With underfunded, ill-equipped British troops struggling in Afghanistan, now is the time for European defence co-operationIt wasn't supposed to be like this. Labour's much-praised defence review of 1998 never contemplated an Iraq and an Afghanistan simultaneously. In military language it envisaged one "relatively short war - fighting deployment" and one "enduring non-war-fighting operation". Instead we have had two long hot wars, one of which, Afghanistan, has every sign of "enduring" for a long time to come. Iraq may to all intents and purposes be over, but as the death toll inexorably rises Afghanistan makes the assumptions of 1998 invalid.Commentators now plausibly argue that our defence is in crisis. The personnel are tired and the equipment is worn out. Procurement is in disarray and in its own annual report for 2008 the MOD noted that such was the impact of overstretch that fewer than half of all military units were ready to deploy on operations in an emergency. Only the goodwill and "can-do" attitude of the forces themselves have helped to paper over the cracks. Usually Trappist senior officers have felt compelled to speak out, first in private and then, more recently, in public. Afghanistan has brought all of this to a head. There is still no clearly enunciated strategy to co-ordinate political, economic, military and counter-narcotic policies. There is a continuing shortage of helicopters and armoured vehicles. The enemy has changed his tactics from outright confrontation to roadside bombs which we have been slow to counter.
It wasn't supposed to be like this. Labour's much-praised defence review of 1998 never contemplated an Iraq and an Afghanistan simultaneously. In military language it envisaged one "relatively short war - fighting deployment" and one "enduring non-war-fighting operation". Instead we have had two long hot wars, one of which, Afghanistan, has every sign of "enduring" for a long time to come. Iraq may to all intents and purposes be over, but as the death toll inexorably rises Afghanistan makes the assumptions of 1998 invalid.
Commentators now plausibly argue that our defence is in crisis. The personnel are tired and the equipment is worn out. Procurement is in disarray and in its own annual report for 2008 the MOD noted that such was the impact of overstretch that fewer than half of all military units were ready to deploy on operations in an emergency. Only the goodwill and "can-do" attitude of the forces themselves have helped to paper over the cracks. Usually Trappist senior officers have felt compelled to speak out, first in private and then, more recently, in public. Afghanistan has brought all of this to a head. There is still no clearly enunciated strategy to co-ordinate political, economic, military and counter-narcotic policies. There is a continuing shortage of helicopters and armoured vehicles. The enemy has changed his tactics from outright confrontation to roadside bombs which we have been slow to counter.
