If unification produces objectionable results, it is not to be supported. Only if it stands to produce, on balance, more favourable than objectionable results is there any sense to supporting it.
So I can live with slower unification if it means that we escape presidentialisation and escape having to live with a neoconservative traitor and war criminal in a high office.
- Jake If you only spend 20 minutes of the rest of your life on economics, go spend them here.
I think there are many progressives, however, who see the EU project as primarily a means to contest American power in international relations, and an over-presidentialization might be a cost they're willing to accept toward that end. I hope that sentiment is not large and doesn't carry the day.
And overall, I'm hopeful that the last eight years of "a strong president" on the other side of the Pond (along with Corruptioni et al on our side) have convinced most progressives that an overly strong executive centred around a single person is A Bad Idea.
Come on, don't backpedal, you did. I'm talking about the essential similarity between historical attempts to unify groups of independent polities
Which cannot be essential, given the essential differences between the polities you consider -- for one, the feudal polities weren't independent. For the other, the example you named (or mis-named -- you first gave the Habsburg Empire, which emerged from personal union rather than a meta position, while you meant something else), the Holy Roman Empire, was not an attempt to unify groups, but to keep together parts of a pre-existing falling-apart empire (the Carolingian one).
The essential similarity is this I think: the centralized political authority answered not to popular consent except in indirect ways, but instead it answered to institutional elites who were insulated from popular opinion.
With that, we get back to another basic problem of your analogy I pointed out in the very first reply: none of the polities in the feudal HRC were democracies. No indirect answering to popular consent. That top-level feudal overlords are undemocratic in an undemocratic feudal world, let's say, doesn't come as a surprise... As for the EU, by all democratic deficits, you should not forget about the EP, and about referendums.
Or are the differences between them and the present EU in fact so great as to make them useless as case studies?
Since I don't see them as historical predecessors, not direct at least (the EU's structure is in no small part modelled on the federal structure of West Germany, so there the long lineage back to the HRE behind that; but just the strength of the intergovernmental side is a deviation), I would obviously say yes. To be more specific, I can't compare feudal lords with their own kingdoms elected for life to people without other positions elected for fixed terms. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
I used the Habsburg name because of its long association with the HRE and also because of its success in holding the most power within the system for the longest time. Obviously Blair would have trouble using their marriage strategy to achieve inter generational success among electors, but I think a sound application of political theory (which has come a long way since Machiavelli) to both European history and the EU would yield some very helpful information about what are desirable and undesirable leadership traits for a council president at this time, and for whom they would be desirable or undesirable. I think they will also provide more sound arguments about why Blair might be the wrong man for the job, as well.
Pachacuti would send spies to regions he had wanted in his empire. They would then report back on the political organization, military might, and wealth. The Sapa Inca would then send messages to the leaders of these lands, extolling the benefits of joining his empire. He offered gifts of luxury goods like high quality textiles, and promised that all living in those territories would be materially richer as subject rulers of the Inca. Most accepted the rule of the Inca as a fait accompli and acquiesced peacefully. The neighboring rulers' children would be brought to Cuzco to be taught about Inca administration systems, and then would return to rule their native lands. This allowed the Inca to indoctrinate the former rulers' children into the Inca nobility, and, with luck, marry their daughters into families at various corners of the empire. It was traditional for the Inca's son to lead the army; Pachacuti's son Túpac Inca began conquests to the north in 1463, continuing them as Inca after Pachucuti's death in 1471. His most important conquest was the Kingdom of Chimor, the Inca's only serious rival for the coast of Peru. Túpac Inca's empire stretched north into modern day Ecuador and Colombia, and his son Huayna Cápac added significant territory to the south. At its height, Tawantinsuyu included Peru and Bolivia, most of what is now Ecuador, a large portion of modern-day Chile, and extended into corners of Argentina and Colombia. Tawantinsuyu was a patchwork of languages, cultures and peoples. The components of the empire were not all uniformly loyal, nor were the local cultures all fully integrated. For example, the Chimú used money in their commerce, while the Inca empire as a whole had an economy based on exchange and taxation of luxury goods and labor. (It is said that Inca tax collectors would take the head lice of the lame and old as a symbolic tribute.) The portions of the Chachapoya that had been conquered were almost openly hostile to the Inca, and the Inca nobles rejected an offer of refuge in their kingdom after their troubles with the Spanish. They ended up being conquered by Francisco Pizarro.
It was traditional for the Inca's son to lead the army; Pachacuti's son Túpac Inca began conquests to the north in 1463, continuing them as Inca after Pachucuti's death in 1471. His most important conquest was the Kingdom of Chimor, the Inca's only serious rival for the coast of Peru. Túpac Inca's empire stretched north into modern day Ecuador and Colombia, and his son Huayna Cápac added significant territory to the south. At its height, Tawantinsuyu included Peru and Bolivia, most of what is now Ecuador, a large portion of modern-day Chile, and extended into corners of Argentina and Colombia.
Tawantinsuyu was a patchwork of languages, cultures and peoples. The components of the empire were not all uniformly loyal, nor were the local cultures all fully integrated. For example, the Chimú used money in their commerce, while the Inca empire as a whole had an economy based on exchange and taxation of luxury goods and labor. (It is said that Inca tax collectors would take the head lice of the lame and old as a symbolic tribute.) The portions of the Chachapoya that had been conquered were almost openly hostile to the Inca, and the Inca nobles rejected an offer of refuge in their kingdom after their troubles with the Spanish. They ended up being conquered by Francisco Pizarro.
However, Google-translating the much longer Spanish version of the article on Pachacuti, and on his son who was active as military leader under him, "most" doesn't seem justified -- there is plenty of military action described; plus damming rivers upstream from cities; and fooling the enemy with messengers bringing the fake news of a peace agreement, followed by takeover while the enemy foolishly celebrated. *Lunatic*, n. One whose delusions are out of fashion.
The neighboring rulers' children would be brought to Cuzco to be taught about Inca administration systems, and then would return to rule their native lands. This allowed the Inca to indoctrinate the former rulers' children into the Inca nobility, and, with luck, marry their daughters into families at various corners of the empire.
So the Inca had their own School of the Americas too? Just how much bad karma did they acquire in their short reign?
