Founders Bank, Worth, IL Millennium State Bank of Texas, Dallas, TX The First National Bank of Danville, Danville, IL The Elizabeth State Bank, Elizabeth, IL Rock River Bank, Oregon, IL The First State Bank of Winchester, Winchester, IL The John Warner Bank, Clinton, IL
You go, grrl
I am particularly concerned with new owners' ability to support depository institutions with adequate capital, management expertise, and a long term commitment to provide banking services in a safe and sound manner. Obviously, we want to maximize investor interest in failed bank resolutions. On the other hand, we don't want to see these institutions coming back. I remain open minded on many aspects of this proposal, including the categories of investors to whom it should apply, the appropriate level of upfront capital commitments, and the operation of cross guarantee provisions and limits on affiliate transactions. I look forward to receiving comments in these areas. I support the transactions we have completed to date which have involved sales to private equity owners. We have imposed some special restrictions on these, including higher capital requirements. However, some have suggested that capital requirements should be even higher, given the difficulties in enforcing source of strength obligations outside the initial capital investment made by the acquirers in so-called "shell" structures. I know that this will be a contentious area, and we are opening high, with a proposed 15% requirement. I am also troubled by the opacity of some of the ownership structures that we have seen in our bidding process, though these have not been winning bids. We have seen bids where it has been difficult to determine actual ownership. We have seen bidders who have wanted permission to immediately flip ownership interests. We have seen structures organized in the secrecy law jurisdictions. So based on the experiences we have gathered, I think it is prudent to put some generic policies in place which tell non-traditional investors that we welcome their participation, but only if we have essential safeguards to assure that they will approach banking in a way that is transparent, long term, and prudently managed.
I support the transactions we have completed to date which have involved sales to private equity owners. We have imposed some special restrictions on these, including higher capital requirements. However, some have suggested that capital requirements should be even higher, given the difficulties in enforcing source of strength obligations outside the initial capital investment made by the acquirers in so-called "shell" structures. I know that this will be a contentious area, and we are opening high, with a proposed 15% requirement.
I am also troubled by the opacity of some of the ownership structures that we have seen in our bidding process, though these have not been winning bids. We have seen bids where it has been difficult to determine actual ownership. We have seen bidders who have wanted permission to immediately flip ownership interests. We have seen structures organized in the secrecy law jurisdictions. So based on the experiences we have gathered, I think it is prudent to put some generic policies in place which tell non-traditional investors that we welcome their participation, but only if we have essential safeguards to assure that they will approach banking in a way that is transparent, long term, and prudently managed.
ht CR Diversity is the key to economic and political evolution.
The Illinois banks are affiliates of Peotone Bank & Trust Co., in Peotone, Illinois, about 45 miles (72 kilometers) south of Chicago. The failures resulted primarily because of soured loans and losses on investments in collateralized debt obligations, the FDIC said. Illinois, with an unemployment rate above the national average, was one of seven states to begin the fiscal year without a spending plan. "The six failed Illinois banks are all controlled by one family and followed a similar business model that created concentrated exposure in each institution," the FDIC said. CDOs, which packaged bonds and loans into notes of varying risk and yield, lost money as real estate defaults soared.
"The six failed Illinois banks are all controlled by one family and followed a similar business model that created concentrated exposure in each institution," the FDIC said. CDOs, which packaged bonds and loans into notes of varying risk and yield, lost money as real estate defaults soared.
seized on Thursday ... (rather than close of business Friday)
