America is back where it belongs, snug in the centre of hearts and estimations across the world. Because that was the deal, right? They give us Obama, we (citizens of the rest of the world) stop hating them. Or not.According to a new poll, while Obama is viewed positively in most of the world, global attitudes toward America have barely improved at all.
America is back where it belongs, snug in the centre of hearts and estimations across the world. Because that was the deal, right? They give us Obama, we (citizens of the rest of the world) stop hating them. Or not.
According to a new poll, while Obama is viewed positively in most of the world, global attitudes toward America have barely improved at all.
It's important not to understand. It's important not to learn. In the total buggeration into which the world's help for Afghanistan has now descended, it's important not to know too much. Accept that somebody some day may understand, but it isn't going to be you. Somebody some day may grab the Gordian knot and cut it, but it isn't going to be us. Know only that. To know more is to know less. It so happens that my week as Nato/Isaf's guest here in Afghanistan has coincided with some big stories coming out of the country. There are battles; there are kidnappings; there came sad news of the deaths of Lieutenant-Colonel Rupert Thorneloe and Trooper Joshua Hammond. There's a presidential election campaign under way. But my argument is that news like this is a distraction from the underlying story. The battle will ebb and flow. But victory is impossible. I'm here as the guest of the International Security Assistance Force, which sort-of is Nato and sort-of isn't -- and, no, don't try to resolve this: it can't. My Isaf/ Nato hosts are welcoming and helpful; so I've been taking a courteous record of the many briefings by the clever chiefs they've been kind enough to arrange, though the swarms of acronyms began to defeat me. And yesterday I forgot my glasses. As I stared unfocused at my notes the acronyms swam forward, their small-print meanings swam away, and I saw only acronyms.
It's important not to understand. It's important not to learn. In the total buggeration into which the world's help for Afghanistan has now descended, it's important not to know too much. Accept that somebody some day may understand, but it isn't going to be you. Somebody some day may grab the Gordian knot and cut it, but it isn't going to be us. Know only that. To know more is to know less.
It so happens that my week as Nato/Isaf's guest here in Afghanistan has coincided with some big stories coming out of the country. There are battles; there are kidnappings; there came sad news of the deaths of Lieutenant-Colonel Rupert Thorneloe and Trooper Joshua Hammond. There's a presidential election campaign under way. But my argument is that news like this is a distraction from the underlying story. The battle will ebb and flow. But victory is impossible.
I'm here as the guest of the International Security Assistance Force, which sort-of is Nato and sort-of isn't -- and, no, don't try to resolve this: it can't. My Isaf/ Nato hosts are welcoming and helpful; so I've been taking a courteous record of the many briefings by the clever chiefs they've been kind enough to arrange, though the swarms of acronyms began to defeat me. And yesterday I forgot my glasses. As I stared unfocused at my notes the acronyms swam forward, their small-print meanings swam away, and I saw only acronyms.
Obama has committed to building "an Afghan army of 134,000 and a police force of 82,000", and adds that "increases in Afghan forces may very well be needed." US generals have spoken openly about wanting a combined Afghan army-police-security apparatus of 450,000 soldiers (in a country with a population half the size of Britain's). Such a force would cost $2 or $3 billion a year to maintain; the annual revenue of the Afghan government is just $600 million. We criticise developing countries for spending 30 per cent of their budget on defence; we are encouraging Afghanistan to spend 500 per cent of its budget. [....] The new UK strategy for Afghanistan is described as: "International... regional... joint civilian-military... co-ordinated... long-term...focused on developing capacity... an approach that combines respect for sovereignty and local values with respect for international standards of democracy, legitimate and accountable government, and human rights; a hard-headed approach: setting clear and realistic objectives with clear metrics of success." This is not a plan: it is a description of what we have not got. Why do we believe that describing what we do not have should constitute a plan on how to get it? In part, it is because the language is comfortingly opaque. A bewildering range of different logical connections and identities can be concealed in a specialised language derived from development theory and overlaid with management consultancy.
Such a force would cost $2 or $3 billion a year to maintain; the annual revenue of the Afghan government is just $600 million. We criticise developing countries for spending 30 per cent of their budget on defence; we are encouraging Afghanistan to spend 500 per cent of its budget. [....] The new UK strategy for Afghanistan is described as: "International... regional... joint civilian-military... co-ordinated... long-term...focused on developing capacity... an approach that combines respect for sovereignty and local values with respect for international standards of democracy, legitimate and accountable government, and human rights; a hard-headed approach: setting clear and realistic objectives with clear metrics of success."
This is not a plan: it is a description of what we have not got. Why do we believe that describing what we do not have should constitute a plan on how to get it? In part, it is because the language is comfortingly opaque. A bewildering range of different logical connections and identities can be concealed in a specialised language derived from development theory and overlaid with management consultancy.
The conflict in Afghanistan has now claimed the lives of as many British servicemen and women as that in Iraq after the Ministry of Defence announced today that another soldier had been killed. Ten servicemen have died within the last nine days and the casualty rate is as high as at any point since Afghanistan was invaded in 2001 in response to the 9/11 terror attacks on the US. The latest casualty - the third to be announced today - was a soldier from the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment. He was killed in southern Afghanistan, the MoD said. Next of kin have been informed. Officials said the soldier was killed in an explosion during an operation near Nad-e-Ali, in central Helmand province. "The loss of this brave Tankie has hit us all deeply," Lieutenant Colonel Nick Richardson, a spokesman for Task Force Helmand, said. "We grieve for him at this very sad time. Our thoughts and prayers are with his family, friends and colleagues who feel the greatest loss. His loss has not been in vain." The death is likely to intensify the debate about whether the Afghanistan operation is worthwhile.
Ten servicemen have died within the last nine days and the casualty rate is as high as at any point since Afghanistan was invaded in 2001 in response to the 9/11 terror attacks on the US.
The latest casualty - the third to be announced today - was a soldier from the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment. He was killed in southern Afghanistan, the MoD said. Next of kin have been informed.
Officials said the soldier was killed in an explosion during an operation near Nad-e-Ali, in central Helmand province.
"The loss of this brave Tankie has hit us all deeply," Lieutenant Colonel Nick Richardson, a spokesman for Task Force Helmand, said.
"We grieve for him at this very sad time. Our thoughts and prayers are with his family, friends and colleagues who feel the greatest loss. His loss has not been in vain."
The death is likely to intensify the debate about whether the Afghanistan operation is worthwhile.
The coup in the small Central American nation of Honduras reveals the deep divisions in the region. The triumphal march of the leftist followers of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has provoked the established elites. The knee-jerk reaction in Honduras has been, yet again, to stage a coup. The border region between Honduras and Nicaragua has a history of suffering. In the 1980s, the US-backed Contra rebels were deployed in the jungle here to bring down Nicaragua's leftist Sandinista government. Occasionally, farmers still set off old land mines in the green hills near the El Espino border crossing. Click on a picture to launch the image gallery (11 Photos) And now it appears that the war has returned. Just past the barrier on the Nicaraguan side, travelers face the gun barrels of young soldiers who have taken control of the border crossings in Honduras. Soldiers are also posted along the road to Tegucigalpa, the capital of this small Central American country. The disputed government imposed a nighttime curfew and blocked foreign television broadcasts right after seizing power on June 28. In San Marcos de Colón, a town near the Nicaraguan border, very few people are willing to discuss the sense political situation. "We don't know anything about politics," say three residents standing in the town's picturesque plaza. But Marcos Rojas, the deputy mayor, who is sitting on the steps in front of the town hall, says quietly, after looking around to see if anyone is listening: "We want our president back. But most people here are afraid of the soldiers."
The coup in the small Central American nation of Honduras reveals the deep divisions in the region. The triumphal march of the leftist followers of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has provoked the established elites. The knee-jerk reaction in Honduras has been, yet again, to stage a coup.
The border region between Honduras and Nicaragua has a history of suffering. In the 1980s, the US-backed Contra rebels were deployed in the jungle here to bring down Nicaragua's leftist Sandinista government. Occasionally, farmers still set off old land mines in the green hills near the El Espino border crossing.
Click on a picture to launch the image gallery (11 Photos) And now it appears that the war has returned. Just past the barrier on the Nicaraguan side, travelers face the gun barrels of young soldiers who have taken control of the border crossings in Honduras. Soldiers are also posted along the road to Tegucigalpa, the capital of this small Central American country. The disputed government imposed a nighttime curfew and blocked foreign television broadcasts right after seizing power on June 28.
In San Marcos de Colón, a town near the Nicaraguan border, very few people are willing to discuss the sense political situation. "We don't know anything about politics," say three residents standing in the town's picturesque plaza. But Marcos Rojas, the deputy mayor, who is sitting on the steps in front of the town hall, says quietly, after looking around to see if anyone is listening: "We want our president back. But most people here are afraid of the soldiers."
After a mass killing of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Taliban prisoners of war by the forces of an American-backed warlord during the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, Bush administration officials repeatedly discouraged efforts to investigate the episode, according to government officials and human rights organizations. American officials had been reluctant to pursue an investigation -- sought by officials from the F.B.I., the State Department, the Red Cross and human rights groups -- because the warlord, Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, was on the payroll of the C.I.A. and his militia worked closely with United States Special Forces in 2001, several officials said... While the deaths have been previously reported, the back story of the frustrated efforts to investigate them has not been fully told. The killings occurred in late November 2001, just days after the American-led invasion forced the ouster of the Taliban government in Kabul. Thousands of Taliban fighters surrendered to General Dostum's forces... Survivors and witnesses told The New York Times and Newsweek in 2002 that, over a three-day period, Taliban prisoners were stuffed into closed metal shipping containers and given no food or water; many suffocated while being trucked to the prison. Other prisoners were killed when guards shot into the containers. The bodies were said to have been buried in a mass grave in Dasht-i-Laili, a stretch of desert just outside Shibarghan... Separately, 10 or so prisoners brought from Afghanistan reported that they had been "stacked like cordwood" in shipping containers and had to lick the perspiration off one another to survive... The Pentagon, however, showed little interest in the matter... Another former defense official, who would speak only on condition of anonymity, recalled that the prisoner deaths came up in a conversation with Paul D. Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of defense at the time, in early 2003. "Somebody mentioned Dostum and the story about the containers and the possibility that this was a war crime," the official said. "And Wolfowitz said we are not going to be going after him for that." ... As evidence mounted about the deaths, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell assigned Mr. Prosper, the United States ambassador at large for war crimes, to look into them in 2002. He met with General Dostum, who denied the allegations, Mr. Prosper recalled. Meanwhile, Karzai government officials told him that they opposed any investigation... Mr. Prosper said that because of the resistance from American and Afghan officials, his office dropped its inquiry.
American officials had been reluctant to pursue an investigation -- sought by officials from the F.B.I., the State Department, the Red Cross and human rights groups -- because the warlord, Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, was on the payroll of the C.I.A. and his militia worked closely with United States Special Forces in 2001, several officials said...
While the deaths have been previously reported, the back story of the frustrated efforts to investigate them has not been fully told. The killings occurred in late November 2001, just days after the American-led invasion forced the ouster of the Taliban government in Kabul. Thousands of Taliban fighters surrendered to General Dostum's forces...
Survivors and witnesses told The New York Times and Newsweek in 2002 that, over a three-day period, Taliban prisoners were stuffed into closed metal shipping containers and given no food or water; many suffocated while being trucked to the prison. Other prisoners were killed when guards shot into the containers. The bodies were said to have been buried in a mass grave in Dasht-i-Laili, a stretch of desert just outside Shibarghan...
Separately, 10 or so prisoners brought from Afghanistan reported that they had been "stacked like cordwood" in shipping containers and had to lick the perspiration off one another to survive...
The Pentagon, however, showed little interest in the matter...
Another former defense official, who would speak only on condition of anonymity, recalled that the prisoner deaths came up in a conversation with Paul D. Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of defense at the time, in early 2003.
"Somebody mentioned Dostum and the story about the containers and the possibility that this was a war crime," the official said. "And Wolfowitz said we are not going to be going after him for that."
...
As evidence mounted about the deaths, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell assigned Mr. Prosper, the United States ambassador at large for war crimes, to look into them in 2002. He met with General Dostum, who denied the allegations, Mr. Prosper recalled. Meanwhile, Karzai government officials told him that they opposed any investigation...
Mr. Prosper said that because of the resistance from American and Afghan officials, his office dropped its inquiry.
And what will happen ... ? {crickets} keep to the Fen Causeway
From your point of view, is that the right position to take? That this must be the essence of a settlement - a compromise deep into the Golan Heights? That even in peace we must ensure that a large part of the Golan Heights remain in our hands? Yes Why? For strategic, military and land-settlement reasons. Needs of water, wine and view.
Yes
Why?
For strategic, military and land-settlement reasons. Needs of water, wine and view.
