It's important not to understand. It's important not to learn. In the total buggeration into which the world's help for Afghanistan has now descended, it's important not to know too much. Accept that somebody some day may understand, but it isn't going to be you. Somebody some day may grab the Gordian knot and cut it, but it isn't going to be us. Know only that. To know more is to know less. It so happens that my week as Nato/Isaf's guest here in Afghanistan has coincided with some big stories coming out of the country. There are battles; there are kidnappings; there came sad news of the deaths of Lieutenant-Colonel Rupert Thorneloe and Trooper Joshua Hammond. There's a presidential election campaign under way. But my argument is that news like this is a distraction from the underlying story. The battle will ebb and flow. But victory is impossible. I'm here as the guest of the International Security Assistance Force, which sort-of is Nato and sort-of isn't -- and, no, don't try to resolve this: it can't. My Isaf/ Nato hosts are welcoming and helpful; so I've been taking a courteous record of the many briefings by the clever chiefs they've been kind enough to arrange, though the swarms of acronyms began to defeat me. And yesterday I forgot my glasses. As I stared unfocused at my notes the acronyms swam forward, their small-print meanings swam away, and I saw only acronyms.
It's important not to understand. It's important not to learn. In the total buggeration into which the world's help for Afghanistan has now descended, it's important not to know too much. Accept that somebody some day may understand, but it isn't going to be you. Somebody some day may grab the Gordian knot and cut it, but it isn't going to be us. Know only that. To know more is to know less.
It so happens that my week as Nato/Isaf's guest here in Afghanistan has coincided with some big stories coming out of the country. There are battles; there are kidnappings; there came sad news of the deaths of Lieutenant-Colonel Rupert Thorneloe and Trooper Joshua Hammond. There's a presidential election campaign under way. But my argument is that news like this is a distraction from the underlying story. The battle will ebb and flow. But victory is impossible.
I'm here as the guest of the International Security Assistance Force, which sort-of is Nato and sort-of isn't -- and, no, don't try to resolve this: it can't. My Isaf/ Nato hosts are welcoming and helpful; so I've been taking a courteous record of the many briefings by the clever chiefs they've been kind enough to arrange, though the swarms of acronyms began to defeat me. And yesterday I forgot my glasses. As I stared unfocused at my notes the acronyms swam forward, their small-print meanings swam away, and I saw only acronyms.
Obama has committed to building "an Afghan army of 134,000 and a police force of 82,000", and adds that "increases in Afghan forces may very well be needed." US generals have spoken openly about wanting a combined Afghan army-police-security apparatus of 450,000 soldiers (in a country with a population half the size of Britain's). Such a force would cost $2 or $3 billion a year to maintain; the annual revenue of the Afghan government is just $600 million. We criticise developing countries for spending 30 per cent of their budget on defence; we are encouraging Afghanistan to spend 500 per cent of its budget. [....] The new UK strategy for Afghanistan is described as: "International... regional... joint civilian-military... co-ordinated... long-term...focused on developing capacity... an approach that combines respect for sovereignty and local values with respect for international standards of democracy, legitimate and accountable government, and human rights; a hard-headed approach: setting clear and realistic objectives with clear metrics of success." This is not a plan: it is a description of what we have not got. Why do we believe that describing what we do not have should constitute a plan on how to get it? In part, it is because the language is comfortingly opaque. A bewildering range of different logical connections and identities can be concealed in a specialised language derived from development theory and overlaid with management consultancy.
Such a force would cost $2 or $3 billion a year to maintain; the annual revenue of the Afghan government is just $600 million. We criticise developing countries for spending 30 per cent of their budget on defence; we are encouraging Afghanistan to spend 500 per cent of its budget. [....] The new UK strategy for Afghanistan is described as: "International... regional... joint civilian-military... co-ordinated... long-term...focused on developing capacity... an approach that combines respect for sovereignty and local values with respect for international standards of democracy, legitimate and accountable government, and human rights; a hard-headed approach: setting clear and realistic objectives with clear metrics of success."
This is not a plan: it is a description of what we have not got. Why do we believe that describing what we do not have should constitute a plan on how to get it? In part, it is because the language is comfortingly opaque. A bewildering range of different logical connections and identities can be concealed in a specialised language derived from development theory and overlaid with management consultancy.
The conflict in Afghanistan has now claimed the lives of as many British servicemen and women as that in Iraq after the Ministry of Defence announced today that another soldier had been killed. Ten servicemen have died within the last nine days and the casualty rate is as high as at any point since Afghanistan was invaded in 2001 in response to the 9/11 terror attacks on the US. The latest casualty - the third to be announced today - was a soldier from the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment. He was killed in southern Afghanistan, the MoD said. Next of kin have been informed. Officials said the soldier was killed in an explosion during an operation near Nad-e-Ali, in central Helmand province. "The loss of this brave Tankie has hit us all deeply," Lieutenant Colonel Nick Richardson, a spokesman for Task Force Helmand, said. "We grieve for him at this very sad time. Our thoughts and prayers are with his family, friends and colleagues who feel the greatest loss. His loss has not been in vain." The death is likely to intensify the debate about whether the Afghanistan operation is worthwhile.
Ten servicemen have died within the last nine days and the casualty rate is as high as at any point since Afghanistan was invaded in 2001 in response to the 9/11 terror attacks on the US.
The latest casualty - the third to be announced today - was a soldier from the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment. He was killed in southern Afghanistan, the MoD said. Next of kin have been informed.
Officials said the soldier was killed in an explosion during an operation near Nad-e-Ali, in central Helmand province.
"The loss of this brave Tankie has hit us all deeply," Lieutenant Colonel Nick Richardson, a spokesman for Task Force Helmand, said.
"We grieve for him at this very sad time. Our thoughts and prayers are with his family, friends and colleagues who feel the greatest loss. His loss has not been in vain."
The death is likely to intensify the debate about whether the Afghanistan operation is worthwhile.
