2009 at 06:33:22 AM EST
[ Parent ]
So, Wikipedia claims that at least the starter of the Empire used soft power for conquest most of the time - interesting, even if what was left out of the picture, the ability to conduct massive forced resettlements, indicate superior military force behind the soft power.

However, Google-translating the much longer Spanish version of the article on Pachacuti, and on his son who was active as military leader under him, "most" doesn't seem justified -- there is plenty of military action described; plus damming rivers upstream from cities; and fooling the enemy with messengers bringing the fake news of a peace agreement, followed by takeover while the enemy foolishly celebrated.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Wed Jul 22nd, 2009 at 07:05:21 AM EST
[ Parent ]
The neighboring rulers' children would be brought to Cuzco to be taught about Inca administration systems, and then would return to rule their native lands. This allowed the Inca to indoctrinate the former rulers' children into the Inca nobility, and, with luck, marry their daughters into families at various corners of the empire.

So the Inca had their own School of the Americas too?  Just how much bad karma did they acquire in their short reign?

by santiago on Wed Jul 22nd, 2009 at 05:36:47 PM EST
[ Parent ]
More like Harvard or Oxbridge than the School of the Americas, I think.

En un viejo país ineficiente, algo así como España entre dos guerras civiles, poseer una casa y poca hacienda y memoria ninguna. -- Gil de Biedma
by Migeru (migeru at eurotrib dot com) on Sun Aug 16th, 2009 at 03:43:02 AM EST
[ Parent ]
I would however rather argue that the modern concept of nation was not born until the late 18th century, and did not find traction in Germany until France abolished the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation.

So well said!

BTW, the HRE got the "German Nation" tag after its loss of influence in Italy due to the Anjous, French kings and Northern Italian cities -- including, crucially, Rome itself. Then, I think it was a zombie at least from the start of the Seven Years War.

*Lunatic*, n.
One whose delusions are out of fashion.

by DoDo on Tue Jul 21st, 2009 at 06:13:06 PM EST
[ Parent ]

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